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Saturday, 29 August 2026

I Read Plotinus' The Enneads So You Don't Have To (Neoplatonism)

I Read Plotinus' The Enneads So You Don't Have To (Neoplatonism)

PLEASE NOTE: 2026 is my eleventh consecutive year of analysing a book of scripture central to a religion. Before The Enneads, I swallowed the teachings of The Quran (Islam —2016), The Satanic Bible (LaVeyan Satanism —2017), Dianetics (Scientology —2018), The Bible (Christianity —2019), The Book Of The Law (Thelema —2020), the Tao Te Ching (Taoism —2021), The Corpus Hermeticum (Hermeticism —2022), and The Secret Doctrine (Theosophy —2023), The Kitáb-i-Aqdas (Baháʼí Faith, 2024), and The Gospel of the Flying Spaghetti Monster/The God Delusion (Pastafarianism/Atheism —2025). Check them all out, and you will be different for it.

I could've sworn I once came across a meme where that astronaut is viewing the planet Earth, saying, "Wait, it was Neoplatonism all along?" and the other astronaut behind him with a gun responds, "Always has been". Did I imagine that? If so, maybe I should make it. Or, even better, would be a Venn diagram where each mainstream religion expands into their respective mystical sects while literally every single circle crosses over into Neoplatonism sitting in the central spot. Because, truly, one cannot underestimate the effect this philosophy has had on the entirety of spiritual thought. Yet, in so many ways, it remains more advanced than the lot.

Let us rewind. How did it come to this? Who was involved? And just who do I think I am to make such bold sweeping claims? I can answer that last question the easiest. My name is Jared Woods. Every year I read a scripture central to a religion. And those bold Neoplatonic claims are hardly mine. If you know, you know, and by the end of this essay, you will know. Oh yes, you will know.

Jesus Was a Shapeshifting Alien
One glance at the name Neoplatonism, and a key figure will leap immediately to your attention. Plato! A Greek philosopher who was born and died in Athens (428/7 — 348/7 BC) but between those dates, went ahead and influenced the entirety of Western thought (and beyond). Indeed, he remains arguably the most important thinker in the history of the world, owing to his writings and to the writings of others based on him. For one massive example, Neoplatonism and Plotinus.

Now, I am not going to sit here and pretend I'm an expert in Plato. In one regard, I'm not, and I hate that. But from another regard, I probably have a pretty solid grasp on him after all, simply because of our topic at hand. So much of Plato buzzes loudly in Neoplatonism, and while I'm sure scholars would scoff as they highlight the differences, Plotinus himself would disagree. Indeed, it is suggested that Plotinus would've loathed the Neoplatonic terminology we use today. As far as he was concerned, he understood Plato properly. He considered his teachings to be authentic and accurate interpretations of Platonism and, in that way, no different of a category from what was already taught. But, of course, it was different, now appreciated as an unexplored expansion on the original, and as a result, a whole new name for a whole new thing. 

Of course, everything is built on something, and, aside from Plato, there is another philosopher, Ammonius Saccas, who deserves major credit as a Neoplatonic precursor and founder. Most importantly, he was Plotinus' teacher. Nevertheless, it was Plotinus who single-handedly penned the foundational texts of this philosophy in the collection known as The Six Enneads, which we are gradually edging towards.

Alrightie, but what makes Plotinus so special? I mean, even if you don't know the first thing about Plato, he is a household name, whereas ask someone about Plotinus and you'd be lucky to get a shrug in return. Well, let's change that. Plotinus was another ancient Greek philosopher, born and raised in Roman Egypt around 204/5 AD, dying in Roman Campania 270 AD. If there were a prophet of this Neoplatonic "religion", it would be him. What's more, there are several stories about the man that deserve to be common knowledge, and damn it, I am going to do my part in spreading them right now.

Like every prophetic figure, Plotinus is said to have supernatural abilities. Some of his superior skills were so commonplace that they border on boring. He once demonstrated his clairvoyant capacity when he accurately pointed out a servant, saying, "He is the thief", after which the servant readily confessed to stealing a necklace. Another ancient report claimed that when Plotinus gave lectures, his face was known to physically shine from its intelligence. However, the favourite story of most researchers is the one in which an Egyptian Priest came to Rome, where Plotinus was teaching. This Priest had powers of his own, and he was eager to flaunt them before the famed superhuman Plotinus. Intrigued, Plotinus agreed to see them. This Priest proceeded to perform his main party trick: summoning an individual's guardian spirit into the material realm. However, upon attempting this magic, the Priest was shocked to discover that Plotinus did not have a spirit residing over him, but instead, a god. The Egyptian immediately dropped, gasping, "Blessed are you who have a god for a spirit and not a companion of the subordinate order!"

Are we to believe these stories? Who is the source? That would be Porphyry of Tyre, a student of Plotinus and a renowned Neoplatonic philosopher in his own right. Porphyry wrote many works, but he will forever be remembered for his connection to our hero, not only for having written the "Life of Plotinus" biography, but, even more notably, for standing as the compiler, editor, and publisher of the Enneads, the only collection of Plotinus' work we know about. Apparently this was no easy task for Porphyry, as Plotinus notoriously had atrocious handwriting, spelling, and disregard for grammar. As a result, there is some discussion about the extent of Porphyry's influence on the final product. Still, it is my understanding that the content itself was changed very little (because, let's be honest, how can a small fry improve on a big potato). Nevertheless, one massive contribution Porphyry made was the organisation, in which 54 treaties were grouped and ordered by like-minded categorisation rather than chronologically. I'm sure there are scholarly opinions on his ultimate choices, but in the end, it seems he did a pretty good job. Thanks, Porphyry.

Of course, none of this helps in the slightest because it's all Greek to us. Literally, it's written in Ancient Greek. And that is why we owe everything to translators. Now, I'll be honest about this: I ordered my Enneads hardcopy online, and what arrived, arrived. It was Stephen MacKenna's English translation, and while there are only a handful of alternative options out there, I recognise that readers have their preferences. Some swear by Thomas Taylor, while others consider him too complicated. Lloyd P. Gerson appears to be the gold-standard fan favourite, but others argue it lacks the poetics. Meanwhile, Stephen MacKenna seems to be generally enjoyed for his balance of philosophical faithfulness and flourish, even if he has a reputation for being somewhat interpretive in difficult verses. My version was further revised by B. S. Page, which I can only hope is a good thing. On a final note, imagine my horror when someone on Reddit claimed MacKenna's version was abridged! However, after further investigation, I can confirm that my 635-page copy was complete in every way. Whew!

Still, sitting down to read a book of this size is always an ugh, especially when the first thing you run into is 51 pages of introduction (written by Professor E. R. Dodds and Professor Paul Henry, S. J.). My initial reaction was that any book requiring that much of a preface is going to be a disaster, but on the contrary, I am so grateful my version had this to ease me in! It helped.

Regardless, translation can only achieve so much, and the source material still rings louder than any package you can put it in. Make no mistake, this is some tricky material, but if there ever was a mark of a true genius, it's not their advanced musings but their ability to explain their complexities to laypeople. I've read my fair share of "holy books", and boy, Neoplatonism was a challenge! Still, so much of it was far more understandable than one could dare hope, which is rare in this circle of esoterica. Again, I thank Plotinus, and yes, I thank MacKenna for getting me to where I am today.

Great! I love talking about history and translations, but sooner or later, I am going to have to answer the main question: what does the Enneads even say? What is Neoplatonism all about? Whew, ok. I'll explain it to you as best I can. Luckily, my best is pretty good.

The Gospel of Christ
Now, one's natural instinct is to tackle this ideology from the ground up, but I have decided to take the opposite route and first decipher Neoplatonism through its influences. Hopefully, such an approach provides some sense of familiarity while further demonstrating just how influential this text was.

First up, let's look at Kabbalah, the most famous branch of Jewish mysticism. I don't feel I am oversimplifying by claiming the most iconic visual representation of this school is the Tree of Life. Have you seen it? It's a diagram that maps out the paths and stages of a transcendent, absolute, indescribable God (in what's called the Keter), which gradually imposes limitations on itself until it reaches the material reality in which we humans exist (in what's called the Malkhut). As we are about to see, this later Kabbalistic creation owes a lot what Neoplatonism had invented almost a millennium earlier, at its most foundational level.

If one were to describe Neoplatonism in a sentence, it would be this: our material realm is not the true reality, and instead, is built within the collective Soul connected to the Intellectual Realm (Nous), which itself comes from The One (a term we could assign as the "God" of the philosophy). This is a far simpler 1-2-3-4 trajectory in comparison to Kabbalah's many roads and base points, but that is exactly why I prefer what Plotinus has achieved here: it's a streamlined version of the secrets of the Universe, which any philosophy can add to, yet would find it far tougher to remove anything from it.

The next logical step would be for me to describe each Neoplatonic stage individually, even though I am probably not the most confident person to do so. While I have made profound connections to each stage of the process, I am certain that my touristic Neoplatonic interpretations are personal and based on preconceived ideas drawn from an array of other scriptures. More seasoned devotees may nitpick at my gaps until my whole sweater comes apart, but here I go anyway.

Step One: The One


The One is hardly something I've struggled with. Not only is Plotinus' choice of title perfectly suited to my understanding, but it's also a definition of God that is more common across religious ideas than it is uncommon. If you've ever read anything I've written, you'll know that I am a Pantheist to my bone marrow, so much so that explaining what a Pantheist is for the thousandth time bores me beyond any effort. Still, what's crucial to note is that Plotinus did not believe Neoplatonism was Pantheistic, and so we are already arguing at the starting line.

Simply put, Pantheism holds that the totality of everything is divine, which we can equate with God if we can shed the baggage of terminology. The Universe, so to speak, is a singular organism, so to speak, is God, so to speak. So if you climb up the systems, climb up up up, from the molecular system to the respiratory system to the ecosystem to the solar system... eventually, even at infinity, you will hit the overarching complete system system. And that, to Pantheists like me, is God. Some will say God is beyond even that in what is known as Panentheism, and good for them, but that is hypothetical. What we know for scientific certainty is that an utmost Universal system exists somewhere, and so there is little supposition about it, even if the details remain unknown.

Plotinus disagreed with this God. He saw Cosmic manifestations as physical, whereas The One is beyond the material (or perhaps better said as underlying the material as the absolute source of it). I disagree with his disagreement. Just like the Dao of Daoism or the Brahman of Hinduism, I see the physical world to be of little relation. Pantheism is a word that applies to the absolute encompassing of EVERYTHING in existence, be it the electron, be it the Milky Way, be it whatever metaphysical code is running the show in the background. If Plotinus or anyone has some preconceived idea of Pantheism, that's their problem. But when I am talking about the undiluted 100% perfect collection of EVERYTHING, the Neoplatonic concept of The One fits perfectly.

The One is also synonymous with The Good, which is something I will explore in greater detail later.

Step Two: The Nous


The next stage is where things get a little thornier, to the point that I initially rejected it as unnecessary. Yet after reading the book, I have warmed up to or even somewhat accepted some of its proposals. The Intellectual Realm (as McKenna translated it) or the Nous (as I far prefer—remember this going forward!!!!) is more difficult to describe in its abstractions, and my understanding of it has changed throughout, even adjusting right near the end.

Again, I can only emphasise that this is my perspective. Still, based on a mix of various theologies (including Kabbalah), I have come to understand that the Nous is the initial step away from The One, whereby limitations were placed on The One in order to evolve. In the process, it created self-contemplation, leading to "thought". How? Because The One, as absolute unification, could not contemplate anything within itself, for there were no distinct components to explore. Thought by its very nature requires some form of duality, because there is (a) the thinker, and (b) the thing being thought about. In a way, it goes back to the age-old discussion: can we understand cold without hot? Happiness without sadness? Or is it the very differentiation between things that gives them their qualities? Simply put: for anything to exist, it requires context. Hence, for any one thought to function, it would require an opposing thought in comparison. Everything demands a contrasting launching point to exist, and that is how multiplicity was born.

For Plotinus, this level is mind itself, which is to say that the very act of thinking is self-sustainable and persists even if every brain died. I don't necessarily believe that. In fact, not so long ago I'd actively reject this. It was my perspective that "mind" was merely the life electricity (soul) that powered the brain, and, like any organ, it served a specific function: in this case, creating a sense of awareness and contemplation. It appeared egotistical to me that humans would consider "thought" or "consciousness" the apex of awareness. Even if such a bridge between God and us could exist, this would certainly not suffice. Surely to reach the Highest Power, it would require something unfathomable that we've never experienced. I may still feel this way.

Nevertheless, I fear a mix of translation shortcomings and ancient terminology may have left everyone behind at once. While my previous description of the Nous would still apply to many people's definitions, Plotinus has a slightly different take on its substance. Primarily, he claims the Nous contains what is known as Forms or Perfect Images. Here, every single thing exists as a metaphysical blueprint; the archetype of whatever we have in our reality, an unseeable version which is in complete harmony with itself and everything else. There are billions of humans on the planet, but in the Nous there is the Perfect Human. Same goes for horses, same goes for apples. Same goes for justice, same goes for numbers. Why? How? Because the Nous is attempting to replicate The One's model essence. But, of course, the Nous is unable to do so because it is a central thinking entity with multiple things to think about, meaning complete unification is unattainable, and therefore, infinite Perfect Images appear. Digest that in whatever way makes you feel comfortable.

Step Three: The Soul


From this, the next level spawns: the World Soul, which, in itself, is split into two additional states, as the higher and lower. The higher is what communicates with the Nous, while the lower feeds into nature, which spins the material world into existence. Of course, the Enneads dives into this using more detail than I could fit into any reasonable word count, but what fascinated me was its connection to the Observer Effect, found not here but in quantum mechanics. The idea that perception creates the reality around us has not only been foundational to my education (and the entire field of Quantum Mysticism) but also works in the Neoplatonic context, even if they were a millennium and a half apart. For the Nous to think things into existence from such an elemental, godly class would explain everything, the entirety of our reality based on the vibration of thought alone. Not that I completely agree, mind you. But I don't disagree either, and it's certainly worth... a thought.

Step Four: The Material


As for the lower soul, that is the saggy bottom bits which are trapped in the material world, and that is precisely what we have to work with. Indeed, we each carry our own little souls, as so many dogmas tell us. However, the problem is that our minds are caught up in the immediate physical manifestation, facing the wrong direction, thinking this is what life is and feeling godawful about it. Well, hopefully it helps to realise (much like what is taught in Dharmic religions about the Maya) that this physical reality is the least real reality. Our world is the furthest emanation from God, the most distant place from the ultimate Good, and, while not exactly evil (something we will detail later), it remains the most illusory position in our narrative.

That noted, and just like Kabbalah, this road map leading down from The One to us can be reversed as the same path to follow upwards to liberation. And thankfully, unlike Kabbalah, the Neoplatonic way is a far easier journey to take.

So here we go! Let's return to God!

That Lamb Prophecy

From the starting line, one of the most rewarding aspects of Neoplatonism is how much it deals with the personal soul. At times, I sensed I was getting to know a different part of myself, and who knows what effect this will have on my evolution moving forward. I am willing to bet a lot.

So once you find yourself sitting in this lower soul, what is the first rung on the ladder to climb up? Probably something weird, like signing away your life to God or sprinkling blood around a candle, right? Wrong. Perhaps the main reason to appreciate ancient Greek philosophy is its striving for rationality. These teachers were primarily concerned with being convincing while standing strong against debate. While scriptures of other religions depend on their self-proclaimed circular authority (the Bible is holy because the Bible says the Bible is holy because the Bible says...), it was the badge of Greek thinkers' honour to offer not only logical reasoning but also practical guidance we can employ right away.

Arguably the simplest and yet most profound Neoplatonic instruction is this: turn to face the Beauty. If you know your Islamic studies (especially Sufism), you will see a connection there. In every waking moment of life and in every decision you make, you must not spend time looking at things that resonate negatively. Instead, actively shift your focus to stuff that makes your tummy-tum feel goodie-good. If you know your New Age studies, you will see a connection there, too. And while it all may seem obvious upon first glance, Plotinus' reasoning goes waaaay deeper.

Beauty is about harmony. When you perceive something as beautiful, it is because its assorted components have lined up perfectly. Your soul also comes from a perfect place, so these are familiar substances recognising themselves in one another. That said, Plotinus' stance on Beauty as an objective quality is not something I agree with. For example, in the wide spectrum of art, now more than ever, we as individuals may find Beauty in different presentations. Our tastes of Beauty can even contradict one another. However, I do not think that negates this third-century philosophy. Rather, it updates it slightly to identify some individualism in the soul. If you feel that is incongruent to the Neoplatonic teaching, honestly, I don't care. It makes complete sense to me.

Nevertheless, there are additional factors at play. The One goes by many names, and the most self-explanatory you'll find in this book is The Good. I recall my lengthy romance with Hermeticism, in which it laid out the identical claim (with Neoplatonism and Hermeticism so similar that it's often easier to highlight their likeness over their differences). At the time, I wholeheartedly disagreed with the concept. If The One is all-encompassing, then the balanced system of Good and Evil must be a part of that! I know this to be true! And yet, somehow, the Enneads convinced me that this may not quite be the case, and while I am still finding my footing in all of that, I am reluctantly tiptoeing back on my previous conviction.

The way I (might) see it now is that there is such a thing as a default condition. For example, health. Maybe we tend to think the opposite of health is illness, but that is not the case. Illness is a spectrum that moves away from health to varying degrees, but it's certainly in the wrong direction, marking the absence of what should be. This is arguably applicable to light and darkness too, or whatever else you like. In the case of The One, the perfect unification, the idea that it is wholly Good is not difficult to comprehend, with each emanation away from it a slightly unhealthier version of that Good. So when we arrive at Matter, it's not that we are existing in an evil manifestation, but instead, just the furthest realm away from the Good as you can get. That said, there is Good News, as our lower souls are just a skip away from our higher souls, and that is a first step towards the ultimate Good, the ultimate God, the ultimate One.

Whether you believe this or not is up to you, and as I've noted, it's up to me too. I don't actually know my stance yet. However, the fact remains that it really helps to shift your perspective this way, so you might as well.

Moving on up, and much like facing Beauty, the best way to God is through living a virtuous life, so says Neoplatonism and so says pretty much every religious instruction on the planet. As you'd expect, honourable action purifies the soul, allowing it to reach a higher state and edge closer to the Nous. Practice this enough, and it will become automatic, and before you know it, your insides will too blossom into Beauty.

This led me to something brand new within myself: curating wholesomeness as a spiritual currency. I am sure Plotinus would have something to say about my conclusions, but in my defence, I recently read another book about West African voodoo, and a relation presented itself. When we talk about affecting the Universe through prayer or ritual (a practice Plotinus endorses), this is an exchange of energy. Hence, if your energy is pure, wholesome, virtuous, and beautiful, then what you can offer is of greater worth.

Within this thought, I experienced a slow-burning epiphany that has never left, blessing me with another way to define the indefinable God: alignment. God is intangible. Anyone who tries to explain what God is, is wrong. However, from a functional self-perspective standpoint, we can find God in that place where the soul purrs. The best way to communicate with the ultimate harmony of The One is to locate the state of harmony inside of ourselves. This alone is enough of an indication that you are on your way upward. Alignment. That is what God is in functional terms.

It goes without saying that people can only explain so much, and what may appear like basic notions to some would be earth-shattering when genuinely experienced by others. Those ideas about facing Beauty, about preserving wholesomeness, about defining God with alignment... they changed my life for the better forever.

Cool! Cool! That's cool! But if you can handle it, we can take this even further.

Jesus Was a Shapeshifting Alien
Again, The One is aptly named as the unification of an indivisible everything. It's One Thing. From there, its "perfection overflowed" (Plotinus' wording) into a thinking essence, the Nous. Now we have diversity, but it is still under one umbrella: the Nous. On this goes: the world soul, the higher soul, the lower soul, nature, the material world, YOU, but everything still exists as part of a fundamental singular reality without authentic difference. Again, this is Pantheistic. And, again, this can be found in some Sufi interpretations. I've already had earthquake epiphanies in this school, especially in resolving the paradox of having a single point of view (through my eyes!) yet not seeing myself as a separate individual. (FYI: the solution is to pit these two states against one another, using the contrast to emphasise their positions. Feel free to ignore that though, it's a different system altogether).

BUT... but, Neoplatonism pushed this beyond what my feeble mind could handle. Look at a stranger and realise you're expressions of the same entity and therefore not separate? Fine, I can find my place in that. But what tumbled me over the cliff was looking at that stranger and becoming the stranger looking at you, realising that by simply seeing them, you are also seeing yourself, the observer and the observed. Everything you perceive, be it a tree or a dog or a chair, should not only be registered as you looking at another thing or even looking at yourself, but perceiving yourself from the thing you're looking at as you are looking at yourself in return. As I write this, I realise how difficult it is to spell out, and I don't know how this will land for you, if it at all. But just know that my entire brain spun around in my skull.

Now, if you want to get really nauseous, it's that the entirety of the Universe exists in that exchange. The One is The One. It does not split down, and therefore there is not the tiniest speck of absolutely anything that does not contain absolutely everything in itself. Even within the smallest atom, lives the entirety of the Universe's soul because it cannot be broken apart by the very character of The One. I'm still sinking into that idea, but I am sure that when it finally clicks, I will vanish completely.

What's fascinating is how hugely foundational this proposal was to the early Christian school of thought. I read that some Christian philosophers were really struggling to settle the notion that God was omnipresent and irreducible, but upon reading Neoplatonic assertions, they found the basis they needed to ultimately build upon. God (The One) is fully in everything, no arguments, sorted. What's more, this is only one of the suggestions that permeates Christianity today. That religion was enormously influenced by Neoplatonic philosophy if you're keen to dig deeper for homework.

On a side (completely irrelevant) note: for much of my time reading the Enneads, I was also deep-diving into the Old Testament. What is so crazy to me is how this Judeo-Christian scripture still dominates the world and yet Neoplatonism has become a footnote. During the exact same period of this Neoplatonic writing, Christianity was exploding across Rome, and yet it's unfathomable how much more advanced Plotinus' words were compared to the so-called "Word of God". Ancient Hebrew philosophy was a fairy tale that has dated badly, losing much of its coherence in our contemporary world. And yet Neoplatonism (and a ton of early Greek philosophy) remains light-years ahead, even now, with philosophy students still studying Greek works, angrily debating one another, trying to work it all out. Let's imagine these ideas were the foundation of modern religious ethics rather than some vengeful jealous God personification? Then again, we have to admit that the simpler the story, the easier it penetrates average minds, and that was the greatest trick Yahweh ever played.

Nevertheless, we are here now, and I am grateful to be where I am. The Enneads were absolutely life-changing for me. From a personal perspective, I place its effect on par with (or even above) the Tao Te Ching as something so tangibly rewarding because it shifted my perspective in a wholly practical manner. Then again, I can also unfavourably compare it to Theosophy's central text The Secret Doctrine because it was anything but an easy read. It took me two years to complete this study, and it's debatable how much actually went in. There were days when I struggled to get through one page. If I read the Enneads a second time, I know so much more would be revealed. But who has time for that?

And therein we expose a massive flaw in my entire "read a new scripture every year" mission. These books are not designed to be devoured cover-to-cover. They are to be studied, which I do not do, my relationship ending when I turn the final page. In my defence, however, my ambition is not to specialise. I wish only to subtly train my mind to see through reality, staring at the godly mechanics behind it, and the role of Neoplatonism in this quest cannot be overstated. It has done so much for me, probably more than I even realise just yet, tightening unnoticed cogs below the big wow moments of which there were several. It yanked me forward. More than most scripture. More than any, even.

So I raise a glass to Plotinus, who may not be historically recognised as a prophet, but by every single measurement, should be. And that's what makes the Enneads so special. Your scripture was written by... who? The Old Testament by? The Gospels? Certainly not penned by Jesus. Then again, the Quran? The Tao Te Ching? The Corpus Hermetica? This category is of superior quality because, by their self-proclaimed single point of authorship, you are reading the words right from the mind of divinely chosen individuals. The Enneads is one of those. And even when considering the countless religions Neoplatonism has influenced, it remains more powerful than they are, for it is undiluted by ritual traditions and afterlife threats. Plotinus is the real deal.

Hence why I am perpetually tickled by atheists who base their entire personality on some "scientific" stance, smugly announcing that God does not exist as if they speak from a pedestal of higher smarts. They wouldn't last five minutes in Plotinus' world. Put any one of them in a debate with this third-century philosopher, and he would. Eat. Them. Alive. I doubt I've met an atheist who could argue against or even understand these ancient texts in the slightest. Because, when you really do your homework, the most significant geniuses in history believed in God and could explain their reasoning with complete rationality (even if their definitions fall far away from Biblical interpretation, granted). Furthermore, Plotinus is probably the smartest dude I've ever read. He blew me to pieces, both intellectually and spiritually, while proving that these two words are deeply connected.

The Enneads achieved something just short of impossible: explaining an unexplainable power. Thanks to this book, my experience has surged forward, and I will never be the same again.
Ok, so that's my analysis done! Next up, as customary, the rest of this piece will feature extracts from the Enneads, complete with my two cents on each.

It's also important to admit that putting this together was a struggle because my notes made little sense out of context. At times, I wasn't even sure what I was getting at. So there is a chance that, in the written moments, some misinterpretations came through, but without associated memories, it's difficult for me to correct them. I did my best!

I have copied and pasted the Ennead text from this online source, so you can read the entire book there if you're insane like me. However, I must note minor discrepancies between this version and my print, which I assume is where B. S Page's revisions came in.

Additional mad love to Philosopher Muse on YouTube, whose series on the first Ennead was essential to my understanding. I cry that he did not finish the rest. Hopefully he sees this, and it encourages him?

Finally, don't forget to check out my own spiritual philosophy, Janthopoyism!

Enough! Ready? Please forgive any rushed speling erors, and let's goooo!

Janthopoyism: Your New Religion


The First Ennead.

Tractate 1.1. The Animate and the Man

Starting off with the basics, this chapter talks about the nature of the soul as the real self, and the physical matter of the body. In Neoplatonism, thinking comes from the soul, which is also which keeps us alive like electricity. I agree with this standard idea. You may also come across the term "the Animate" which just means an alive creature.

1.1.1. Pleasure and distress, fear and courage, desire and aversion, where have these affections and experiences their seat?

Clearly, either in the Soul alone, or in the Soul as employing the body, or in some third entity deriving from both. And for this third entity, again, there are two possible modes: it might be either a blend or a distinct form due to the blending.

And what applies to the affections applies also to whatsoever acts, physical or mental, spring from them.

We have, therefore, to examine discursive-reason and the ordinary mental action upon objects of sense, and enquire whether these have the one seat with the affections and experiences, or perhaps sometimes the one seat, sometimes another.

And we must consider also our acts of Intellection, their mode and their seat.

And this very examining principle, which investigates and decides in these matters, must be brought to light.

Firstly, what is the seat of Sense-Perception? This is the obvious beginning since the affections and experiences either are sensations of some kind or at least never occur apart from sensation.

The first verse in full. Coming out swinging, already asking huge questions I’d never considered. The seat is a good term for it. Where these emotions exist.

1.1.2. If this be so, then, indeed, we may think of the Soul as an immortal—if the immortal, the imperishable, must be impassive, giving out something of itself but itself taking nothing from without except for what it receives from the Existents prior to itself from which Existents, in that they are the nobler, it cannot be sundered.

Now what could bring fear to a nature thus unreceptive of all the outer? Fear demands feeling. Nor is there place for courage: courage implies the presence of danger. And such desires as are satisfied by the filling or voiding of the body, must be proper to something very different from the Soul, to that only which admits of replenishment and voidance.

And how could the Soul lend itself to any admixture? An essential is not mixed. Or of the intrusion of anything alien? If it did, it would be seeking the destruction of its own nature. Pain must be equally far from it. And Grief—how or for what could it grieve? Whatever possesses Existence is supremely free, dwelling, unchangeable, within its own peculiar nature. And can any increase bring joy, where nothing, not even anything good, can accrue? What such an Existent is, it is unchangeably.

At this early stage, I really had no idea what to note and what not to as I found my footing. According to my notes, I interpreted this verse to be about a personal soul vs. the collective soul, where the immortal soul inherits or collects data from the personal. It also questions why bad emotions exist, because such a turmoil would indicate the soul’s nature is keen on destroying itself. It’s a lot to take so early on, but all of this will be addressed plenty more times as we go on.

1.1.3. We may treat of the Soul as in the body—whether it be set above it or actually within it—since the association of the two constitutes the one thing called the living organism, the Animate.
[...]

It may be objected that the Soul must however, have Sense-Perception since its use of its instrument must acquaint it with the external conditions, and such knowledge comes by way of sense. Thus, it will be argued, the eyes are the instrument of seeing, and seeing may bring distress to the soul: hence the Soul may feel sorrow and pain and every other affection that belongs to the body; and from this again will spring desire, the Soul seeking the mending of its instrument.

[...]

In this last case it will be the double task of philosophy to direct this lower Soul towards the higher, the agent, and except in so far as the conjunction is absolutely necessary, to sever the agent from the instrument, the body, so that it need not forever have its Act upon or through this inferior.

I am only including a handful of paragraphs here, but this whole verse was good. We start by defining the Animate, ending with how our individual souls need to be aimed towards the greater “soul”.

1.1.4. The body has acquired life, it is the body that will acquire, with life, sensation and the affections coming by sensation. Desire, then, will belong to the body, as the objects of desire are to be enjoyed by the body. And fear, too, will belong to the body alone; for it is the body's doom to fail of its joys and to perish.

[...]

Compare the passage (in Aristotle) where we read* that "it is absurd to suppose that the Soul weaves"; equally absurd to think of it as desiring, grieving. All this is rather in the province of something which we may call the Animate.

I can only laugh and apologise to myself as I go through my notes and find contradictions, footnotes, reversal of opinions. The previous verse convinced me that Plotinus believed emotions were stored in the soul, whereas this verse suggests that emotions are more material! Again, this is to help define “the Animate” which is the totality of the creature, I am assuming?

1.1.5. Now this Animate might be merely the body as having life: it might be the Couplement of Soul and body: it might be a third and different entity formed from both.

Defining what the Animate may or may not be, without fully committing to a strict definition. But at least we have “Couplement” as the place where body and soul meet.

1.1.6. It may seem reasonable to lay down as a law that when any powers are contained by a recipient, every action or state expressive of them must be the action or state of that recipient, they themselves remaining unaffected as merely furnishing efficiency.

I noted this verse due to its three Buts and one Yet to start its paragraphs. Unbeknownst to me that the time, but it’s the perfect representation of Plotinus and his self debating. I’m not a huge fan of that, but he’s far from the guiltiest (albeit very guilty).

1.1.7. There is no reason why the entire compound entity should not be described as the Animate or Living-Being—mingled in a lower phase, but above that point the beginning of the veritable man, distinct from all that is kin to the lion, all that is of the order of the multiple brute. And since The Man, so understood, is essentially the associate of the reasoning Soul, in our reasoning it is this "We" that reasons, in that the use and act of reason is a characteristic Act of the Soul.

I did not include this entire verse, but from what I gathered, it tells that the soul meets the body to create a third thing: the Animate, from where perception comes. Based on the included paragraph, it also insinuates that animals don’t have this? Another thing of which I am not convinced either way.

1.1.7. No; from the organized body and something else, let us say a light, which the Soul gives forth from itself, it forms a distinct Principle, the Animate; and in this Principle are vested Sense-Perception and all the other experiences found to belong to the Animate.

The first example of the light analogy, which is undoubtedly Plotinus' go-to.

1.1.8. This also we possess as the summit of our being. And we have It either as common to all or as our own immediate possession: or again we may possess It in both degrees, that is in common, since It is indivisible—one, everywhere and always Its entire self—and severally in that each personality possesses It entire in the First-Soul [i.e. in the Intellectual as distinguished from the lower phase of the Soul].

Hence we possess the Ideal-Forms also after two modes: in the Soul, as it were unrolled and separate; in the Intellectual-Principle, concentrated, one.

I think I noted this part because it mentioned The One and I got overly excited. But its lack of capitalisation is a good indication that it's not quite there yet.

1.1.8. In that the Divinity is contained in the Intellectual-Principle and Authentic-Existence; and We come third in order after these two, for the We is constituted by a union of the supreme, the undivided Soul—we read—and that Soul which is divided among [living] bodies. For, note, we inevitably think of the Soul, though one undivided in the All, as being present to bodies in division: in so far as any bodies are Animates, the Soul has given itself to each of the separate material masses; or rather it appears to be present in the bodies by the fact that it shines into them: it makes them living beings not by merging into body but by giving forth, without any change in itself, images or likenesses of itself like one face caught by many mirrors.

The first of these images is Sense-Perception seated in the Couplement; and from this downwards all the successive images are to be recognized as phases of the Soul in lessening succession from one another, until the series ends in the faculties of generation and growth and of all production of offspring—offspring efficient in its turn, in contradistinction to the engendering Soul which [has no direct action within matter but] produces by mere inclination towards what it fashions.

Reading back, he really throws you in the deep end. The Enneads themselves are aptly compiled, but I am unconvinced that there was any intention to assist our understanding by slowly building familiarity. Going over my extremely early notes having now finished the entire book two years later, and I am as lost as ever. Still, I enjoy these explanations leading down the hierarchy.

1.1.9. And towards the Intellectual-Principle what is our relation? By this I mean, not that faculty in the soul which is one of the emanations from the Intellectual-Principle, but The Intellectual-Principle itself [Divine-Mind].

A lot of philosophies claim this, that the soul is pure, free of evil, evil is pure man. What's so fascinating is that my notes say "just accepting this is not easy for me" and yet now, sitting here, able to completely believe this. Could this be a direct result of this book? That's crazy and so likely. What a monumentally fundamental shift. If this book achieved nothing else, then that already is unbelievable.

1.1.9. Thus in spite of all, the Soul is at peace as to itself and within itself: all the changes and all the turmoil we experience are the issue of what is subjoined to the Soul, and are, as have said, the states and experiences of this elusive "Couplement."

This ties into the previous.

1.1.9. But it has been observed that the Couplement, too—especially before our emancipation—is a member of this total We, and in fact what the body experiences we say We experience. This then covers two distinct notions; sometimes it includes the brute-part, sometimes it transcends the brute. The body is brute touched to life; the true man is the other, going pure of the body, natively endowed with the virtues which belong to the Intellectual-Activity, virtues whose seat is the Separate Soul, the Soul which even in its dwelling here may be kept apart. [This Soul constitutes the human being] for when it has wholly withdrawn, that other Soul which is a radiation [or emanation] from it withdraws also, drawn after it.

Those virtues, on the other hand, which spring not from contemplative wisdom but from custom or practical discipline belong to the Couplement: to the Couplement, too, belong the vices; they are its repugnances, desires, sympathies.

And Friendship?

This emotion belongs sometimes to the lower part, sometimes to the interior man.

This whole verse is worth analysing. Use it to try and work out how much we influence the soul and vice versa.

1.1.11. In childhood the main activity is in the Couplement and there is but little irradiation from the higher principles of our being: but when these higher principles act but feebly or rarely upon us their action is directed towards the Supreme; they work upon us only when they stand at the mid-point.

A child exists in the lower, only as we get older can start to climb. I actually disagree with this. A child feels closer to the raw source to me.

1.1.11. And the animals, in what way or degree do they possess the Animate?

If there be in them, as the opinion goes, human Souls that have sinned, then the Animating-Principle in its separable phase does not enter directly into the brute; it is there but not there to them; they are aware only of the image of the Soul [only of the lower Soul] and of that only by being aware of the body organised and determined by that image.

If there be no human Soul in them, the Animate is constituted for them by a radiation from the All-Soul.

Important questions about the animals. I'm not sure how to interpret this answer, but possible that the Animate comes straight from the big soul? Like, how I see that is living on a more instinctual basis? That seems... better.

1.1.12. When we tell of the sinless Soul, we make Soul and Essential-Soul one and the same: it is the simple unbroken Unity.

By the Soul subject to sin we indicate a groupment, we include that other, that phase of the Soul which knows all the states and passions: the Soul in this sense is compound, all-inclusive: it falls under the conditions of the entire living experience: this compound it is that sins; it is this, and not the other, that pays penalty.

It is in this sense that we read of the Soul: "We saw it as those others saw the sea-god Glaukos." "And," reading on, "if we mean to discern the nature of the Soul we must strip it free of all that has gathered about it, must see into the philosophy of it, examine with what Existences it has touch and by kinship to what Existences it is what it is."

How soul can be sinless while we are not as extensions of that? It makes sense to me with or without, but from what I understand, the solution here is that we are two things at once: a higher and a lower (more manifested) soul. The closer to The One you go, the less impure the soul will be. But here in this physical realm, we've dirtied the hell out of everything.

1.1.12. The poet, too, in the story of Hercules, seems to give this image separate existence; he puts the shade of Hercules in the lower world and Hercules himself among the gods: treating the hero as existing in the two realms at once, he gives us a twofold Hercules.

It is not difficult to explain this distinction. Hercules was a hero of practical virtue. By his noble serviceableness he was worthy to be a God. On the other hand, his merit was action and not the Contemplation which would place him unreservedly in the higher realm. Therefore while he has place above, something of him remains below.

I love the discussion of Hercules here, reminding us that we are talking with the Greeks. But more importantly, these figures are taken as allegorical messages!!

1.1.13. And Intellection in us is twofold: since the Soul is intellective, and Intellection is the highest phase of life, we have Intellection both by the characteristic Act of our Soul and by the Act of the Intellectual-Principle upon us—for this Intellectual-Principle is part of us no less than the Soul, and towards it we are ever rising.

Thus ends the first Ennead, with perhaps the most potent line thus far.

Tractate 1.2. The Virtues

This chapter details different levels of virtues, some that are everyday, but others which sit higher. Through these, we can make our way back to God, first with the small virtues, but working our way upward.

1.2.1. Since Evil is here, "haunting this world by necessary law," and it is the Soul's design to escape from Evil, we must escape hence.

Great first line.

1.2.1. "In attaining Likeness to God," we read. And this is explained as "becoming just and holy, living by wisdom," the entire nature grounded in Virtue.

That's how we escape evil.

1.2.1. Is Likeness, then, attained, perhaps, not by these virtues of the social order but by those greater qualities known by the same general name? And if so do the Civic Virtues give us no help at all?

Higher virtues introduced.

1.2.1. When warmth comes in to make anything warm, must there needs be something to warm the source of the warmth?

Analogy about virtue leading to God.

1.2.1. The objection would be valid if what the soul takes in were one and the same with the source, but in fact virtue is one thing, the source of virtue quite another. The material house is not identical with the house conceived in the intellect, and yet stands in its likeness: the material house has distribution and order while the pure idea is not constituted by any such elements; distribution, order, symmetry are not parts of an idea.

Workable house analogy.

1.2.2. There is the likeness demanding an identical nature in the objects which, further, must draw their likeness from a common principle: and there is the case in which B resembles A, but A is a Primal, not concerned about B and not said to resemble B. In this second case, likeness is understood in a distinct sense: we no longer look for identity of nature, but, on the contrary, for divergence since the likeness has come about by the mode of difference.

The two types of likeness. Kind of important to see how it is us coming from it, not it coming to us.

1.2.3. To Plato, unmistakably, there are two distinct orders of virtue, and the civic does not suffice for Likeness: "Likeness to God," he says, "is a flight from this world's ways and things": in dealing with the qualities of good citizenship he does not use the simple term Virtue but adds the distinguishing word civic: and elsewhere he declares all the virtues without exception to be purifications.

Bringing Plato into this, obviously.

1.2.3. As speech is the echo of the thought in the Soul, so thought in the Soul is an echo from elsewhere: that is to say, as the uttered thought is an image of the soul-thought, so the soul-thought images a thought above itself and is the interpreter of the higher sphere.

He's pretty good at describing things, I'll give him that.

1.2.4. We come, so, to the question whether Purification is the whole of this human quality, virtue, or merely the forerunner upon which virtue follows? Does virtue imply the achieved state of purification or does the mere process suffice to it, Virtue being something of less perfection than the accomplished pureness which is almost the Term?

A lot of this tractate is about how we must purify the soul through virtues, and once its purified, Goodness itself will automatically take control... I think.

1.2.5. It will hold itself above all passions and affections. Necessary pleasures and all the activity of the senses it will employ only for medicament and assuagement lest its work be impeded. Pain it may combat, but, failing the cure, it will bear meekly and ease it by refusing assent to it. All passionate action it will check: the suppression will be complete if that be possible, but at worst the Soul will never itself take fire but will keep the involuntary and uncontrolled outside its precincts and rare and weak at that. The Soul has nothing to dread, though no doubt the involuntary has some power here too: fear therefore must cease, except so far as it is purely monitory. What desire there may be can never be for the vile; even the food and drink necessary for restoration will lie outside of the Soul's attention, and not less the sexual appetite: or if such desire there must be, it will turn upon the actual needs of the nature and be entirely under control; or if any uncontrolled motion takes place, it will reach no further than the imagination, be no more than a fleeting fancy.

As noted before, if you work on it long enough, it will start to happen without you needing to be involved. Like anything, I guess. It's training.

1.2.5. The Soul itself will be inviolately free and will be working to set the irrational part of the nature above all attack, or if that may not be, then at least to preserve it from violent assault, so that any wound it takes may be slight and be healed at once by virtue of the Soul's presence, just as a man living next door to a Sage would profit by the neighbourhood, either in becoming wise and good himself or, for sheer shame, never venturing any act which the nobler mind would disapprove.

There will be no battling in the Soul: the mere intervention of Reason is enough: the lower nature will stand in such awe of Reason that for any slightest movement it has made it will grieve, and censure its own weakness, in not having kept low and still in the presence of its lord.

I love this!

1.2.6. On this principle, the supreme Rectitude of the Soul is that it direct its Act towards the Intellectual-Principle: its Restraint (Sophrosyne) is its inward bending towards the Intellectual-Principle; its Fortitude is its being impassive in the likeness of That towards which its gaze is set, Whose nature comports an impassivity which the Soul acquires by virtue and must acquire if it is not to be at the mercy of every state arising in its less noble companion.

According to Wikipedia: Sophrosyne is an ancient Greek concept of an ideal of excellence of character and soundness of mind, which when combined in one well-balanced individual leads to other qualities, such as temperance, moderation, prudence, purity, decorum, and self-control.

1.2.7. The solution is in understanding the virtues and what each has to give: thus the man will learn to work with this or that as every several need demands. And as he reaches to loftier principles and other standards these in turn will define his conduct: for example, Restraint in its earlier form will no longer satisfy him; he will work for the final Disengagement; he will live, no longer, the human life of the good man—such as Civic Virtue commends—but, leaving this beneath him, will take up instead another life, that of the Gods.

For it is to the Gods, not to the Good, that our Likeness must look: to model ourselves upon good men is to produce an image of an image: we have to fix our gaze above the image and attain Likeness to the Supreme Exemplar.

Pretty crazy. Don't aim to be like good humans, that's a copy of a copy. We must aim to mimic the gods.

Tractate 1.3. Dialectic

"Dialectic" is a discipline whereby through asking smart questions and thinking clearly, you can bring the path of Good into focus, using it to redirect reason upward towards God. Wisdom is the highest level, where you see things as they truly are. This chapter further lists examples of types of people this applies to, for example, lovers, musicians, metaphysicians etc. It's the things we are born to be drawn to. In a way, perhaps this could hint at reincarnation? Or at least some code that is embedded into our spirit from the get-go.

1.3.4. But this science, this Dialectic essential to all the three classes alike, what, in sum, is it?

It is the Method, or Discipline, that brings with it the power of pronouncing with final truth upon the nature and relation of things—what each is, how it differs from others, what common quality all have, to what Kind each belongs and in what rank each stands in its Kind and whether its Being is Real-Being, and how many Beings there are, and how many non-Beings to be distinguished from Beings.

Dialectic treats also of the Good and the not-Good, and of the particulars that fall under each, and of what is the Eternal and what the not Eternal—and of these, it must be understood, not by seeming-knowledge ["sense-knowledge"] but with authentic science.

Explanation of Dialectic.

1.3.6. Is Dialectic, then, the same as Philosophy?

It is the precious part of Philosophy. We must not think of it as the mere tool of the metaphysician: Dialectic does not consist of bare theories and rules: it deals with verities; Existences are, as it were, Matter to it, or at least it proceeds methodically towards Existences, and possesses itself, at the one step, of the notions and of the realities.

Untruth and sophism it knows, not directly, not of its own nature, but merely as something produced outside itself, something which it recognises to be foreign to the verities laid up in itself; in the falsity presented to it, it perceives a clash with its own canon of truth. Dialectic, that is to say, has no knowledge of propositions—collections of words—but it knows the truth, and, in that knowledge, knows what the schools call their propositions: it knows above all, the operation of the soul, and, by virtue of this knowing, it knows, too, what is affirmed and what is denied, whether the denial is of what was asserted or of something else, and whether propositions agree or differ; all that is submitted to it, it attacks with the directness of sense-perception and it leaves petty precisions of process to what other science may care for such exercises.

Differences between dialects and philosophy. Seemed interesting at the time.

Tractate 1.4. Happiness

As the title suggests, this one if about happiness. The material world's happiness is unreliable. Instead one must curate it via good acts and thoughts. All of happiness comes from the soul inside, never the outside (which is surely cross-pollinated from Stoicism). And the closer to The One you go, the true-happier you will be. It was a testing chapter to understand (although, in hindsight, chips compared to what's coming) but the power is undeniable. It makes you want to strive to become a proficient human and it feels so possible because it’s just in the head.

1.4.1. But, to begin with, it is surely unsound to deny that good of life to animals only because they do not appear to man to be of great account. And as for plants, we need not necessarily allow to them what we accord to the other forms of life, since they have no feeling. It is true people might be found to declare prosperity possible to the very plants: they have life, and life may bring good or evil; the plants may thrive or wither, bear or be barren.

No: if Pleasure be the Term, if here be the good of life, it is impossible to deny the good of life to any order of living things; if the Term be inner-peace, equally impossible; impossible, too, if the good of life be to live in accordance with the purpose of nature.

Addressing animals. I agree.

1.4.2. Those that deny the happy life to the plants on the ground that they lack sensation are really denying it to all living things.

Don't pick flowers, asshole.

1.4.3. Those, then, that set happiness not in the mere living but in the reasoning life seem to overlook the fact that they are not really making it depend upon life at all: they admit that this reasoning faculty, round which they centre happiness, is a property [not the subject of a property]: the subject, to them, must be the Reasoning-Life since it is in this double term that they find the basis of the happiness: so that they are making it consist not in life but in a particular kind of life—not, of course, a species formally opposite but, in terminology, standing as an "earlier" to a "later" in the one Kind.

[...]

If mere Being is insufficient, if happiness demands fulness of life, and exists, therefore, where nothing is lacking of all that belongs to the idea of life, then happiness can exist only in a being that lives fully.

Happiness is the reflection of the Good.

1.4.4. Once the man is a Sage, the means of happiness, the way to good, are within, for nothing is good that lies outside him. Anything he desires further than this he seeks as a necessity, and not for himself but for a subordinate, for the body bound to him, to which since it has life he must minister the needs of life, not needs, however, to the true man of this degree. He knows himself to stand above all such things, and what he gives to the lower he so gives as to leave his true life undiminished.

Adverse fortune does not shake his felicity: the life so founded is stable ever. Suppose death strikes at his household or at his friends; he knows what death is, as the victims, if they are among the wise, know too. And if death taking from him his familiars and intimates does bring grief, it is not to him, not to the true man, but to that in him which stands apart from the Supreme, to that lower man in whose distress he takes no part.

Very stoic.

1.4.7. Then why are these conditions sought and their contraries repelled by the man established in happiness?

Here is our answer:

These more pleasant conditions cannot, it is true, add any particle towards the Sage's felicity: but they do serve towards the integrity of his being, while the presence of the contraries tends against his Being or complicates the Term: it is not that the Sage can be so easily deprived of the Term achieved but simply that he that holds the highest good desires to have that alone, not something else at the same time, something which, though it cannot banish the Good by its incoming, does yet take place by its side.

In any case if the man that has attained felicity meets some turn of fortune that he would not have chosen, there is not the slightest lessening of his happiness for that. If there were, his felicity would be veering or falling from day to day; the death of a child would bring him down, or the loss of some trivial possession. No: a thousand mischances and disappointments may befall him and leave him still in the tranquil possession of the Term.

Worth noting.

1.4.7. If the Sage thinks all fortunate events, however momentous, to be no great matter—kingdom and the rule over cities and peoples, colonisations and the founding of states, even though all be his own handiwork—how can he take any great account of the vacillations of power or the ruin of his fatherland? Certainly if he thought any such event a great disaster, or any disaster at all, he must be of a very strange way of thinking. One that sets great store by wood and stones, or... Zeus... by mortality among mortals cannot yet be the Sage, whose estimate of death, we hold, must be that it is better than life in the body.

I love the Zeus name drop. Good to be reminded where we are in history. But also, wow, how old yet how insanely smart.

1.4.8. As for violent personal sufferings, he will carry them off as well as he can; if they overpass his endurance they will carry him off.

This entire verse is worth reading and contemplating. One thing I must note that the online version I am copying and pasting from uses the word "Sage" instead of "Proficient" found in my hardcopy.

1.4.11. If this does not satisfy them, we must ask them to keep in mind a living Sage and, under these terms, to enquire whether the man is in happiness: they must not whittle away his life and then ask whether he has the happy life; they must not take away man and then look for the happiness of a man: once they allow that the Sage lives within, they must not seek him among the outer activities, still less look to the outer world for the object of his desires. To consider the outer world to be a field to his desire, to fancy the Sage desiring any good external, would be to deny Substantial-Existence to happiness; for the Sage would like to see all men prosperous and no evil befalling anyone; but though it prove otherwise, he is still content.

I like this. Happiness is internal, as we all know.

1.4.12. The pleasure demanded for the life cannot be in the enjoyments of the licentious or in any gratifications of the body—there is no place for these, and they stifle happiness—nor in any violent emotions—what could so move the Sage?—it can be only such pleasure as there must be where Good is, pleasure that does not rise from movement and is not a thing of process, for all that is good is immediately present to the Sage and the Sage is present to himself: his pleasure, his contentment, stands, immovable.

Thus he is ever cheerful, the order of his life ever untroubled: his state is fixedly happy and nothing whatever of all that is known as evil can set it awry—given only that he is and remains a Sage.

If anyone seeks for some other kind of pleasure in the life of the Sage, it is not the life of the Sage he is looking for.

All of this, agree 100%.

Tractate 1.5. Happiness and Extension of Time

Happiness is in the now. Not in the memory or anticipation, presently only. You hear this everywhere, but perhaps it was revolutionary at the time, especially in the West. Eastern mindfulness predates this, of course.

1.5.2. Then again the Gods to-day must be happier than of old: and their bliss, too, is not perfect, will never be perfect. Further, when the will attains what it was seeking, it attains something present: the quest is always for something to be actually present until a standing felicity is definitely achieved. The will to life which is will to Existence aims at something present, since Existence must be a stably present thing. Even when the act of the will is directed towards the future, and the furthest future, its object is an actually present having and being: there is no concern about what is passed or to come: the future state a man seeks is to be a now to him; he does not care about the forever: he asks that an actual present be actually present.

I tend to note when he mentions gods plural, because I enjoy defining the poly from the mono to the Absolute. What's interesting that even the gods are not considered perfect or happy because they are a manifestation away from the One. I love the closing point too.

1.5.6. In the matter of sorrows and pains there is, no doubt, ground for saying that time brings increase: for example, in a lingering malady the evil hardens into a state, and as time goes on the body is brought lower and lower. But if the constitution did not deteriorate, if the mischief grew no worse, then, here too, there would be no trouble but that of the present moment: we cannot tell the past into the tale of unhappiness except in the sense that it has gone to make up an actually existing state—in the sense that, the evil in the sufferer's condition having been extended over a longer time, the mischief has gained ground. The increase of ill-being then is due to the aggravation of the malady not to the extension of time.

This actually makes sense. The body deteriorates as it gets older, but that's only if you're comparing it to the past.

1.5.7. There is no absurdity in taking count of time which has ceased to be: we are merely counting what is past and finished, as we might count the dead: but to treat past happiness as actually existent and as outweighing present happiness, that is an absurdity. For Happiness must be an achieved and existent state, whereas any time over and apart from the present is nonexistent: all progress of time means the extinction of all the time that has been.

Reflections on the past is fine as long as you don't do so emotionally? That might actually be the best advice I've heard.

1.5.8. And what is there pleasant in the memory of pleasure? What is it to recall yesterday's excellent dinner? Still more ridiculous, one of ten years ago. So, too, of last year's morality.

I have said similar stuff but idk. I find some pleasures in thinking back to certain moments. We all do. I see no harm in it, as long as pleasure is the primary association.

Tractate 1.6. Beauty

We tend to think of beauty as a combination of external sensors, like shapes, sizes, colours, etc. Plotinus says not so. It's about an inner harmony, a registration of the soul that is reflected in nature. Beauty is one of the most important aspects to pursue in Neoplatonism. It's not something to be expressed, only observed and experienced. By doing so, you will ascend, because Beauty is the representation of a purer form closer to The One. A lot of Sufism is like this and most likely adapted all of it from here.

1.6.1. Almost everyone declares that the symmetry of parts towards each other and towards a whole, with, besides, a certain charm of colour, constitutes the beauty recognized by the eye, that in visible things, as indeed in all else, universally, the beautiful thing is essentially symmetrical, patterned.

But think what this means.

Only a compound can be beautiful, never anything devoid of parts; and only a whole; the several parts will have beauty, not in themselves, but only as working together to give a comely total. Yet beauty in an aggregate demands beauty in details; it cannot be constructed out of ugliness; its law must run throughout.

This does make sense in a way, but the more literal we take "Beauty", the less is works because now more than ever, beauty is understood as subjective, especially in terms of visuals like art.

1.6.1. Turn to what is attractive in methods of life or in the expression of thought; are we to call in symmetry here? What symmetry is to be found in noble conduct, or excellent laws, in any form of mental pursuit?

What symmetry can there be in points of abstract thought?

The symmetry of being accordant with each other? But there may be accordance or entire identity where there is nothing but ugliness: the proposition that honesty is merely a generous artlessness chimes in the most perfect harmony with the proposition that morality means weakness of will; the accordance is complete.

Then again, all the virtues are a beauty of the soul, a beauty authentic beyond any of these others; but how does symmetry enter here? The soul, it is true, is not a simple unity, but still its virtue cannot have the symmetry of size or of number: what standard of measurement could preside over the compromise or the coalescence of the soul's faculties or purposes?

Beauty itself is too abstract to be described by symmetry and the like. Why is love beautiful? Still, trying to find symmetry in one's mental real could be beneifical as an exercise.

1.6.2. But let the soul fall in with the Ugly and at once it shrinks within itself, denies the thing, turns away from it, not accordant, resenting it.

Our interpretation is that the soul—by the very truth of its nature, by its affiliation to the noblest Existents in the hierarchy of Being—when it sees anything of that kin, or any trace of that kinship, thrills with an immediate delight, takes its own to itself, and thus stirs anew to the sense of its nature and of all its affinity.

Again, I’m unsure. If taken literal, then ugliness is subjective. I resonate with intentionally ugly aesthetics. Has this part of our taste evolved? Or am I taking this too literally?

1.6.2. All shapelessness whose kind admits of pattern and form, as long as it remains outside of Reason and Idea, is ugly by that very isolation from the Divine-Thought. And this is the Absolute Ugly: an ugly thing is something that has not been entirely mastered by pattern, that is by Reason, the Matter not yielding at all points and in all respects to Ideal-Form.

But where the Ideal-Form has entered, it has grouped and coordinated what from a diversity of parts was to become a unity: it has rallied confusion into co-operation: it has made the sum one harmonious coherence: for the Idea is a unity and what it moulds must come to unity as far as multiplicity may.

And on what has thus been compacted to unity, Beauty enthrones itself, giving itself to the parts as to the sum: when it lights on some natural unity, a thing of like parts, then it gives itself to that whole. Thus, for an illustration, there is the beauty, conferred by craftsmanship, of all a house with all its parts, and the beauty which some natural quality may give to a single stone.

This, then, is how the material thing becomes beautiful—by communicating in the thought that flows from the Divine.

Noting.

1.6.4. This is the spirit that Beauty must ever induce, wonderment and a delicious trouble, longing and love and a trembling that is all delight. For the unseen all this may be felt as for the seen; and this the Souls feel for it, every soul in some degree, but those the more deeply that are the more truly apt to this higher love—just as all take delight in the beauty of the body but all are not stung as sharply, and those only that feel the keener wound are known as Lovers.

Kind of repeating myself, but don't we all see beauty in different ways? So how does that variation apply to the One? Does not everything have the potential to be beautiful from certain perspectives, and if so, this is all redundant. I wonder if it might be lost in translation, because even though I find beauty in the ugly, there is obviously an easy distinction to be made for the ugly I cannot find beauty in. Perhaps there is some universal understanding there.

1.6.5. Let us then suppose an ugly Soul, dissolute, unrighteous: teeming with all the lusts; torn by internal discord; beset by the fears of its cowardice and the envies of its pettiness; thinking, in the little thought it has, only of the perish able and the base; perverse in all its the friend of unclean pleasures; living the life of abandonment to bodily sensation and delighting in its deformity.

What must we think but that all this shame is something that has gathered about the Soul, some foreign bane outraging it, soiling it, so that, encumbered with all manner of turpitude, it has no longer a clean activity or a clean sensation, but commands only a life smouldering dully under the crust of evil; that, sunk in manifold death, it no longer sees what a Soul should see, may no longer rest in its own being, dragged ever as it is towards the outer, the lower, the dark?

An unclean thing, I dare to say; flickering hither and thither at the call of objects of sense, deeply infected with the taint of body, occupied always in Matter, and absorbing Matter into itself; in its commerce with the Ignoble it has trafficked away for an alien nature its own essential Idea.

If a man has been immersed in filth or daubed with mud his native comeliness disappears and all that is seen is the foul stuff besmearing him: his ugly condition is due to alien matter that has encrusted him, and if he is to win back his grace it must be his business to scour and purify himself and make himself what he was.

So, we may justly say, a Soul becomes ugly—by something foisted upon it, by sinking itself into the alien, by a fall, a descent into body, into Matter. The dishonour of the Soul is in its ceasing to be clean and apart. Gold is degraded when it is mixed with earthy particles; if these be worked out, the gold is left and is beautiful, isolated from all that is foreign, gold with gold alone. And so the Soul; let it be but cleared of the desires that come by its too intimate converse with the body, emancipated from all the passions, purged of all that embodiment has thrust upon it, withdrawn, a solitary, to itself again—in that moment the ugliness that came only from the alien is stripped away.

A huge chunk of text, but I love the poetics of it, describing how pure the soul is, any dirt coming into it, never from it. It is something that has made more sense to me as the book went on.

1.6.6. What else is Sophrosyne, rightly so-called, but to take no part in the pleasures of the body, to break away from them as unclean and unworthy of the clean? So too, Courage is but being fearless of the death which is but the parting of the Soul from the body, an event which no one can dread whose delight is to be his unmingled self. And Magnanimity is but disregard for the lure of things here. And Wisdom is but the Act of the Intellectual-Principle withdrawn from the lower places and leading the Soul to the Above.

A quick recap of certain terms.

1.6.8. He that has the strength, let him arise and withdraw into himself, foregoing all that is known by the eyes, turning away for ever from the material beauty that once made his joy. When he perceives those shapes of grace that show in body, let him not pursue: he must know them for copies, vestiges, shadows, and hasten away towards That they tell of. For if anyone follow what is like a beautiful shape playing over water—is there not a myth telling in symbol of such a dupe, how he sank into the depths of the current and was swept away to nothingness? So too, one that is held by material beauty and will not break free shall be precipitated, not in body but in Soul, down to the dark depths loathed of the Intellective-Being, where, blind even in the Lower-World, he shall have commerce only with shadows, there as here.

Narcissus.

1.6.9. But how are you to see into a virtuous soul and know its loveliness?

Withdraw into yourself and look. And if you do not find yourself beautiful yet, act as does the creator of a statue that is to be made beautiful: he cuts away here, he smoothes there, he makes this line lighter, this other purer, until a lovely face has grown upon his work. So do you also: cut away all that is excessive, straighten all that is crooked, bring light to all that is overcast, labour to make all one glow of beauty and never cease chiselling your statue, until there shall shine out on you from it the godlike splendour of virtue, until you shall see the perfect goodness surely established in the stainless shrine.

Famous part but also solid practical advice. I need to remember this stuff at all times.

Tractate 1.7. On the Primal Good and Secondary Forms of Good

A short chapter worth reading for yourself. Seeking Goodness in the material world or even existing as our best selves are never the full Good, only emanations of the Source Good, like taking tiny shortcuts to feel a sliver of the real thing, our desires only reflections of our much greater desire: to unite with the collective soul. There is only one True Good and that is The One, they are synonymous, and only by pursuing The One will find the Good. Apparently this is the last essay Plotinus wrote before his death, which comes with extra meaning as if he was making peace.

Tractate 1.8. The Nature and Source of Evil

Hilariously, this treatise landed on page 66.

Basically, evil does not quite exist: it is the absence of Good, which only happens when we focus on material as the lowest mode, manifested furtherest away from God. Of course, our souls have mixed with our physical bodies which makes our true selves susceptible to the material, the mind unable to be everywhere at once, instead getting attached to the organism and stuck into this specific focal point. Hence, we begin to relate reality to the illusion rather than the whole. So we don't need to personify evil or fear evil or anything like that, as it's not an actual thing. There is no source of evil, only a source of Good, and all you have to do is turn to face it and make your way towards it. Extremely powerful stuff.

1.8.4. The bodily Kind, in that it partakes of Matter is an evil thing. What form is in bodies is an untrue-form: they are without life: by their own natural disorderly movement they make away with each other; they are hindrances to the soul in its proper Act; in their ceaseless flux they are always slipping away from Being.

This directly refers to material as evil, which makes sense as us a further emanation away from God. But does that mean the world is inherently evil? This could be argued as Gnostic, although I know Plotinus goes against this.

1.8.4. The Soul wrought to perfection, addressed towards the Intellectual-Principle, is steadfastly pure: it has turned away from Matter; all that is undetermined, that is outside of measure, that is evil, it neither sees nor draws near; it endures in its purity, only, and wholly, determined by the Intellectual-Principle.

The Soul that breaks away from this source of its reality to the non-perfect and non-primal is, as it were, a secondary, an image, to the loyal Soul. By its falling-away—and to the extent of the fall—it is stripped of Determination, becomes wholly indeterminate, sees darkness. Looking to what repels vision, as we look when we are said to see darkness, it has taken Matter into itself.

There is value in here somewhere.

1.8.5. Evil is not in any and every lack; it is in absolute lack. What falls in some degree short of the Good is not Evil; considered in its own kind it might even be perfect, but where there is utter dearth, there we have Essential Evil, void of all share in Good; this is the case with Matter.

Again, matter itself is 100% evil? Am I getting that right? Not convinced either way.

1.8.6. And when the disputant in that dialogue says that, if men could be convinced of the doctrine advanced, there would be an end of Evil, he is answered, "That can never be: Evil is of necessity, for there must be a contrary to good."

Evil is necessary, obvz.

1.8.8. Matter becomes mistress of what is manifested through it: it corrupts and destroys the incomer, it substitutes its own opposite character and kind, not in the sense of opposing, for example, concrete cold to concrete warmth, but by setting its own formlessness against the Form of heat, shapelessness to shape, excess and defect to the duly ordered. Thus, in sum, what enters into Matter ceases to belong to itself, comes to belong to Matter, just as, in the nourishment of living beings, what is taken in does not remain as it came, but is turned into, say, dog's blood and all that goes to make a dog, becomes, in fact, any of the humours of any recipient.

Love this paragraph and confirms that matter is evil, soul is good.

1.8.13. Perhaps Evil is merely an impediment to the Soul like something affecting the eye and so hindering sight.

But such an evil in the eyes is no more than an occasion of evil, the Absolute Evil is something quite different. If then Vice is an impediment to the Soul, Vice is an occasion of evil but not Evil-Absolute. Virtue is not the Absolute Good, but a co-operator with it; and if Virtue is not the Absolute Good neither is Vice the Absolute Evil. Virtue is not the Absolute Beauty or the Absolute Good; neither, therefore, is Vice the Essential Ugliness or the Essential Evil.

We teach that Virtue is not the Absolute Good and Beauty, because we know that These are earlier than Virtue and transcend it, and that it is good and beautiful by some participation in them. Now as, going upward from virtue, we come to the Beautiful and to the Good, so, going downward from Vice, we reach Essential Evil: from Vice as the starting-point we come to vision of Evil, as far as such vision is possible, and we become evil to the extent of our participation in it. We are become dwellers in the Place of Unlikeness, where, fallen from all our resemblance to the Divine, we lie in gloom and mud: for if the Soul abandons itself unreservedly to the extreme of viciousness, it is no longer a vicious Soul merely, for mere vice is still human, still carries some trace of good: it has taken to itself another nature, the Evil, and as far as Soul can die it is dead. And the death of Soul is twofold: while still sunk in body to lie down in Matter and drench itself with it; when it has left the body, to lie in the other world until, somehow, it stirs again and lifts its sight from the mud: and this is our "going down to Hades and slumbering there."

Full verse here. Also worth noting that the numbers here correlate with my hardcopy, for some reason the online version is different.

1.8.14. It may be suggested that Vice is feebleness in the Soul.

We shall be reminded that the Vicious Soul is unstable, swept along from every ill to every other, quickly stirred by appetites, headlong to anger, as hasty to compromises, yielding at once to obscure imaginations, as weak, in fact, as the weakest thing made by man or nature, blown about by every breeze, burned away by every heat.

Informative and beautifully written.

1.8.14. Now this weakness must be seated either in Souls utterly disengaged or in Souls bound to Matter or in both.

It cannot exist in those apart from Matter, for all these are pure and, as we read, winged and perfect and unimpeded in their task: there remains only that the weakness be in the fallen Souls, neither cleansed nor clean; and in them the weakness will be, not in any privation but in some hostile presence, like that of phlegm or bile in the organs of the body.

Poetic again.

1.8.14. Matter exists; Soul exists; and they occupy, so to speak, one place. There is not one place for Matter and another for Soul-Matter, for instance, kept to earth, Soul in the air: the soul's "separate place" is simply its not being in Matter; that is, its not being united with it; that is that there be no compound unit consisting of Soul and Matter; that is that Soul be not moulded in Matter as in a matrix; this is the Soul's apartness.

But the faculties of the Soul are many, and it has its beginning, its intermediate phases, its final fringe. Matter appears, importunes, raises disorders, seeks to force its way within; but all the ground is holy, nothing there without part in Soul. Matter therefore submits, and takes light: but the source of its illumination it cannot attain to, for the Soul cannot lift up this foreign thing close by, since the evil of it makes it invisible. On the contrary the illumination, the light streaming from the Soul, is dulled, is weakened, as it mixes with Matter which offers Birth to the Soul, providing the means by which it enters into generation, impossible to it if no recipient were at hand.

This is the fall of the Soul, this entry into Matter: thence its weakness: not all the faculties of its being retain free play, for Matter hinders their manifestation; it encroaches upon the Soul's territory and, as it were, crushes the Soul back; and it turns to evil all that it has stolen, until the Soul finds strength to advance again.

Thus the cause, at once, of the weakness of Soul and of all its evil is Matter.

The evil of Matter precedes the weakness, the vice; it is Primal Evil. Even though the Soul itself submits to Matter and engenders to it; if it becomes evil within itself by its commerce with Matter, the cause is still the presence of Matter: the Soul would never have approached Matter but that the presence of Matter is the occasion of its earth-life.

So in summary: the soul and matter exist together, but soul is superior, it exists in a higher place than matter can ever reach. But while matter cannot damage soul, it can dim it, dirty it, so to speak, because it moves away from it. It's what we've been saying from the beginning. Soul is pure and good. Matter is less than that, because it moves away from that good and we get distracted by it, trapped in it.

Tractate 1.9. The Reasoned Dismissal

Another very short read. It’s a diplomatic and balanced view on death, which is a sacred event with certain types contaminating the soul, such as suicide. However, in extreme cases, suicide is a justified option, for example, in painful illness, insanity, or coercion to immoral behaviour. But, of course, it's better to let the body let go with naturally.

The Second Ennead.

In a sentence: everything works together and it’s fkn beautiful.

Tractate 2.1. The Heavenly System

The Universe is a living being; a divine mind. This I have always agreed with. However, its obsession with fire is less clear-cut for me. On the one hand, it seems a little basic, staring up at the sun and stars and making that deduction. Then again, I tend to favour Plotinus as being correct to my own fault, and I can see the value as symbolic. For example: fire is both destructive and useful. It does not need replenishment and can be eternal, like stars. It brings light and warmth. It seemingly appears from nowhere and disappears in a flash. So much of life can be represented through fire, even the spirit within us feeling closer to a flame than any other element.

2.1.1. This would apply even to the entire ordered universe itself. For it is very possible that this too, though not in process of destruction from outside, might have only formal duration; its parts may be so wearing each other down as to keep it in a continuous decay while, amid the ceaseless flux of the Kind constituting its base, an outside power ceaselessly restores the form: in this way the living All may lie under the same conditions as man and horse and the rest man and horse persisting but not the individual of the type.

This kinda summarises how things die but types (like, the spiritual blueprint, I guess) persist. Everything is a system that continues, decays but rejuvenates... forever?

2.1.1. But if we are obliged to allow individual persistence to any definite entity within the Kosmos then, firstly, we must show that the Divine Will is adequate to make it so; secondly, we have to face the question, What accounts for some things having individual persistence and others only the persistence of type? and, thirdly, we ask how the partial entities of the celestial system hold a real duration which would thus appear possible to all partial things.

These are good questions that we will address.

2.1.2. Every living thing is a combination of soul and body-kind: the celestial sphere, therefore, if it is to be everlasting as an individual entity must be so in virtue either of both these constituents or of one of them, by the combination of soul and body or by soul only or by body only.

Of course anyone that holds body to be incorruptible secures the desired permanence at once; no need, then, to call on a soul or on any perdurable conjunction to account for the continued maintenance of a living being.

But the case is different when one holds that body is, of itself, perishable and that Soul is the principle of permanence: this view obliges us to the proof that the character of body is not in itself fatal either to the coherence or to the lasting stability which are imperative: it must be shown that the two elements of the union envisaged are not inevitably hostile, but that on the contrary [in the heavens] even Matter must conduce to the scheme of the standing result.

Soul vs body, unsure I understand? Soul is surely the permanent one. Physical is perishable. Anyway, earlier in this section, it mentions both the theories of Plato and Aristotle, if you're keen.

2.1.3. We have a parallel in our earth, constant from eternity to pattern and to mass; the air, too, never fails; and there is always water: all the changes of these elements leave unchanged the Principle of the total living thing, our world.

This entire section is worth reading. I'm unsure about sustainably of water, but air and fire are good examples of things that decay and replenish as reflections of The All.

2.1.4. But matters are involved here which demand specific investigation and cannot be treated as incidental merely to our present problem. We are faced with several questions: Is the heavenly system exposed to any such flux as would occasion the need of some restoration corresponding to nourishment; or do its members, once set in their due places, suffer no loss of substance, permanent by Kind? Does it consist of fire only, or is it mainly of fire with the other elements, as well, taken up and carried in the circuit by the dominant Principle?

The Enneads compare fire to the soul a lot which was common in Theosophy.

2.1.4. Our doctrine of the immortality of the heavenly system rests on the firmest foundation once we have cited the sovereign agent, the soul, and considered, besides, the peculiar excellence of the bodily substance constituting the stars, a material so pure, so entirely the noblest, and chosen by the soul as, in all living beings, the determining principle appropriates to itself the choicest among their characteristic parts. No doubt Aristotle is right in speaking of flame as a turmoil, fire insolently rioting; but the celestial fire is equable, placid, docile to the purposes of the stars.

Big ups to the stars! Also Aristotle mention again.

2.1.4. And is it conceivable that the Soul, valid to sustain for a certain space of time, could not so sustain for ever? This would be to assume that it holds things together by violence; that there is a "natural course" at variance with what actually exists in the nature of the universe and in these exquisitely ordered beings; and that there is some power able to storm the established system and destroy its ordered coherence, some kingdom or dominion that may shatter the order founded by the Soul.

Further: The Kosmos has had no beginning—the impossibility has been shown elsewhere—and this is warrant for its continued existence. Why should there be in the future a change that has not yet occurred? The elements there are not worn away like beams and rafters: they hold sound for ever, and so the All holds sound. And even supposing these elements to be in ceaseless transmutation, yet the All persists: the ground of all the change must itself be changeless.

Questioning the sustainability of it which it appears obvious. Also: without a beginning why an end? Although... is there no beginning? How could there be? How could there not be?

2.1.5. But how explain the permanence There, while the content of this sphere—its elements and its living things alike—are passing?

The reason is given by Plato: the celestial order is from God, the living things of earth from the gods sprung from God; and it is law that the offspring of God endures.

In other words, the celestial soul—and our souls with it—springs directly next from the Creator, while the animal life of this earth is produced by an image which goes forth from that celestial soul and may be said to flow downwards from it.

We come directly from God, which is fine, but then animals don’t? I disagree with that.

2.1.6. We may now consider the question whether fire is the sole element existing in that celestial realm and whether there is any outgoing thence with the consequent need of renewal.

[...]

Similarly with fire. No doubt Timaeus speaks of it as necessary not to the existence but to the visibility of earth and the other elements; and certainly light is essential to all visibility—we cannot say that we see darkness, which implies, precisely, that nothing is seen, as silence means nothing being heard.

[...]

Supposing it does not possess the solidity of the three dimensions, it has that of its thrust; now, cannot this belong to it by the mere right and fact of its being one of the corporeal entities in nature? Hardness is another matter, a property confined to earth-stuff. Remember that gold—which is water—becomes dense by the accession not of earth but of denseness or consolidation: in the same way fire, with Soul present within it, may consolidate itself upon the power of the Soul; and there are living beings of fire among the Celestials.

Worth reading this whole verse, even if I feel like so much would be negatided by modern standards. He runs through the elements, hypothosising what is "essential". The importance of fire weirdly seems related to sight, but that does make sense if we take the sun to be fire. Is Gold water? Either way, I sense this will all have dated scientifically.

2.1.7. In the universe as a whole there must necessarily be such a degree of solidity, that is to say, of resistance, as will ensure that the earth, set in the centre, be a sure footing and support to the living beings moving over it, and inevitably communicate something of its own density to them: the earth will possess coherence by its own unaided quality, but visibility by the presence of fire: it will contain water against the dryness which would prevent the cohesion of its particles; it will hold air to lighten its bulky matters; it will be in contact with the celestial fire—not as being a member of the sidereal system but by the simple fact that the fire there and our earth both belong to the ordered universe so that something of the earth is taken up by the fire as something of the fire by the earth and something of everything by everything else.

This borrowing, however, does not mean that the one thing taking-up from the other enters into a composition, becoming an element in a total of both: it is simply a consequence of the kosmic fellowship; the participant retains its own being and takes over not the thing itself but some property of the thing, not air but air's yielding softness, not fire but fire's incandescence: mixing is another process, a complete surrender with a resultant compound not, as in this case, earth—remaining earth, the solidity and density we know—with something of fire's qualities superadded.

The Earth is set in the centre of the Universe, don't you know. Otherwise, interesting dynamic between elements worth noting.

2.1.7. "At the second circuit from the earth, God kindled a light": he is speaking of the sun which, elsewhere, he calls the all-glowing and, again, the all-gleaming: thus he prevents us imagining it to be anything else but fire, though of a peculiar kind; in other words it is light, which he distinguishes from flame as being only modestly warm: this light is a corporeal substance but from it there shines forth that other "light" which, though it carries the same name, we pronounce incorporeal, given forth from the first as its flower and radiance, the veritable "incandescent body." Plato's word earthy is commonly taken in too depreciatory a sense: he is thinking of earth as the principle of solidity; we are apt to ignore his distinctions and think of the concrete clay.

Fire of this order, giving forth this purest light, belongs to the upper realm, and there its seat is fixed by nature; but we must not, on that account, suppose the flame of earth to be associated with the beings of that higher sphere.

Plato quote first thing. Fire and light are not the same thing, as this clarifies, while the Sun itself is from the higher realm? I'm unsure but also, if anything tangible is, that's it for sure.

2.1.8. Besides, the corporeal substance nearest to the heavens would be air or fire: air has no destructive quality; fire would be powerless there since it could not enter into effective contact: in its very rush it would change before its attack could be felt; and, apart from that, it is of the lesser order, no match for what it would be opposing in those higher regions.

Noting.

Tractate 2.2. The Heavenly Circuit

As we've already stated, everything is alive, including the stars, the sky, the world. Nothing is random, it's choeregraphed, it follows a law. And we are part of that.

2.2.1. If the Soul had been the moving power [by any such semi-physical action] it would be so no longer; it would have accomplished the act of moving and have brought the universe to rest; there would be an end of this endless revolution.

In fact the Soul must be in repose or at least cannot have spatial movement; how then, having itself a movement of quite another order, could it communicate spatial movement?

Totally.

2.2.1. Or, better; the Soul is ceaselessly leading the Kosmos towards itself: the continuous attraction communicates a continuous movement—not to some outside space but towards the Soul and in the one sphere with it, not in the straight line [which would ultimately bring the moving body outside and below the Soul], but in the curving course in which the moving body at every stage possesses the Soul that is attracting it and bestowing itself upon it.

If the soul were stationary, that is if [instead of presiding over a Kosmos] it dwelt wholly and solely in the realm in which every member is at rest, motion would be unknown; but, since the Soul is not fixed in some one station There, the Kosmos must travel to every point in quest of it, and never outside it: in a circle, therefore.

Love it.

2.2.3. The lower Soul is moved by the higher which, besides encircling and supporting it, actually resides in whatsoever part of it has thrust upwards and attained the spheres. The lower then, ringed round by the higher and answering its call, turns and tends towards it; and this upward tension communicates motion to the material frame in which it is involved: for if a single point in a spheric mass is in any degree moved, without being drawn away from the rest, it moves the whole, and the sphere is set in motion. Something of the same kind happens in the case of our bodies: the unspatial movement of the Soul—in happiness, for instance, or at the idea of some pleasant event—sets up a spatial movement in the body: the Soul, attaining in its own region some good which increases its sense of life, moves towards what pleases it; and so, by force of the union established in the order of nature, it moves the body, in the body's region, that is in space.

As for that phase of the Soul in which sensation is vested, it, too, takes its good from the Supreme above itself and moves, rejoicingly, in quest of it: and since the object of its desire is everywhere, it too ranges always through the entire scope of the universe.

A decent summary.

Tractate 2.3. Are the Stars Causes?

Addressing the influence of the stars. Like horoscopes. Plotinus says nope, which I appreciate. He claimed these entities reflect the Universe's going ons, they do not control it. Instead, focus on your soul as it wields far more influence. I agree with him, although I do think he personifies the stars too much in his argument. Adherents would point how celestial objects demonstrably affect the world, for example, the gravitational pull of the moon. Still, that doesn't quite explain why it would affect certain people differently especially according to birth time. I've never been convinced.

2.3.1. The belief is that the planets in their courses actually produce not merely such conditions as poverty, wealth, health and sickness but even ugliness and beauty and, gravest of all, vices and virtue and the very acts that spring from these qualities, the definite doings of each moment of virtue or vice. We are to suppose the stars to be annoyed with men—and upon matters in which men, moulded to what they are by the stars themselves, can surely do them no wrong.

[...]

More absurdly still, some of them are supposed to be malicious and others to be helpful, and yet the evil stars will bestow favours and the benevolent act harshly: further, their action alters as they see each other or not, so that, after all, they possess no definite nature but vary according to their angles of aspect; a star is kindly when it sees one of its fellows but changes at sight of another: and there is even a distinction to be made in the seeing as it occurs in this figure or in that. Lastly, all acting together, the fused influence is different again from that of each single star, just as the blending of distinct fluids gives a mixture unlike any of them.

Well put and funny.

2.3.3. Further, why should any distress of theirs work harm to us?

No: we cannot think of them as grieving at all or as being cheerful upon occasions: they must be continuously serene, happy in the good they enjoy and the Vision before them. Each lives its own free life; each finds its Good in its own Act; and this Act is not directed towards us.

Noting.

2.3.5. When they tell us that a certain cold star is more benevolent to us in proportion as it is further away, they clearly make its harmful influence depend upon the coldness of its nature; and yet it ought to be beneficent to us when it is in the opposed Zodiacal figures.

This whole section covers star/zodiac positions.

2.3.6. Again: countless myriads of living beings are born and continue to be: to minister continuously to every separate one of these; to make them famous, rich, poor, lascivious; to shape the active tendencies of every single one—what kind of life is this for the stars, how could they possibly handle a task so huge?

Good stuff.

2.3.7. Thus each entity takes its origin from one Principle and, therefore, while executing its own function, works in with every other member of that All from which its distinct task has by no means cut it off: each performs its act, each receives something from the others, every one at its own moment bringing its touch of sweet or bitter. And there is nothing undesigned, nothing of chance, in all the process: all is one scheme of differentiation, starting from the Firsts and working itself out in a continuous progression of Kinds.

As above so below.

2.3.8. For our part, nature keeps us upon the work of the Soul as long as we are not wrecked in the multiplicity of the Universe: once thus sunk and held we pay the penalty, which consists both in the fall itself and in the lower rank thus entailed upon us: riches and poverty are caused by the combinations of external fact.

Noted.

2.3.9. Our task, then, is to work for our liberation from this sphere, severing ourselves from all that has gathered about us; the total man is to be something better than a body ensouled—the bodily element dominant with a trace of Soul running through it and a resultant life-course mainly of the body—for in such a combination all is, in fact, bodily. There is another life, emancipated, whose quality is progression towards the higher realm, towards the good and divine, towards that Principle which no one possesses except by deliberate usage but so may appropriate, becoming, each personally, the higher, the beautiful, the Godlike, and living, remote, in and by It—unless one choose to go bereaved of that higher Soul and therefore, to live fate-bound, no longer profiting, merely, by the significance of the sidereal system but becoming as it were a part sunken in it and dragged along with the whole thus adopted.

Big things.

2.3.12. All that thus proceeds from the supernal combines into a unity and every existing entity takes something from this blended infusion so that the result is the thing itself plus some quality. The effluence does not make the horse but adds something to it; for horse comes by horse, and man by man: the sun plays its part no doubt in the shaping, but the man has his origin in the Human-Principle. Outer things have their effect, sometimes to hurt and sometimes to help; like a father, they often contribute to good but sometimes also to harm; but they do not wrench the human being from the foundations of its nature; though sometimes Matter is the dominant, and the human principle takes the second place so that there is a failure to achieve perfection; the Ideal has been attenuated.

Full verse and strong content.

2.3.13. The gist of the whole matter lies in the consideration that Soul governs this All by the plan contained in the Reason-Principle and plays in the All exactly the part of the particular principle which in every living-thing forms the members of the organism and adjusts them to the unity of which they are portions; the entire force of the Soul is represented in the All, but, in the parts, Soul is present only in proportion to the degree of essential reality held by each of such partial objects. Surrounding every separate entity there are other entities, whose approach will sometimes be hostile and sometimes helpful to the purpose of its nature; but to the All taken in its length and breadth each and every separate existent is an adjusted part, holding its own characteristic and yet contributing by its own native tendency to the entire life-history of the Universe.

Nice summary.

2.3.13. The greater and most valuable among them have an important operation over a wide range: their contribution towards the life of the whole consists in acting, not in being acted upon; others, but feebly equipped for action, are almost wholly passive; there is an intermediate order whose members contain within themselves a principle of productivity and activity and make themselves very effective in many spheres or ways and yet serve also by their passivity.

I wonder.

2.3.14. Wealth may be due to personal activity: in this case if the body has contributed, part of the effect is due to whatever has contributed towards the physical powers, first the parents and then, if place has had its influence, sky and earth; if the body has borne no part of the burden, then the success, and all the splendid accompaniments added by the Recompensers, must be attributed to virtue exclusively. If fortune has come by gift from the good, then the source of the wealth is, again, virtue: if by gift from the evil, but to a meritorious recipient, then the credit must be given to the action of the best in them: if the recipient is himself unprincipled, the wealth must be attributed primarily to the very wickedness and to whatsoever is responsible for the wickedness, while the givers bear an equal share in the wrong.

When the success is due to labour, tillage for example, it must be put down to the tiller, with all his environment as contributory. In the case of treasure-trove, something from the All has entered into action; and if this be so, it will be foreshown—since all things make a chain, so that we can speak of things universally. Money is lost: if by robbery, the blame lies with the robber and the native principle guiding him: if by shipwreck, the cause is the chain of events. As for good fame, it is either deserved and then is due to the services done and to the merit of those appraising them, or it is undeserved, and then must be attributed to the injustice of those making the award. And the same principle holds is regards power—for this also may be rightly or unrightly placed—it depends either upon the merit of the dispensers of place or upon the man himself who has effected his purpose by the organization of supporters or in many other possible ways. Marriages, similarly, are brought about either by choice or by chance interplay of circumstance. And births are determined by marriages: the child is moulded true to type when all goes well; otherwise it is marred by some inner detriment, something due to the mother personally or to an environment unfavourable to that particular conception.

Chance vs effort. Well put.

2.3.18. Perhaps rather because without evil the All would be incomplete. For most or even all forms of evil serve the Universe—much as the poisonous snake has its use—though in most cases their function is unknown. Vice itself has many useful sides: it brings about much that is beautiful, in artistic creations for example, and it stirs us to thoughtful living, not allowing us to drowse in security.

Worth reading this whole verse. It's closer how I see the topic of evil.

Tractate 2.4. Matter

So much of my studies concerns the "Formless Substance", and this touches on the subject. Physical matter is like clay, it's potential, whereas spiritual matter is another matter, lol. It appears Neoplatonism somewhat concurs that the the physical world is illusionary, the Maya, the distraction. Still, I struggled with this chapter, both in terms of length and content. It felt like he was talking to himself mostly.

2.4.5. But that argument would equally cancel the Matter present in the bodily forms of this realm: body without shape has never existed, always body achieved and yet always the two constituents. We discover these two—Matter and Idea—by sheer force of our reasoning which distinguishes continually in pursuit of the simplex, the irreducible, working on, until it can go no further, towards the ultimate in the subject of enquiry. And the ultimate of every partial-thing is its Matter, which, therefore, must be all darkness since light is a Reason-Principle. The Mind, too, as also a Reason-Principle, sees only in each particular object the Reason-Principle lodging there; anything lying below that it declares to lie below the light, to be therefore a thing of darkness, just as the eye, a thing of light, seeks light and colours which are modes of light, and dismisses all that is below the colours and hidden by them, as belonging to the order of the darkness, which is the order of Matter.

The dark element in the Intelligible, however, differs from that in the sense-world: so therefore does the Matter—as much as the forming-Idea presiding in each of the two realms. The Divine Matter, though it is the object of determination has, of its own nature, a life defined and intellectual; the Matter of this sphere while it does accept determination is not living or intellective, but a dead thing decorated: any shape it takes is an image, exactly as the Base is an image. There on the contrary the shape is a real-existent as is the Base. Those that ascribe Real Being to Matter must be admitted to be right as long as they keep to the Matter of the Intelligible Realm: for the Base there is Being, or even, taken as an entirety with the higher that accompanies it, is illuminated Being.

Might help, idk.

2.4.7. There are no atoms; all body is divisible endlessly: besides neither the continuity nor the ductility of corporeal things is explicable apart from Mind, or apart from the Soul which cannot be made up of atoms; and, again, out of atoms creation could produce nothing but atoms: a creative power could produce nothing from a material devoid of continuity. Any number of reasons might be brought, and have been brought, against this hypothesis and it need detain us no longer.

So interesting! Atoms discussed here before "atoms" were discovered then named INCORRECTLY after this Greek concept, because atoms are supposed to be indivisible, yet we have since divided atoms further. Then again, that's exactly what Plotinus was saying here, which is a big score for him!

2.4.13. But this notion reduces all existence to qualified things or qualities: Quantity itself becomes a Quality and so does even Existence. Now this cannot be: if such things as Quantity and Existence are qualified, they are, by that very fact, not qualities: Quality is an addition to them; we must not commit the absurdity of giving the name Quality to something distinguishable from Quality, something therefore that is not Quality.

[...]

An absence is neither a Quality nor a qualified entity; it is the negation of a Quality or of something else, as noiselessness is the negation of noise and so on. A lack is negative; Quality demands something positive. The distinctive character of Matter is unshape, the lack of qualification and of form; surely then it is absurd to pretend that it has Quality in not being qualified; that is like saying that sizelessness constitutes a certain size.

Definition of quality. Out of context but still. Unsure this is useful.

2.4.16. The Matter in the Intellectual Realm is an Existent, for there is nothing previous to it except the Beyond-Existence; but what precedes the Matter of this sphere is Existence; by its alienism in regard to the beauty and good of Existence, Matter is therefore a non-existent.

Last paragraph. Around this point, I slowed down my note taking.

Tractate 2.5. Potentiality and Actuality

What is vs what it can be. Everything beyond The One is potential, and potential requires an outside power to become actuality. In itself, actuality is not actually anything. I enjoy the topic but didnt feel this short chapter either.

2.5.1. We cannot think of potentiality as standing by itself; there can be no potentiality apart from something which a given thing may be or become. Thus bronze is the potentiality of a statue: but if nothing could be made out of the bronze, nothing wrought upon it, if it could never be anything as a future to what it has been, if it rejected all change, it would be bronze and nothing else: its own character it holds already as a present thing, and that would be the full of its capacity: it would be destitute of potentiality. Whatsoever has a potentiality must first have a character of its own; and its potentiality will consist in its having a reach beyond that character to some other.

He uses the statue analogy a lot.

2.5.3. But surely Potentiality exists in the Soul? Surely the Soul is potentially the living-being of this world before it has become so? Is it not potentially musical, and everything else that it has not been and becomes? Does not this imply potentiality even in the Intellectual Existences?

Example of Plotinus asking himself questions then answering them. At times, I’m unsure if I automatically buy it.

Tractate 2.6. Quality

Another short chapter, this one asking what gives something its qualities. Qualities are not the thing itself, there is a deeper level which makes something the thing. Qualities are applied.

2.6.1. And this is the starting-point of an error we constantly make: in our enquiries into things we let realities escape us and fasten on what is mere quality. Thus fire is not the thing we so name from the observation of certain qualities present; fire is a Reality [not a combination of material phenomena]; the phenomena observed here and leading us to name fire call us away from the authentic thing; a quality is erected into the very matter of definition—a procedure, however, reasonable enough in regard to things of the realm of sense which are in no case realities but accidents of Reality.

To the point: fire is not the qualities, it is something deeper.

2.6.1. The Reality there—possessing Authentic Being in the strictest sense, with the least admixture—is Reality by existing among the differentiations of the Authentic Being; or, better, Reality is affirmed in the sense that with the existence of the Supreme is included its Act so that Reality seems to be a perfectionment of the Authentic Being, though in the truth it is a diminution; the produced thing is deficient by the very addition, by being less simplex, by standing one step away from the Authentic.

The qualities actually lessen the thing. It makes sense, because that is the material emanation.

2.6.2. Its mere body, perhaps? If so, body being the Reality, fire is a warmed body; and the total thing is not the Reality; and the fire has warmth as a man might have a snub nose.

Lol, snub nose.

2.6.2. Thus: Quality is a condition superadded to a Reality whose existence does not depend upon it, whether this something more be a later acquirement or an accompaniment from the first; it is something in whose absence the Reality would still be complete. It will sometimes come and go, sometimes be inextricably attached, so that there are two forms of Quality, the moveable and the fixed.

Spelt out. My notes say "unsure if I fully subscribe" but I now think I do.

Tractate 2.7. Complete Transfusion

Loving these short chapters in quick succession. The question here is: can souls merge into The One? You'd lose yourself completely, in that 1+1+=1.

2.7.1. Those, on the other hand, that accept "complete transfusion," might object that it does not require the reduction of the mixed things to fragments, a certain cleavage being sufficient: thus, for instance, sweat does not split up the body or even pierce holes in it. And if it is answered that this may well be a special decree of Nature to allow of the sweat exuding, there is the case of those manufactured articles, slender but without puncture, in which we can see a liquid wetting them through and through so that it runs down from the upper to the under surface. How can this fact be explained, since both the liquid and the solid are bodily substances? Interpenetration without disintegration is difficult to conceive, and if there is such mutual disintegration the two must obviously destroy each other.

That sweat observation is rad.

2.7.2. This, however, raises a problem deserving investigation in itself: what has happened when a definite magnitude of water becomes air, and how do we explain the increase of volume? But for the present we must be content with the matter thus far discussed out of all the varied controversy accumulated on either side.

Unsure what hes getting at but merging things does make them bigger?

2.7.2. When water runs through wool or when papyrus-pulp gives up its moisture why is not the moist content expressed to the very last drop or even, without question of outflow, how can we possibly think that in a mixture the relation of matter with matter, mass with mass, is contact and that only the qualities are fused? The pulp is not merely in touch with water outside it or even in its pores; it is wet through and through so that every particle of its matter is drenched in that quality. Now if the matter is soaked all through with the quality, then the water is everywhere in the pulp.

"Not the water; the quality of the water."

But then, where is the water? and [if only a quality has entered] why is there a change of volume? The pulp has been expanded by the addition: that is to say it has received magnitude from the incoming substance but if it has received the magnitude, magnitude has been added; and a magnitude added has not been absorbed; therefore the combined matter must occupy two several places. And as the two mixing substances communicate quality and receive matter in mutual give and take so they may give and take magnitude. Indeed when a quality meets another quality it suffers some change; it is mixed, and by that admixture it is no longer pure and therefore no longer itself but a blunter thing, whereas magnitude joining magnitude retains its full strength.

Pulp stuff.

Tractate 2.8. Why Distant Objects Appear Small

Hilarious question as if they hadn't discovered depth perception yet. Still, Plotinus does appear to have an interesting take. He speaks of it kind of a further away object is stripped of qualities, taking so long to reach us that it becomes a more basic form. Up close, a mountain has rocks and lines and trees etc. But from far away, it's just a blurry merger. There's an active intellectual principle at work. I think it all says a lot about Plotinus in general.

2.8.1. Seen from a distance, objects appear reduced and close together, however far apart they be: within easy range, their sizes and the distances that separate them are observed correctly.

Distant objects show in this reduction because they must be drawn together for vision and the light must be concentrated to suit the size of the pupil; besides, as we are placed farther and farther away from the material mass under observation, it is more and more the bare form that reaches us, stripped, so to speak, of magnitude as of all other quality.

That about sums it up.

2.8.1. The magnitude of a sound is known not by actual quantity but by degree of impact, by intensity—and this in no indirect knowledge; the ear appreciates a certain degree of force, exactly as the palate perceives by no indirect knowledge, a certain degree of sweetness. But the true magnitude of a sound is its extension; this the hearing may define to itself incidentally by deduction from the degree of intensity but not to the point of precision. The intensity is merely the definite effect at a particular spot; the magnitude is a matter of totality, the sum of space occupied.

Never thought about sound as an impact before, but of course it is.

Tractate 2.9. Against the Gnostics

AKA: Against Those That Affirm the Creator of the Kosmos and the Kosmos Itself to Be Evil.

As someone well-versed in Gnosticism, this was the chapter I was most looking forward to, and it did not disappoint even if it was long, damn. Gnostics believe that the material world is inherently evil, created by the Demiurge as a negative entity. Plotinus is like, nah. That makes sense considering The One and Supreme Goodness, that philosophy kinda bypasses that stuff. I also wonder how much information this book provided when Gnosticism was so violently suppressed. This may have been a decent source before the Nag Hammadi, but then again, it is addressing a pre-Christian form of Gnosticism anyway.

2.9.1. We have seen elsewhere that the Good, the Principle, is simplex, and, correspondingly, primal—for the secondary can never be simplex—that it contains nothing: that it is an integral Unity.

Now the same Nature belongs to the Principle we know as The One. just as the goodness of The Good is essential and not the outgrowth of some prior substance so the Unity of The One is its essential.

Therefore:

When we speak of The One and when we speak of The Good we must recognize an Identical Nature; we must affirm that they are the same—not, it is true, as venturing any predication with regard to that [unknowable] Hypostasis but simply as indicating it to ourselves in the best terms we find.

Even in calling it "The First" we mean no more than to express that it is the most absolutely simplex: it is the Self-Sufficing only in the sense that it is not of that compound nature which would make it dependent upon any constituent; it is "the Self-Contained" because everything contained in something alien must also exist by that alien.

Deriving, then, from nothing alien, entering into nothing alien, in no way a made-up thing, there can be nothing above it.

We need not, then, go seeking any other Principles; this—the One and the Good—is our First; next to it follows the Intellectual Principle, the Primal Thinker; and upon this follows Soul. Such is the order in nature. The Intellectual Realm allows no more than these and no fewer.

A good summary of The One. I must also commend Plotinus for his simplicity. Obviously the philosophy is made more complicated by ancient language and translation, but at its core, it's on a mission to keep things as basic as possible without anything unnecessary added. In my opinion, it's the most genuine trait of the greats.

2.9.2. Therefore we must affirm no more than these three Primals: we are not to introduce superfluous distinctions which their nature rejects. We are to proclaim one Intellectual-Principle unchangeably the same, in no way subject to decline, acting in imitation, as true as its nature allows, of the Father.

[...]

The Soul's disaster falls upon it when it ceases to dwell in the perfect Beauty—the appropriate dwelling-place of that Soul which is no part and of which we too are no part—thence to pour forth into the frame of the All whatsoever the All can hold of good and beauty. There that Soul rests, free from all solicitude, not ruling by plan or policy, not redressing, but establishing order by the marvellous efficacy of its contemplation of the things above it.

Again, the rigid simplicity. Also, disaster only happens when you turn away from the Beauty. If you can remember this, you've achieved it fully. Perhaps the most profound mental shift this book has provided me with is this one.

2.9.4. To those who assert that creation is the work of the Soul after the failing of its wings, we answer that no such disgrace could overtake the Soul of the All. If they tell us of its falling, they must tell us also what caused the fall. And when did it take place? If from eternity, then the Soul must be essentially a fallen thing: if at some one moment, why not before that?

I agree. While Neoplatonism has some hypotheticals, its actual instruction is extremely basic and arrived at through logic. The vast majority of theologies just say shit willy nilly and you're expected to swallow really obscure ideas. Not the case here whatsoever.

2.9.4. And when will it destroy the work? If it repents of its work, what is it waiting for? If it has not yet repented, then it will never repent: it must be already accustomed to the world, must be growing more tender towards it with the passing of time.

Good questions.

2.9.5. Now let us suppose the Maker craving to construct such an Intermediate World—though what motive could He have?—in addition to the Intellectual world which He eternally possesses. If He made the mid-world first, what end was it to serve?

To be a dwelling-place for Souls?

How then did they ever fall from it? It exists in vain.

If He made it later than this world—abstracting the formal-idea of this world and leaving the Matter out—the Souls that have come to know that intermediate sphere would have experienced enough to keep them from entering this. If the meaning is simply that Souls exhibit the Ideal-Form of the Universe, what is there distinctive in the teaching?

Good questions again.

2.9.6. If all comes to states of the Soul—"Repentance" when it has undergone a change of purpose; "Impressions" when it contemplates not the Authentic Existences but their simulacra—there is nothing here but a jargon invented to make a case for their school: all this terminology is piled up only to conceal their debt to the ancient Greek philosophy which taught, clearly and without bombast, the ascent from the cave and the gradual advance of souls to a truer and truer vision.

For, in sum, a part of their doctrine comes from Plato; all the novelties through which they seek to establish a philosophy of their own have been picked up outside of the truth.

From Plato come their punishments, their rivers of the underworld and the changing from body to body; as for the plurality they assert in the Intellectual Realm—the Authentic Existent, the Intellectual-Principle, the Second Creator and the Soul—all this is taken over from the Timaeus, where we read:

"As many Ideal-Forms as the Divine Mind beheld dwelling within the Veritably Living Being, so many the Maker resolved should be contained in this All."

This whole section is good. Lays into people, accusing them of wrongly interpreting Plato which in turn gives us an easy way into Plato’s work itself.

2.9.7. The natural movement within the plan will be injurious to anything whose natural tendency it opposes: one group will sweep bravely onward with the great total to which it is adapted; the others, not able to comply with the larger order, are destroyed. A great choral is moving to its concerted plan; midway in the march, a tortoise is intercepted; unable to get away from the choral line it is trampled under foot; but if it could only range itself within the greater movement it too would suffer nothing.

Good.

2.9.9. Wealth and poverty, and all inequalities of that order, are made ground of complaint. But this is to ignore that the Sage demands no equality in such matters: he cannot think that to own many things is to be richer or that the powerful have the better of the simple; he leaves all such preoccupations to another kind of man. He has learned that life on earth has two distinct forms, the way of the Sage and the way of the mass, the Sage intent upon the sublimest, upon the realm above, while those of the more strictly human type fall, again, under two classes, the one reminiscent of virtue and therefore not without touch with good, the other mere populace, serving to provide necessaries to the better sort.

Also really good!

2.9.9. The more perfect the man, the more compliant he is, even towards his fellows; we must temper our importance, not thrusting insolently beyond what our nature warrants; we must allow other beings, also, their place in the presence of the Godhead; we may not set ourselves alone next after the First in a dream-flight which deprives us of our power of attaining identity with the Godhead in the measure possible to the human Soul, that is to say, to the point of likeness to which the Intellectual-Principle leads us; to exalt ourselves above the Intellectual-Principle is to fall from it.

Yes, I agree with this.

2.9.10. They first maintain that the Soul and a certain "Wisdom" [Sophia] declined and entered this lower sphere though they leave us in doubt of whether the movement originated in Soul or in this Sophia of theirs, or whether the two are the same to them—then they tell us that the other Souls came down in the descent and that these members of Sophia took to themselves bodies, human bodies, for example.

Yet in the same breath, that very Soul which was the occasion of descent to the others is declared not to have descended. "It knew no decline," but merely illuminated the darkness in such a way that an image of it was formed upon the Matter. Then, they shape an image of that image somewhere below—through the medium of Matter or of Materiality or whatever else of many names they choose to give it in their frequent change of terms, invented to darken their doctrine—and so they bring into being what they call the Creator or Demiurge, then this lower is severed from his Mother [Sophia] and becomes the author of the Kosmos down to the latest of the succession of images constituting it.

Such is the blasphemy of one of their writers.

As someone who knows their Gnosticism, this pre-Christian commentary is wildly exciting for me.

2.9.11. If it is an Intellection, then we ask first "What justifies the name?" and next, "How does anything come into being unless the Soul give this Intellection creative power and how, after all, can creative power reside in a created thing?" Are we to be told that it is a question of a first Image followed by a second?

But this is quite arbitrary.

And why is fire the first creation?

Good questions. For me, it's about whether Gnosticism is supposed to be literal or allegorical.

2.9.12. And how does this image set to its task immediately after it comes into being?

By memory of what it has seen?

But it was utterly non-existent, it could have no vision, either it or the Mother they bestow upon it.

Continuation of the former.

2.9.15. Epicurus denies a Providence and recommends pleasure and its enjoyment, all that is left to us: but the doctrine under discussion is still more wanton; it carps at Providence and the Lord of Providence; it scorns every law known to us; immemorial virtue and all restraint it makes into a laughing stock, lest any loveliness be seen on earth; it cuts at the root of all orderly living, and of the righteousness which, innate in the moral sense, is made perfect by thought and by self-discipline: all that would give us a noble human being is gone. What is left for them except where the pupil by his own character betters the teaching—comes to pleasure, self-seeking, the grudge of any share with one's fellows, the pursuit of advantage.

[...]

This school, in fact, is convicted by its neglect of all mention of virtue: any discussion of such matters is missing utterly: we are not told what virtue is or under what different kinds it appears; there is no word of all the numerous and noble reflections upon it that have come down to us from the ancients; we do not learn what constitutes it or how it is acquired, how the Soul is tended, how it is cleaned. For to say "Look to God" is not helpful without some instruction as to what this looking imports: it might very well be said that one can "look" and still sacrifice no pleasure, still be the slave of impulse, repeating the word God but held in the grip of every passion and making no effort to master any. Virtue, advancing towards the Term and, linked with thought, occupying a Soul makes God manifest: God on the lips, without a good conduct of life, is a word.

This whole section deserves attention. Deals with epicureanism. Probably the strongest attack thus far.

That Lamb Prophecy

The Third Ennead.

Tractate 3.1. Fate

We have more control over our fate than the stars if we can connect to the bigger soul, according to Plotinus. As for me, I have come to accept that no one has ever thought of anything that makes enough sense to break my hard determinism.

3.1.1. In the two orders of things—those whose existence is that of process and those in whom it is Authentic Being—there is a variety of possible relation to Cause.

Marking for full section. Everything has a cause, the root cause is in nature.

3.1.2. But to halt at these nearest determinants, not to be willing to penetrate deeper, indicates a sluggish mind, a dullness to all that calls us towards the primal and transcendent causes.

How comes it that the same surface causes produce different results? There is moonshine, and one man steals and the other does not: under the influence of exactly similar surroundings one man falls sick and the other keeps well; an identical set of operations makes one rich and leaves another poor. The differences amongst us in manners, in characters, in success, force us to go still further back.

I could easily debate against this but, still, it's a fair stance.

3.1.2. Finally, there are those that dwell on the interconnection of the causative forces and on their linked descent—every later phenomenon following upon an earlier, one always leading back to others by which it arose and without which it could not be, and the latest always subservient to what went before them—but this is obviously to bring in fate by another path. This school may be fairly distinguished into two branches; a section which makes all depend upon some one principle and a section which ignores such a unity.

Appreciate how he addresses this.

3.1.3. "Atoms" or "elements"—it is in either case an absurdity, an impossibility, to hand over the universe and its contents to material entities, and out of the disorderly swirl thus occasioned to call order, reasoning, and the governing soul into being; but the atomic origin is, if we may use the phrase, the most impossible.

I find the atoms conversation so fascinating due to what we know now vs the terminology only at that time. RIP Plotinus, you would've loved electrons.

3.1.4. Another theory:

The Universe is permeated by one Soul, Cause of all things and events; every separate phenomenon as a member of a whole moves in its place with the general movement; all the various causes spring into action from one source: therefore, it is argued, the entire descending claim of causes and all their interaction must follow inevitably and so constitute a universal determination. A plant rises from a root, and we are asked on that account to reason that not only the interconnection linking the root to all the members and every member to every other but the entire activity and experience of the plant, as well, must be one organized overruling, a "destiny" of the plant.

But such an extremity of determination, a destiny so all-pervasive, does away with the very destiny that is affirmed: it shatters the sequence and co-operation of causes.

Good section. He’s doing a good job to tackle each theory, but I don't know if I agree.

3.1.5. Augury, it is urged, is able from these indications to foretell what is to happen not merely to the universe as a whole, but even to individuals, and this not merely as regards external conditions of fortune but even as to the events of the mind. We observe, too, how growth or check in other orders of beings—animals and Plants—is determined by their sympathetic relations with the heavenly bodies and how widely they are influenced by them, how, for example, the various countries show a different produce according to their situation on the earth and especially their lie towards the sun. And the effect of place is not limited to plants and animals; it rules human beings too, determining their appearance, their height and colour, their mentality and their desires, their pursuits and their moral habit. Thus the universal circuit would seem to be the monarch of the All.

The geographical changes are well put.

3.1.5. None the less, in spite of physical resemblance and similar environment, we observe the greatest difference in temperament and in ideas: this side of the human being, then, derives from some quite other Principle [than any external causation or destiny]. A further confirmation is found in the efforts we make to correct both bodily constitution and mental aspirations.

If the stars are held to be causing principles on the ground of the possibility of foretelling individual fate or fortune from observation of their positions, then the birds and all the other things which the soothsayer observes for divination must equally be taken as causing what they indicate.

Fair points!

3.1.9. But when our Soul holds to its Reason-Principle, to the guide, pure and detached and native to itself, only then can we speak of personal operation, of voluntary act. Things so done may truly be described as our doing, for they have no other source; they are the issue of the unmingled Soul, a Principle that is a First, a leader, a sovereign not subject to the errors of ignorance, not to be overthrown by the tyranny of the desires which, where they can break in, drive and drag, so as to allow of no act of ours, but mere answer to stimulus.

Feels like the conclusion of conclusions.

Tractate 3.2. Providence (1)

Providence means divine plan. Bad things happen because each layer which emenates away from The One get less perfect, but there is still goodness in all of it. Good chapter, it reminded me of Janthopoyism's This Is Why Bad Things Happen.

3.2.1. The authentic and primal Kosmos is the Being of the Intellectual Principle and of the Veritable Existent. This contains within itself no spatial distinction, and has none of the feebleness of division, and even its parts bring no incompleteness to it since here the individual is not severed from the entire. In this Nature inheres all life and all intellect, a life living and having intellection as one act within a unity: every part that it gives forth is a whole; all its content is its very own, for there is here no separation of thing from thing, no part standing in isolated existence estranged from the rest, and therefore nowhere is there any wronging of any other, any opposition. Everywhere one and complete, it is at rest throughout and shows difference at no point; it does not make over any of its content into any new form; there can be no reason for changing what is everywhere perfect.

Another nice summary.

3.2.2. By derivation from that Authentic Kosmos, one within itself, there subsists this lower kosmos, no longer a true unity.

It is multiple, divided into various elements, thing standing apart from thing in a new estrangement. No longer is there concord unbroken; hostility, too, has entered as the result of difference and distance; imperfection has inevitably introduced discord; for a part is not self-sufficient, it must pursue something outside itself for its fulfillment, and so it becomes the enemy to what it needs.

First 2 paragraphs here but read this whole thing. There is discord but it’s still actually harmonious?

3.2.3. I am made by a God: from that God I came perfect above all forms of life, adequate to my function, self-sufficing, lacking nothing: for I am the container of all, that is, of every plant and every animal, of all the Kinds of created things, and many Gods and nations of Spirit-Beings and lofty souls and men happy in their goodness.

And do not think that, while earth is ornate with all its growths and with living things of every race, and while the very sea has answered to the power of Soul, do not think that the great air and the ether and the far-spread heavens remain void of it: there it is that all good Souls dwell, infusing life into the stars and into that orderly eternal circuit of the heavens which in its conscious movement ever about the one Centre, seeking nothing beyond, is a faithful copy of the divine Mind. And all that is within me strives towards the Good; and each, to the measure of its faculty, attains. For from that Good all the heavens depend, with all my own Soul and the Gods that dwell in my every part, and all that lives and grows, and even all in me that you may judge inanimate.

Profoundly important summary.

3.2.3. But there are degrees of participation: here no more than Existence, elsewhere Life; and, in Life, sometimes mainly that of Sensation, higher again that of Reason, finally Life in all its fullness. We have no right to demand equal powers in the unequal: the finger is not to be asked to see; there is the eye for that; a finger has its own business—to be finger and have finger power.

Love this. The body is not about equality, it's about collaborative equity.

3.2.4. Why the wrong course is followed is scarcely worth enquiring: a slight deviation at the beginning develops with every advance into a continuously wider and graver error—especially since there is the attached body with its inevitable concomitant of desire—and the first step, the hasty movement not previously considered and not immediately corrected, ends by establishing a set habit where there was at first only a fall.

Punishment naturally follows: there is no injustice in a man suffering what belongs to the condition in which he is; nor can we ask to be happy when our actions have not earned us happiness; the good, only, are happy; divine beings are happy only because they are good.

Why things go wrong. Logical.

3.2.7. We answer that the universe is one living organism: as well maintain that while human head and face are the work of nature and of the ruling reason-principle, the rest of the frame is due to other agencies—accident or sheer necessity—and owes its inferiority to this origin, or to the incompetence of unaided Nature. And even granting that those less noble members are not in themselves admirable it would still be neither pious nor even reverent to censure the entire structure.

This feels exactly where I am at.

3.2.8. Now in every living being the upper parts—head, face—are the most beautiful, the mid and lower members inferior. In the Universe the middle and lower members are human beings; above them, the Heavens and the Gods that dwell there; these Gods with the entire circling expanse of the heavens constitute the greater part of the Kosmos: the earth is but a central point, and may be considered as simply one among the stars. Yet human wrong-doing is made a matter of wonder; we are evidently asked to take humanity as the choice member of the Universe, nothing wiser existent!

But what about genitals?

3.2.8. But humanity, in reality, is poised midway between gods and beasts, and inclines now to the one order, now to the other; some men grow like to the divine, others to the brute, the greater number stand neutral. But those that are corrupted to the point of approximating to irrational animals and wild beasts pull the mid-folk about and inflict wrong upon them; the victims are no doubt better than the wrongdoers, but are at the mercy of their inferiors in the field in which they themselves are inferior, where, that is, they cannot be classed among the good since they have not trained themselves in self-defence.

A gang of lads, morally neglected, and in that respect inferior to the intermediate class, but in good physical training, attack and throw another set, trained neither physically nor morally, and make off with their food and their dainty clothes. What more is called for than a laugh?

And surely even the lawgiver would be right in allowing the second group to suffer this treatment, the penalty of their sloth and self-indulgence: the gymnasium lies there before them, and they, in laziness and luxury and listlessness, have allowed themselves to fall like fat-loaded sheep, a prey to the wolves.

But the evil-doers also have their punishment: first they pay in that very wolfishness, in the disaster to their human quality: and next there is laid up for them the due of their Kind: living ill here, they will not get off by death; on every precedent through all the line there waits its sequent, reasonable and natural—worse to the bad, better to the good.

Such a cool perspective.

3.2.8. Bad men rule by the feebleness of the ruled: and this is just; the triumph of weaklings would not be just.

Fascinating. I feel this.

3.2.11. We are like people ignorant of painting who complain that the colours are not beautiful everywhere in the picture: but the Artist has laid on the appropriate tint to every spot. Or we are censuring a drama because the persons are not all heroes but include a servant and a rustic and some scurrilous clown; yet take away the low characters and the power of the drama is gone; these are part and parcel of it.

So many wins in this tractate.

3.2.15. Men directing their weapons against each other—under doom of death yet neatly lined up to fight as in the pyrrhic sword-dances of their sport—this is enough to tell us that all human intentions are but play, that death is nothing terrible, that to die in a war or in a fight is but to taste a little beforehand what old age has in store, to go away earlier and come back the sooner. So for misfortunes that may accompany life, the loss of property, for instance; the loser will see that there was a time when it was not his, that its possession is but a mock boon to the robbers, who will in their turn lose it to others, and even that to retain property is a greater loss than to forfeit it.

Decent way to look at it.

3.2.16. For, in the All, the sequences, including what follows upon wickedness, become Reason-Principles, and therefore in right reason. Thus: from adultery and the violation of prisoners the process of nature will produce fine children, to grow, perhaps, into fine men; and where wicked violence has destroyed cities, other and nobler cities may rise in their place.

I admire the optimism.

Tractate 3.3. Providence (2)

This may better apply to the previous chapter, but to repeat: emanations are like a copy of a copy of a copy of God, so they get worse. Nevertheless, it's all part of a bigger plan that can help good things to happen. Everything is run by reason.

3.3.1. Having attached all to this source, we turn to move down again in continuous division: we see the Unity fissuring, as it reaches out into Universality, and yet embracing all in one system so that with all its differentiation it is one multiple living thing—an organism in which each member executes the function of its own nature while it still has its being in that One Whole; fire burns; horse does horse work; men give, each the appropriate act of the peculiar personal quality—and upon the several particular Kinds to which each belongs follow the acts, and the good or evil of the life.

Nicely explained.

3.3.3. Or is there, perhaps, no responsibility? After all, none is charged in the case of plants brought into being without the perceptive faculties; no one is blamed because animals are not all that men are—which would be like complaining that men are not all that gods are. Reason acquits plant and animal and, their maker; how can it complain because men do not stand above humanity?

Good points.

3.3.4. This does not, however, stand outside of Providence or of the Reason of the All; the Over-World cannot be dependent upon the World of Sense. The higher shines down upon the lower, and this illumination is Providence in its highest aspect: The Reason-Principle has two phases, one which creates the things of process and another which links them with the higher beings: these higher beings constitute the over-providence on which depends that lower providence which is the secondary Reason-Principle inseparably united with its primal: the two—the Major and Minor Providence—acting together produce the universal woof, the one all-comprehensive Providence.

Wtf is the universal woof??? I know what I want it to be, which is why I am reluctant to research it.

3.3.7. And since the higher exists, there must be the lower as well. The Universe is a thing of variety, and how could there be an inferior without a superior or a superior without an inferior? We cannot complain about the lower in the higher; rather, we must be grateful to the higher for giving something of itself to the lower.

Said this all before, but Plotinus did beat me to it by some thousands of years.

Tractate 3.4. Our Tutelary Spirit

Tutelary Spirit is basically the same as a "spirit guide", as in a personal divine associate, but a little more complex than that. In a way, it's a higher self. My belief depends on specifics. I don't believe in spirit guides, although I get the value in believing it, which is enough. That said, I have started to feel like maybe there is a higher spiritual version of ourselves, less mental, more energetic which is like a stepping stone towards something holier. If nothing else, it can work like a more tangible beacon to face instead of attempting to leap all the way to the unfathomable God.

3.4.3. What, then, is the spirit [guiding the present life and determining the future]?

The Spirit of here and now.

And the God?

The God of here and now.

Spirit, God; This in act within us, conducts every life; for, even here and now, it is the dominant of our Nature.

That is to say that the dominant is the spirit which takes possession of the human being at birth?

No: the dominant is the Prior of the individual spirit; it presides inoperative while its secondary acts: so that if the acting force is that of men of the sense-life, the tutelary spirit is the Rational Being, while if we live by that Rational Being, our tutelary Spirit is the still higher Being, not directly operative but assenting to the working principle. The words "You shall yourselves choose" are true, then; for by our life we elect our own loftier.

Another nice explainy bit. It goes on, this whole section deserves your attention.

3.4.6. The Universal circuit is like a breeze, and the voyager, still or stirring, is carried forward by it. He has a hundred varied experiences, fresh sights, changing circumstances, all sorts of events. The vessel itself furnishes incident, tossing as it drives on. And the voyager also acts of himself in virtue of that individuality which he retains because he is on the vessel in his own person and character. Under identical circumstances individuals answer very differently in their movements and acts: hence it comes about that, be the occurrences and conditions of life similar or dissimilar, the result may differ from man to man, as on the other hand a similar result may be produced by dissimilar conditions: this (personal answer to incident) it is that constitutes destiny.

Beautiful. Great closing paragraph of this tractate.

Tractate 3.5. Love

Love is obviously connected to Beauty which comes from a higher spiritual plane. We can use it for guidance like a magnet. This chapter covers sex too. I will also be revisiting this chapter to build the case that Greeks were personifying elements as deities. It’s not literal. I think every ancient polytheistic group understood this, and only modern idiots get it twisted.

3.5.1. Now everyone recognizes that the emotional state for which we make this "Love" responsible rises in souls aspiring to be knit in the closest union with some beautiful object, and that this aspiration takes two forms, that of the good whose devotion is for beauty itself, and that other which seeks its consummation in some vile act. But this generally admitted distinction opens a new question: we need a philosophical investigation into the origin of the two phases.

Good and bad sides of sex.

3.5.1. Those that desire earthly procreation are satisfied with the beauty found on earth, the beauty of image and of body; it is because they are strangers to the Archetype, the source of even the attraction they feel towards what is lovely here. There are Souls to whom earthly beauty is a leading to the memory of that in the higher realm and these love the earthly as an image; those that have not attained to this memory do not understand what is happening within them, and take the image for the reality. Once there is perfect self-control, it is no fault to enjoy the beauty of earth; where appreciation degenerates into carnality, there is sin.

Sex as material desires is bad. But it's still a beauty of the earth. You can see how it's both things.

3.5.1. The less the desire for procreation, the greater is the contentment with beauty alone, yet procreation aims at the engendering of beauty; it is the expression of a lack; the subject is conscious of insufficiency and, wishing to produce beauty, feels that the way is to beget in a beautiful form. Where the procreative desire is lawless or against the purposes of nature, the first inspiration has been natural, but they have diverged from the way, they have slipped and fallen, and they grovel; they neither understand whither Love sought to lead them nor have they any instinct to production; they have not mastered the right use of the images of beauty; they do not know what the Authentic Beauty is.

The potential shallowness of sex. How beauty is more than physical. Not going to lie, this topic of conversation is hella confusing for me, and probably most of us in our porn-ridden non-monogamous society.

3.5.2. The Heavenly Aphrodite, daughter of Kronos who is no other than the Intellectual Principle—must be the Soul at its divinest: unmingled as the immediate emanation of the unmingled; remaining ever Above, as neither desirous nor capable of descending to this sphere, never having developed the downward tendency, a divine Hypostasis essentially aloof, so unreservedly an Authentic Being as to have no part with Matter—and therefore mythically "the unmothered" justly called not Celestial Spirit but God, as knowing no admixture, gathered cleanly within itself.

I love how the Greek gods come in, clearly as symbolism.

3.5.3. That Love is a Hypostasis [a "Person"] a Real-Being sprung from a Real-Being—lower than the parent but authentically existent—is beyond doubt.

A weird claim. I get "love" as a concept with a greater metaphysical. But Love as a being. Polytheistic mentalities, I suppose, but how do we use this?

3.5.4. As the All-Soul contains the Universal Love, so must the single Soul be allowed its own single Love: and as closely as the single Soul holds to the All-Soul, never cut off but embraced within it, the two together constituting one principle of life, so the single separate Love holds to the All-Love. Similarly, the individual love keeps with the individual Soul as that other, the great Love, goes with the All-Soul; and the Love within the All permeates it throughout so that the one Love becomes many, showing itself where it chooses at any moment of the Universe, taking definite shape in these its partial phases and revealing itself at its will.

Just noting.

3.5.5. Again, this Kosmos is a compound of body and soul; but Aphrodite to Plato is the Soul itself, therefore Aphrodite would necessarily—he a constituent part of Eros, dominant member! A man is the man's Soul, if the world is, similarly, the world's Soul, then Aphrodite, the Soul, is identical with Love, the Kosmos! And why should this one spirit, Love, be the Universe to the exclusion of all the others, which certainly are sprung from the same Essential-Being? Our only escape would be to make the Kosmos a complex of Supernals.

More deities of symbolism.

3.5.8. We have seen that the Aphrodite of the Myth is the Soul and that Poros, Wealth, is the Reason-Principle of the Universe: we have still to explain Zeus and his garden.

We cannot take Zeus to be the Soul, which we have agreed is represented by Aphrodite.

Plato, who must be our guide in this question, speaks in the Phaedrus of this God, Zeus, as the Great Leader—though elsewhere he seems to rank him as one of three—but in the Philebus he speaks more plainly when he says that there is in Zeus not only a royal Soul, but also a royal Intellect.

As a mighty Intellect and Soul, he must be a principle of Cause; he must be the highest for several reasons but especially because to be King and Leader is to be the chief cause: Zeus then is the Intellectual Principle. Aphrodite, his daughter, issue of him, dwelling with him, will be Soul, her very name Aphrodite [= the habra, delicate] indicating the beauty and gleam and innocence and delicate grace of the Soul.

And if we take the male gods to represent the Intellectual Powers and the female gods to be their souls—to every Intellectual Principle its companion Soul—we are forced, thus also, to make Aphrodite the Soul of Zeus; and the identification is confirmed by Priests and Theologians who consider Aphrodite and Hera one and the same and call Aphrodite's star the star of Hera.

Working out Zeus as representation, a solid section to prove the personification effect.

Tractate 3.6. The Impassivity of the Unembodied

Unembodied means doesn't have a body, for example, the soul, the mind, or The One. So impassivity means these entities cannot get affected or damaged like a body can. Hence, don't identify with body, transcend it. This super long chapter is more of a diss track to physical matter. As we've covered, matter is evil in the way that it’s the furthest emanation from The One. But it’s also a result of The One, so there’s Good in it as a requirement for reality. In saying that, matter is a blank slate, as it could not create anything without spirit propulsion. That's how I understood this chapter anyway. Due to its length, I found it difficult to know which parts to highlight.

3.6.5. The purification of the Soul is simply to allow it to be alone; it is pure when it keeps no company; when it looks to nothing without itself; when it entertains no alien thoughts—be the mode or origin of such notions or affections what they may, a subject on which we have already touched—when it no longer sees in the world of image, much less elaborates images into veritable affections. Is it not a true purification to turn away towards the exact contrary of earthly things?

Daoist.

3.6.7. Matter is no Soul; it is not Intellect, is not Life, is no Ideal-Principle, no Reason-Principle; it is no limit or bound, for it is mere indetermination; it is not a power, for what does it produce?

It lives on the farther side of all these categories and so has no tide to the name of Being. It will be more plausibly called a non-being, and this in the sense not of movement [away from Being] or station (in Not-Being) but of veritable Not-Being, so that it is no more than the image and phantasm of Mass, a bare aspiration towards substantial existence; it is stationary but not in the sense of having position, it is in itself invisible, eluding all effort to observe it, present where no one can look, unseen for all our gazing, ceaselessly presenting contraries in the things based upon it; it is large and small, more and less, deficient and excessive; a phantasm unabiding and yet unable to withdraw—not even strong enough to withdraw, so utterly has it failed to accept strength from the Intellectual Principle, so absolute its lack of all Being.

Its every utterance, therefore, is a lie; it pretends to be great and it is little, to be more and it is less; and the Existence with which it masks itself is no Existence, but a passing trick making trickery of all that seems to be present in it, phantasms within a phantasm; it is like a mirror showing things as in itself when they are really elsewhere, filled in appearance but actually empty, containing nothing, pretending everything. Into it and out of it move mimicries of the Authentic Existents, images playing upon an image devoid of Form, visible against it by its very formlessness; they seem to modify it but in reality effect nothing, for they are ghostly and feeble, have no thrust and meet none in Matter either; they pass through it leaving no cleavage, as through water; or they might be compared to shapes projected so as to make some appearance upon what we can know only as the Void.

Hard dissing matter.

3.6.11. In a word, when we call Matter evil we are right only if we mean that it is not amenable to modification by The Good; but that means simply that it is subject to no modification whatever.

Clarification.

3.6.13. The reflections in the mirror are not taken to be real, all the less since the appliance on which they appear is seen and remains while the images disappear, but Matter is not seen either with the images or without them. But suppose the reflections on the mirror remaining and the mirror itself not seen, we would never doubt the solid reality of all that appears.

If, then, there is, really, something in a mirror, we may suppose objects of sense to be in Matter in precisely that way: if in the mirror there is nothing, if there is only a seeming of something, then we may judge that in Matter there is the same delusion and that the seeming is to be traced to the Substantial-Existence of the Real-Beings, that Substantial-Existence in which the Authentic has the real participation while only an unreal participation can belong to the unauthentic since their condition must differ from that which they would know if the parts were reversed, if the Authentic Existents were not and they were.

Something trippy here.

3.6.14. But would this mean that if there were no Matter nothing would exist?

Precisely as in the absence of a mirror, or something of similar power, there would be no reflection.

Continuation from the previous.

3.6.16. Eliminate this Ideal-Form and the substratum ceases to be a thing of magnitude, or to appear so: the mass produced by the Idea was, let us suppose, a man or a horse; the horse-magnitude came upon the Matter when a horse was produced upon it; when the horse ceases to exist upon the Matter, the magnitude of the horse departs also. If we are told that the horse implies a certain determined bulk and that this bulk is a permanent thing, we answer that what is permanent in this case is not the magnitude of the horse but the magnitude of mass in general. That same Magnitude might be fire or earth; on their disappearance their particular magnitudes would disappear with them. Matter, then, can never take to itself either pattern or magnitude; if it did, it would no longer be able to turn from being fire, let us say, into being something else; it would become and be fire once for all.

That horse thing kinda clicked. It's spiritual material pressed upon matter, not matter itself. Matter isn’t anything anyway, just lego pieces. At what point do the pieces make the thing?

3.6.19. This too exalting title is conferred upon it in order to indicate that it is the source of things in the sense of being their underlie: it is an approximate name chosen for a general conception; there is no intention of suggesting a complete parallel with motherhood to those not satisfied with a surface impression but needing a precisely true presentment; by a remote symbolism, the nearest they could find, they indicate that Matter is sterile, not female to full effect, female in receptivity only, not in pregnancy: this they accomplish by exhibiting Matter as approached by what is neither female nor effectively male, but castrated of that impregnating power which belongs only to the unchangeably masculine.

I wish I understood this gender stuff better.

Tractate 3.7. Time and Eternity

Another difficult chapter. It's about time vs. movement. Eternity exists in the Intellect as something perfect and unchanging. Meanwhile, time exists in the physical because it moves and changes. I don’t know why even this debate exists. What do I do with this info?

3.7.3. There exists no source or ground from which anything could make its way into that standing present; any imagined entrant will prove to be not alien but already integral. And as it can never come to be anything at present outside it, so, necessarily, it cannot include any past; what can there be that once was in it and now is gone? Futurity, similarly, is banned; nothing could be yet to come to it. Thus no ground is left for its existence but that it be what it is.

That which neither has been nor will be, but simply possesses being; that which enjoys stable existence as neither in process of change nor having ever changed—that is Eternity. Thus we come to the definition: the Life—instantaneously entire, complete, at no point broken into period or part—which belongs to the Authentic Existent by its very existence, this is the thing we were probing for—this is Eternity.

Kind of summary.

3.7.6. Now the Principle this stated, all good and beauty, and everlasting, is centred in The One, sprung from It, and pointed towards It, never straying from It, but ever holding about It and in It and living by Its law; and it is in this reference, as I judge, that Plato—finely, and by no means inadvertently but with profound intention—wrote those words of his, "Eternity stable in Unity"; he wishes to convey that Eternity is not merely something circling on its traces into a final unity but has [instantaneous] Being about The One as the unchanging Life of the Authentic Existent. This is certainly what we have been seeking: this Principle, at rest within rest with the One, is Eternity; possessing this stable quality, being itself at once the absolute self-identical and none the less the active manifestation of an unchanging Life set towards the Divine and dwelling within It, untrue, therefore, neither on the side of Being nor on the side of Life—this will be Eternity [the Real-Being we have sought].

My notes said "am I tired or is this type of thing so confusing?" lol. I think it makes more sense now.

3.7.6. There is, of course, no difference between Being and Everlasting Being; just as there is none between a philosopher and a true philosopher: the attribute "true" came into use because there arose what masqueraded as philosophy; and for similar reasons "everlasting" was adjoined to "Being," and "Being" to "everlasting," and we have [the tautology of] "Everlasting Being." We must take this "Everlasting" as expressing no more than Authentic Being: it is merely a partial expression of a potency which ignores all interval or term and can look forward to nothing by way of addition to the All which it possesses. The Principle of which this is the statement will be the All-Existent, and, as being all, can have no failing or deficiency, cannot be at some one point complete and at some other lacking.

This is great.

3.7.6. The phrase "He was good" [used by Plato of the Demiurge] refers to the Idea of the All; and its very indefiniteness signifies the utter absense of relation to Time: so that even this Universe has had no temporal beginning; and if we speak of something "before" it, that is only in the sense of the Cause from which it takes its Eternal Existence. Plato used the word merely for the convenience of exposition, and immediately corrects it as inappropriate to the order vested with the Eternity he conceives and affirms.

I had to research outside of this. Apparently Plotinus is referring to Plato's Timaeus, where Plato describes the Gnostic Demiurge as "good" which is weird because nobody says that. But what I learned is that "demiurge" was a common Greek word for "craftsman" while Plato elevated it to a divine cosmic architect and then finally the Gnostics formed the evil Yaldabaoth character from it. Nevertheless, Plotinus is claiming that Plato was using the demiurge origins story to make a point rather than a statement, and therefore, he's not wrong or right.

3.7.10. Enough: Our main purpose is to show what Time is, not to refute false definition. To traverse point by point the many opinions of our many predecessors would mean a history rather than an identification; we have treated the various theories as fully as is possible in a cursory review: and, notice, that which makes Time the Measure of the All-Movement is refuted by our entire discussion and, especially, by the observations upon the Measurement of Movement in general, for all the argument—except, of course, that from irregularity—applies to the All as much as to particular Movement.

Up until this point it appears he was addressing other theories.

3.7.11. To this end we must go back to the state we affirmed of Eternity, unwavering Life, undivided totality, limitless, knowing no divagation, at rest in unity and intent upon it. Time was not yet: or at least it did not exist for the Eternal Beings, though its being was implicit in the Idea and Principle of progressive derivation.

Time is man made.

3.7.11. To bring this Kosmos into being, the Soul first laid aside its eternity and clothed itself with Time; this world of its fashioning it then gave over to be a servant to Time, making it at every point a thing of Time, setting all its progressions within the bournes of Time.

Love this line.

3.7.12. We observe the tract between a sunrise and its return and, as the movement is uniform, we thus obtain a Time-interval upon which to measure ourselves, and we use this as a standard. We have thus a measure of Time. Time itself is not a measure. How would it set to work? And what kind of thing is there of which it could say, "I find the extent of this equal to such and such a stretch of my own extent?" What is this "I"? Obviously something by which measurement is known. Time, then, serves towards measurement but is not itself the Measure: the Movement of the All will be measured according to Time, but Time will not, of its own Nature, be a Measure of Movement: primarily a Kind to itself, it will incidentally exhibit the magnitudes of that movement.

And the reiterated observation of Movement—the same extent found to be traversed in such and such a period—will lead to the conception of a definite quantity of Time past.

This brings us to the fact that, in a certain sense, the Movement, the orbit of the universe, may legitimately be said to measure Time—in so far as that is possible at all—since any definite stretch of that circuit occupies a certain quantity of Time, and this is the only grasp we have of Time, our only understanding of it: what that circuit measures—by indication, that is—will be Time, manifested by the Movement but not brought into being by it.

Kind of interesting. Time was something we made up to make sense of things, but it is still based on moveemnt. Unsure why this giant chapter is important to my greater spirituality though. Maybe mindfulness?

Tractate 3.8. Nature, Contemplation, and the One

My takeaway is that nature is the unfolding of The One. It's not contemplation, it's not a conscious plan, it's merely the inevitable process of The One, to the Intellect, to the Soul, to the material.

3.8.3. And does this Reason-Principle, Nature, spring from a contemplation?

Wholly and solely?

From self-contemplation, then? Or what are we to think? It derives from a Contemplation and some contemplating Being; how are we to suppose it to have Contemplation itself?

The Contemplation springing from the reasoning faculty—that, I mean, of planning its own content, it does not possess.

But why not, since it is a phase of Life, a Reason-Principle and a creative Power?

Because to plan for a thing is to lack it: Nature does not lack; it creates because it possesses. Its creative act is simply its possession of it own characteristic Essence; now its Essence, since it is a Reason-Principle, is to be at once an act of contemplation and an object of contemplation. In other words, the, Nature-Principle produces by virtue of being an act of contemplation, an object of contemplation and a Reason-Principle; on this triple character depends its creative efficacy.

Thus the act of production is seen to be in Nature an act of contemplation, for creation is the outcome of a contemplation which never becomes anything else, which never does anything else, but creates by simply being a contemplation.

Nature creates from contemplation but not as a plan because it already possess it.

3.8.4. And Nature, asked why it brings forth its works, might answer if it cared to listen and to speak:

"It would have been more becoming to put no question but to learn in silence just as I myself am silent and make no habit of talking. And what is your lesson? This; that whatsoever comes into being is my is my vision, seen in my silence, the vision that belongs to my character who, sprung from vision, am vision-loving and create vision by the vision-seeing faculty within me. The mathematicians from their vision draw their figures: but I draw nothing: I gaze and the figures of the material world take being as if they fell from my contemplation. As with my Mother (the All-Soul] and the Beings that begot me so it is with me: they are born of a Contemplation and my birth is from them, not by their Act but by their Being; they are the loftier Reason-Principles, they contemplate themselves and I am born."

Now what does this tell us?

Plotinus puts words into nature's mouth and then just as quickly follows it like “What does this tell us?” He’s essentially quoting himself as a reference haha.

3.8.5. The Soul is to extend throughout the Universe, no spot void of its energy: but, a prior is always different from its secondary, and energy is a secondary, rising as it must from contemplation or act; act, however, is not at this stage existent since it depends upon contemplation: therefore the Soul, while its phases differ, must, in all of them, remain a contemplation and what seems to be an act done under contemplation must be in reality that weakened contemplation of which we have spoken: the engendered must respect the Kind, but in weaker form, dwindled in the descent.

All goes softly since nothing here demands the parade of thought or act upon external things: it is a Soul in vision and, by this vision, creating its own subsequent—this Principle [of Nature], itself also contemplative but in the feebler degree since it lies further away and cannot reproduce the quality or experiences of its prior—a Vision creates the Vision.

A summary. "A vision creates the vision" I like.

3.8.9. Wherever you be, you have only to range over against this omnipresent Being that in you which is capable of drawing from It, and you have your share in it: imagine a voice sounding over a vast waste of land, and not only over the emptiness alone but over human beings; wherever you be in that great space you have but to listen and you take the voice entire—entire though yet with a difference.

This para seems profound and well explained.

3.8.10. Imagine a spring that has no source outside itself; it gives itself to all the rivers, yet is never exhausted by what they take, but remains always integrally as it was; the tides that proceed from it are at one within it before they run their several ways, yet all, in some sense, know beforehand down what channels they will pour their streams.

This entire section needs your attention.

3.8.11. The Intellectual-Principle is a Seeing, and a Seeing which itself sees; therefore it is a potentiality which has become effective.

This implies the distinction of Matter and Form in it—as there must be in all actual seeing—the Matter in this case being the Intelligibles which the Intellectual-Principle contains and sees. All actual seeing implies duality; before the seeing takes place there is the pure unity [of the power of seeing]. That unity [of principle] acquires duality [in the act of seeing], and the duality is [always to be traced back to] a unity.

The act of seeing creating duality really shook me.

Tractate 3.9. Detached Considerations.

A short burst of miscellaneous thought, perhaps functioning as a midpoint book summary. Each paragraph was almost a different subject, like discarded snippets collected in one place.

3.9.4. How, then, does Unity give rise to Multiplicity?

By its omnipresence: there is nowhere where it is not; it occupies, therefore, all that is; at once, it is manifold—or, rather, it is all things.

If it were simply and solely everywhere, all would be this one thing alone: but it is, also, in no place, and this gives, in the final result, that, while all exists by means of it, in virtue of its omnipresence, all is distinct from it in virtue of its being nowhere.

But why is it not merely present everywhere but in addition nowhere-present?

Because, universality demands a previous unity. It must, therefore, pervade all things and make all, but not be the universe which it makes.

This felt important enough to hold onto.

The Fourth Ennead.

Tractate 4.1. On the Essence of the Soul (I)

Short chapter to explain what we already know. The soul is not physical. There is one soul. We have our own bit of the soul which uses the body. It lives between body and Nous. It’s the same but delegated.

4.1.1. The entity, therefore, described as "consisting of the undivided soul and of the soul divided among bodies," contains a soul which is at once above and below, attached to the Supreme and yet reaching down to this sphere, like a radius from a centre.

Summary.

Tractate 4.2. On the Essence of the Soul (II)

The soul has many functions, but I see it as a spark that keeps us alive which, upon meeting the brain, creates thinking. Neoplatonism kind of agrees, in that only soul is capable of thinking. On that thought, a common metaphor is to liken the soul to a light from the Sun (the overall soul) shining into a room (the body). The physical receives it and the soul is aware of this physical, including its pain, but a soul cannot be injured. In this way, the body is actually in the soul, not the other way round. That was a new one for me.

4.2.1. But to that order is opposed Essence [Real-Being]; this is in no degree susceptible of partition; it is unparted and impartible; interval is foreign to it, cannot enter into our idea of it: it has no need of place and is not, in diffusion or as an entirety, situated within any other being: it is poised over all beings at once, and this is not in the sense of using them as a base but in their being neither capable nor desirous of existing independently of it; it is an essence eternally unvaried: it is common to all that follows upon it: it is like the circle's centre to which all the radii are attached while leaving it unbrokenly in possession of itself, the starting point of their course and of their essential being, the ground in which they all participate: thus the indivisible is the principle of these divided existences and in their very outgoing they remain enduringly in contact with that stationary essence.

Can't remember why I was noting this.

4.2.1. The bodies are separate, and the ideal form which enters them is correspondingly sundered while, still, it is present as one whole in each of its severed parts, since amid that multiplicity in which complete individuality has entailed complete partition, there is a permanent identity; we may think of colour, qualities of all kinds, some particular shape, which can be present in many unrelated objects at the one moment, each entire and yet with no community of experience among the various manifestations. In the case of such ideal-forms we may affirm complete partibility.

Feels important.

4.2.1. In whatsoever bodies it occupies—even the vastest of all, that in which the entire universe is included—it gives itself to the whole without abdicating its unity.

[...]

Itself devoid of mass, it is present to all mass: it exists here and yet is There, and this not in distinct phases but with unsundered identity: thus it is "parted and not parted," or, better, it has never known partition, never become a parted thing, but remains a self-gathered integral, and is "parted among bodies" merely in the sense that bodies, in virtue of their own sundered existence, cannot receive it unless in some partitive mode; the partition, in other words, is an occurrence in body not in soul.

Explaining soul characteristics.

4.2.2. If it had the nature of body it would consist of isolated members each unaware of the conditions of every other; there would be a particular soul—say a soul of the finger—answering as a distinct and independent entity to every local experience; in general terms, there would be a multiplicity of souls administering each individual; and, moreover, the universe would be governed not by one soul but by an incalculable number, each standing apart to itself. But, without a dominant unity, continuity is meaningless.

[...]

In the case of things not endowed with intelligence, the "leading-principle" is their mere unity—a lower reproduction of the soul's efficiency.

Definitely dropping some heavy stuff here. I feel like in the midst of reading the book, these hit me hard, but now stripping them out of context, I struggle to place them even if I can sense how significant the information is.

Tractate 4.3. Problems of the Soul (I)

I came across a wifi analogy, whereby the connection comes from the outside (the All-Soul), not from inside of your phone (the body). But they are connected nonetheless.

Again, the soul cannot be corrupted or injured, so you can always turn towards that place. Seek beauty, it’s there. This chapter is also a lot about memory, which I struggled to understand, but I think it's claimed that memory is not body nor soul, it’s in a seat of the lower soul that integrates with the body? So nothing to do with reincarnation etc.

4.3.2. Part, as understood of body—uniform or varied—need not detain us; it is enough to indicate that, when part is mentioned in respect of things whose members are alike, it refers to mass and not to ideal-form [specific idea]: take for example, whiteness: the whiteness in a portion of milk is not a part of the whiteness of milk in general: we have the whiteness of a portion not a portion of whiteness; for whiteness is utterly without magnitude; has nothing whatever to do with quantity.

[...]

Again, it is admitted that the particular soul—this "part of the All-Soul—is of one ideal-form with it, but this does not entail the relation of part to whole, since in objects formed of continuous parts there is nothing inevitably making any portion uniform with the total: take, for example, the parts of a circle or square; we may divide it in different ways so as to get our part; a triangle need not be divided into triangles; all sorts of different figures are possible: yet an absolute uniformity is admitted to reign throughout soul.

I only semi understood these analogies, but they seem like good ones to ponder.

4.3.4. The unit soul holds aloof, not actually falling into body; the differentiated souls—the All-Soul, with the others—issue from the unity while still constituting, within certain limits, an association. They are one soul by the fact that they do not belong unreservedly to any particular being; they meet, so to speak, fringe to fringe; they strike out here and there, but are held together at the source much as light is a divided thing upon earth, shining in this house, and that, and yet remains uninterruptedly one identical substance.

The All-Soul would always remain above, since essentially it has nothing to do with descent or with the lower, or with any tendency towards this sphere: the other souls would become ours [become "partial," individual in us] because their lot is cast for this sphere, and because they are solicited by a thing [the body] which invites their care.

The one—the lowest soul in the to the All-Soul—would correspond to that in some great growth, silently, unlaboriously conducting the whole; our own lowest soul might be compared to the insect life in some rotted part of the growth—for this is the ratio of the animated body to the universe—while the other soul in us, of one ideal nature with the higher parts of the All-Soul, may be imaged as the gardener concerned about the insects lodged in the tree and anxiously working to amend what is wrong; or we may contrast a healthy man living with the healthy and, by his thought or by his act, lending himself to the service of those about him, with, on the other side, a sick man intent upon his own care and cure, and so living for the body, body-bound.

Still finding my place in all of this but it felt important to keep.

4.3.5. Thus the gist of the matter is established: one soul the source of all; those others, as a many founded in that one, are, on the analogy of the Intellectual-Principle, at once divided and undivided; that Soul which abides in the Supreme is the one expression or Logos of the Intellectual-Principle, and from it spring other Reason-Principles, partial but immaterial, exactly as in the differentiation of the Supreme.

Nifty little summary for you.

4.3.6. The answer might be that there is an even greater difference among these souls, the one never having fallen away from the All-Soul, but dwelling within it and assuming body therein, while the others received their allotted spheres when the body was already in existence, when their sister soul was already in rule and, as it were, had already prepared habitations for them. Again, the reason may be that the one [the creative All-Soul] looks towards the universal Intellectual-Principle [the exemplar of all that can be], while the others are more occupied with the Intellectual within themselves, that which is already of the sphere of part; perhaps, too, these also could have created, but that they were anticipated by that originator—the work accomplished before them—an impediment inevitable whichsoever of the souls were first to operate.

[...]

The "secondary and tertiary souls," of which we hear, must be understood in the sense of closer or remoter position: it is much as in ourselves the relation to the Supreme is not identical from soul to soul; some of us are capable of becoming Uniate, others of striving and almost attaining, while a third rank is much less apt; it is a matter of the degree or powers of the soul by which our expression is determined—the first degree dominant in the one person, the second, the third [the merely animal life] in others while, still, all of us contain all the powers.

Some of us are more in tuned with our own souls, others more with the greater??

4.3.8. The infinity is a matter of power: there is question, not of the soul's being divisible into an infinite number of parts, but of an infinite possible effectiveness: it is infinity in the sense in which the Supreme God, also, is free of all bound.

Their “infinity” does not mean they are physically endless or divided into parts, but that their power and activity are unlimited. Also, the Supreme God stuff.

4.3.9. In the absence of body, soul could not have gone forth, since there is no other place to which its nature would allow it to descend. Since go forth it must, it will generate a place for itself; at once body, also, exists.

While the Soul [as an eternal, a Divine Being] is at rest—in rest firmly based on Repose, the Absolute—yet, as we may put it, that huge illumination of the Supreme pouring outwards comes at last to the extreme bourne of its light and dwindles to darkness; this darkness, now lying there beneath, the soul sees and by seeing brings to shape; for in the law of things this ultimate depth, neighbouring with soul, may not go void of whatsoever degree of that Reason-Principle it can absorb, the dimmed reason of reality at its faintest.

Imagine that a stately and varied mansion has been built; it has never been abandoned by its Architect, who, yet, is not tied down to it; he has judged it worthy in all its length and breadth of all the care that can serve to its Being—as far as it can share in Being—or to its beauty, but a care without burden to its director, who never descends, but presides over it from above: this gives the degree in which the kosmos is ensouled, not by a soul belonging to it, but by one present to it; it is mastered not master; not possessor but possessed. The soul bears it up, and it lies within, no fragment of it unsharing.

The process of materialism. Honestly, this computes with my overall understanding as well as that of the the Observer Effect. It's basically the "energy" (soul) observing itself into existence. Also appreciate the final paragraph's metaphor.

4.3.10. We are not to think that the Soul acts upon the object by conformity to any external judgement; there is no pause for willing or planning: any such procedure would not be an act of sheer nature, but one of applied art: but art is of later origin than soul; it is an imitator, producing dim and feeble copies—toys, things of no great worth—and it is dependent upon all sorts of mechanism by which alone its images can be produced. The soul, on the contrary, is sovereign over material things by might of Real-Being; their quality is determined by its lead, and those elementary things cannot stand against its will. On the later level, things are hindered one by the other, and thus often fall short of the characteristic shape at which their unextended Reason-Principle must be aiming; in that other world [under the soul but above the material] the entire shape [as well as the idea] comes from soul, and all that is produced takes and keeps its appointed place in a unity, so that the engendered thing, without labour as without clash, becomes all that it should be. In that world the soul has elaborated its creation, the images of the gods, dwellings for men, each existing to some peculiar purpose.

The soul is more important because it can exist without the body, not the other way around.

4.3.11. The Intellectual-Principle in the Supreme has ever been the sun of that sphere—let us accept that as the type of the creative Logos—and immediately upon it follows the Soul depending from it, stationary Soul from stationary Intelligence. But the Soul borders also upon the sun of this sphere, and it becomes the medium by which all is linked to the overworld; it plays the part of an interpreter between what emanates from that sphere down to this lower universe, and what rises—as far as, through soul, anything can—from the lower to the highest.

Summary of the hierarchy.

4.3.14. Thus it comes about that this kosmos, lit with many lights, gleaming in its souls, receives still further graces, gifts from here and from there, from the gods of the Supreme, and from those other Intellectual-Principles whose nature it is to ensoul. This is probably the secret of the myth in which, after Prometheus had moulded woman, the other gods heaped gifts upon her, Hephaistos "blending the clay with moisture and bestowing the human voice and the form of a goddess"; Aphrodite bringing her gifts, and the Graces theirs, and other gods other gifts, and finally calling her by the name [Pandora] which tells of gift and of all giving—for all have added something to this formation brought to being by a Promethean, a fore-thinking power. As for the rejection of Prometheus' gift by after-thought, Epimetheus, what can this signify but that the wiser choice is to remain in the Intellectual realm? Pandora's creator is fettered, to signify that he is in some sense held by his own creation; such a fettering is external and the release by Hercules tells that there is power in Prometheus, so that he need not remain in bonds.

Gorgeously written and so appreciated with Greek god coverage.

4.3.16. The punishment justly overtaking the wicked must therefore be ascribed to the kosmic order which leads all in accordance with the right.

But what of chastisements, poverty, illness, falling upon the good outside of all justice? These events, we will be told, are equally interwoven into the world order and fall under prediction, and must consequently have a cause in the general reason: are they therefore to be charged to past misdoing?

No: such misfortunes do not answer to reasons established in the nature of things; they are not laid up in the master-facts of the universe, but were merely accidental sequents: a house falls, and anyone that chances to be underneath is killed, no matter what sort of man he be: two objects are moving in perfect order—or one if you like—but anything getting in the way is wounded or trampled down. Or we may reason that the undeserved stroke can be no evil to the sufferer in view of the beneficent interweaving of the All or again, no doubt, that nothing is unjust that finds justification in a past history.

I love the perspective of karma. Literally, it's just an accident. There is no cosmic retribution. Personally, I don't quite subscribe to that. For me, it is still Neoplatonic to suggest that, through the soul, reality manifests. And so, if an individual spends an extensive time removed from "The Good" of The One and feels negative emotion as a result, then their reality will reflect their inner turmoil accordingly. Which is why the best way to commit heinous acts is to feel absolutely no remorse for it; a practice which in theory is obviously impossible to control.

4.3.20. This simply shows that neither the soul entire nor any part of it may be considered to be within the body as in a space: space is a container, a container of body; it is the home of such things as consist of isolated parts, things, therefore, in which at no point is there an entirety; now, the soul is not a body and is no more contained than containing.

Neither is it in body as in some vessel: whether as vessel or as place of location, the body would remain, in itself, unensouled. If we are to think of some passing-over from the soul—that self-gathered thing—to the containing vessel, then soul is diminished by just as much as the vessel takes.

[...]

How comes it then that everyone speaks of soul as being in body?

Because the soul is not seen and the body is: we perceive the body, and by its movement and sensation we understand that it is ensouled, and we say that it possesses a soul; to speak of residence is a natural sequence. If the soul were visible, an object of the senses, radiating throughout the entire life, if it were manifest in full force to the very outermost surface, we would no longer speak of soul as in body; we would say the minor was within the major, the contained within the container, the fleeting within the perdurable.

Good explanations.

4.3.22. May we think that the mode of the soul's presence to body is that of the presence of light to the air?

This certainly is presence with distinction: the light penetrates through and through, but nowhere coalesces; the light is the stable thing, the air flows in and out; when the air passes beyond the lit area it is dark; under the light it is lit: we have a true parallel to what we have been saying of body and soul, for the air is in the light quite as much as the light in the air.

One of his most famous analogies, I believe.

4.3.23. I explain: A living body is illuminated by soul: each organ and member participates in soul after some manner peculiar to itself; the organ is adapted to a certain function, and this fitness is the vehicle of the soul-faculty under which the function is performed; thus the seeing faculty acts through the eyes, the hearing faculty through the ears, the tasting faculty through the tongue, the faculty of smelling through the nostrils, and the faculty of sentient touch is present throughout, since in this particular form of perception the entire body is an instrument in the soul's service.

This whole piece needs to be noted.

4.3.24. Now comes the question of the soul leaving the body; where does it go?

Worth reading this whole thing. It does talk about "alien elements" like lower attachments to the material world which are "punished" because they can't reach the higher plane without purification, but this is simply just the design of reality rather than cosmic judgement. I conclude with a maybe.

4.3.25. Now comes the question, equally calling for an answer, whether those souls that have quitted the places of earth retain memory of their lives—all souls or some, of all things, or of some things, and, again, for ever or merely for some period not very long after their withdrawal.

Another full verse worth visiting, asking the question about memories of past lives. If I understand correctly, his perception is that soul does not retain memory per se, but rather accesses a higher truth which contains all of knowledge anyway?

4.3.26. Now if sensations of the active order depend upon the Couplement of soul and body, sensation must be of that double nature. Hence it is classed as one of the shared acts: the soul, in the feeling, may be compared to the workman in such operations as boring or weaving, the body to the tool employed: the body is passive and menial; the soul is active, reading such impressions as are made upon the body or discerned by means of the body, perhaps entertaining only a judgement formed as the result of the bodily experiences.

Again, I am noting only the first paragraph to represent the entire verse. I think it's talking about how the soul can recall things that the body never experiences. Something like that explains why we feel compelled to pursue things even though we’ve never done them before. Is that past stuff embedded in the soul? I don’t pretend to fully understand.

4.3.32. The loftier, on the contrary, must desire to come to a happy forgetfulness of all that has reached it through the lower: for one reason, there is always the possibility that the very excellence of the lower prove detrimental to the higher, tending to keep it down by sheer force of vitality. In any case the more urgent the intention towards the Supreme, the more extensive will be the soul's forgetfulness, unless indeed, when the entire living has, even here, been such that memory has nothing but the noblest to deal with: in this world itself, all is best when human interests have been held aloof; so, therefore, it must be with the memory of them. In this sense we may truly say that the good soul is the forgetful. It flees multiplicity; it seeks to escape the unbounded by drawing all to unity, for only thus is it free from entanglement, light-footed, self-conducted. Thus it is that even in this world the soul which has the desire of the other is putting away, amid its actual life, all that is foreign to that order. It brings there very little of what it has gathered here; as long as it is in the heavenly regions only, it will have more than it can retain.

Looking here at both 31 and 32. I struggle to make sense of it, but the line “In this sense we may truly say that the good soul is the forgetful” did land. It's about the lack of duality. A "lower soul" is focused on an individual life, a higher soul breaks free from that, and therefore has no need for memory.

Tractate 4.4. Problems of the Soul (II)

Still on the memory thing, and what soul does remember is the important aspects like beauty, truth, and goodness. But stuff like your PIN or your boss' name has nothing to do with the soul. This chapter goes onto discuss how everything is connected as a singular organism, so when you perform a ritual or say a prayer with the right intention, it reaches everywhere. However, the spiritual gurus wouldn't even do this because they transcend the need to meddle. I have said all of this before!

4.4.2. There will not even be memory of the personality; no thought that the contemplator is the self—Socrates, for example—or that it is Intellect or Soul. In this connection it should be borne in mind that, in contemplative vision, especially when it is vivid, we are not at the time aware of our own personality; we are in possession of ourselves but the activity is towards the object of vision with which the thinker becomes identified; he has made himself over as matter to be shaped; he takes ideal form under the action of the vision while remaining, potentially, himself. This means that he is actively himself when he has intellection of nothing.

I think he’s saying that personality itself is memory based which is something I FULLY believe. You’ll lose yourself when you really connect.

4.4.6. The question touches memory in the stars in general, and also in the sun and moon and ends by dealing with the soul of the All, even by audaciously busying itself with the memories of Zeus himself. The enquiry entails the examination and identification of acts of understanding and of reasoning in these beings, if such acts take place.

Zeus again.

4.4.7. In other words, they have seen God and they do not remember?

Ah, no: it is that they see God still and always, and that, as long as they see, they cannot tell themselves they have had the vision; such reminiscence is for souls that have lost it.

Awesome stuff.

4.4.9. But Zeus—ordering all, governor, guardian and disposer, possessor for ever of the kingly soul and the kingly intellect, bringing all into being by his providence, and presiding over all things as they come, administering all under plan and system, unfolding the periods of the kosmos, many of which stand already accomplished—would it not seem inevitable that, in this multiplicity of concern, Zeus should have memory of all the periods, their number and their differing qualities? Contriving the future, co-ordinating, calculating for what is to be, must he not surely be the chief of all in remembering, as he is chief in producing?

Zeus is a representative of the divine ordering principle. He is the "soul of the Universe", I've read it said. This whole thing can be tricky. The Greek god thing is obviously metaphorical but I do wonder how the mythological narratives tie into all of this.

4.4.10. The ordering principle is twofold; there is the principle known to us as the Demiurge and there is the Soul of the All; we apply the appellation "Zeus" sometimes to the Demiurge and sometimes to the principle conducting the universe.

When under the name of Zeus we are considering the Demiurge we must leave out all notions of stage and progress, and recognize one unchanging and timeless life.

Demiurge again here too. From what I can find out, apparently these allegories are used because Plato did so. And, of course, that is what Neoplatonism is supposed to be, the faithful interpretation of Plato, that was Plotinus' entire thing. It’s about common mythology used for communication.

4.4.12. Again, if the leading principle of the universe knows the future as it must—then obviously it will know by what means that future is to come about; given this knowledge, what further need is there of its reasoning towards it, or confronting past with present? And, of course, this knowledge of things to come—admitting it to exist—is not like that of the diviners; it is that of the actual causing principles holding the certainty that the thing will exist, the certainty inherent in the all-disposers, above perplexity and hesitancy; the notion is constituent and therefore unvarying. The knowledge of future things is, in a word, identical with that of the present; it is a knowledge in repose and thus a knowledge transcending the processes of cogitation.

If the leading principle of the universe does not know the future which it is of itself to produce, it cannot produce with knowledge or to purpose; it will produce just what happens to come, that is to say by haphazard. As this cannot be, it must create by some stable principle; its creations, therefore, will be shaped in the model stored up in itself; there can be no varying, for, if there were, there could also be failure.

Soooo the Universe knows the future? Or, not that it “knows” exactly, it’s just that the principles render itself inevitable?

4.4.13. But what is the difference between the Wisdom thus conducting the universe and the principle known as Nature?

This whole paragraph is interesting and deserves thought. Nature just acts, as it is just that: it's nature. It is a result of the higher intellect.

4.4.14. Of the corporeal thus brought into being by Nature the elemental materials of things are its very produce, but how do animal and vegetable forms stand to it?

Are we to think of them as containers of Nature present within them?

Light goes away and the air contains no trace of it, for light and air remain each itself, never coalescing: is this the relation of Nature to the formed object?

Short and well explained verse worth reading.

4.4.17. When the desiring faculty is stirred, there is a presentment of the object—a sort of sensation, in announcement and in picture, of the experience—calling us to follow and to attain: the personality, whether it resists or follows and procures, is necessarily thrown out of equilibrium. The same disturbance is caused by passion urging revenge and by the needs of the body; every other sensation or experience effects its own change upon our mental attitude; then there is the ignorance of what is good and the indecision of a soul [a human soul] thus pulled in every direction; and, again, the interaction of all these perplexities gives rise to yet others.

Cool.

4.4.18. There remains the question whether the body possesses any force of its own—so that, with the incoming of the soul, it lives in some individuality—or whether all it has is this Nature we have been speaking of, the superior principle which enters into relations with it.

Wrestling with this entire verse, and from what I can gather, I agree. Matter is kind of "dead" in a way, it's the power of the "soul" that brings life. So where we currently exist is the mid-world, where we are both the matter and the soul which two very different (almost contradictory) substances forced to combine. So in that is why we feel can pain and such. But it's still up to us to direct the soul in one of two directions: down to the physical (bad) or up towards the greater One (good!).

4.4.19. Thus what we know as pleasure and pain may be identified: pain is our perception of a body despoiled, deprived of the image of the soul; pleasure our perception of the living frame in which the image of the soul is brought back to harmonious bodily operation.

Ties into the previous.

4.4.19. But why, thus, two phases of desire; why should not the body as a determined entity [the living total] be the sole desirer?

Because there are [in man] two distinct things, this Nature and the body, which, through it, becomes a living being: the Nature precedes the determined body which is its creation, made and shaped by it; it cannot originate the desires; they must belong to the living body meeting the experiences of this life and seeking in its distress to alter its state, to substitute pleasure for pain, sufficiency for want: this Nature must be like a mother reading the wishes of a suffering child, and seeking to set it right and to bring it back to herself; in her search for the remedy she attaches herself by that very concern to the sufferer's desire and makes the child's experience her own.

Good analogy with the mother.

4.4.22. It is difficult to see how earth could be a god if it did not possess a soul thus distinct: but the whole matter is obscure since Plato's statements increase or at least do not lessen the perplexity. It is best to begin by facing the question as a matter of reasoned investigation.

I love the idea of the Earth having its collective soul, and in that way, is a god we SHOULD be worshipping.

4.4.26. Their knowledge of our prayers is due to what we may call an enlinking, a determined relation of things fitted into a system; so, too, the fulfillment of the petitions; in the art of magic all looks to this enlinkment: prayer and its answer, magic and its success, depend upon the sympathy of enchained forces.

This entire verse is huge. Not only does it reaffirm that Earth has a "soul" and therefore its own form of perception, but also that spiritual requests (such a prayer) are responded to by this soul, not from a direct being, but almost under a law of (meta)physics. I had come to this conclusion myself a while ago.

4.4.28. On the other hand, anger follows closely upon bodily states; people in whom the blood and the bile are intensely active are as quick to anger as those of cool blood and no bile are slow; animals grow angry though they pay attention to no outside combinations except where they recognize physical danger; all this forces us again to place the seat of anger in the strictly corporeal element, the principle by which the animal organism is held together. Similarly, that anger or its first stirring depends upon the condition of the body follows from the consideration that the same people are more irritable ill than well, fasting than after food: it would seem that the bile and the blood, acting as vehicles of life, produce these emotions.

I'm just pulling this paragraph as a representative to a very long and weird verse. His talk about anger living in the blood and bile seems a stretch and even laughable by modern science. His reasoning is that these emotions must live somewhere in the physical because we tend to be more moody when we're sick or tired etc. It is further justified that trees don't get angry because they do not have blood or bile. That said, he does recognise how we can get angry if someone insults us which is not physical, but the seems to produce a bodily reaction (red face, etc.). It makes sense that the less connected to the body and the more to spirit we are, the easier we won’t succumb to emotional upset.

4.4.29. But—keeping to our illustration, by which the body is warmed by soul and not merely illuminated by it—how is it that when the higher soul withdraws there is no further trace of the vital principle?

For a brief space there is; and, precisely, it begins to fade away immediately upon the withdrawal of the other, as in the case of warmed objects when the fire is no longer near them: similarly hair and nails still grow on the dead; animals cut to pieces wriggle for a good time after; these are signs of a life force still indwelling.

Besides, simultaneous withdrawal would not prove the identity of the higher and lower phases: when the sun withdraws there goes with it not merely the light emanating from it, guided by it, attached to it, but also at once that light seen upon obliquely situated objects, a light secondary to the sun's and cast upon things outside of its path [reflected light showing as colour]; the two are not identical and yet they disappear together.

But is this simultaneous withdrawal or frank obliteration?

The question applies equally to this secondary light and to the corporeal life, that life which we think of as being completely sunk into body.

This is cool stuff. The essence kinda persists in a different way?

4.4.29. But in the case of the soul it is a question whether the secondary phases follow their priors—the derivatives their sources—or whether every phase is self-governing, isolated from its predecessors and able to stand alone; in a word, whether no part of the soul is sundered from the total, but all the souls are simultaneously one soul and many, and, if so, by what mode; this question, however, is treated elsewhere.

Big questions here, never really thought this far.

4.4.30. We have declared acts of memory unnecessary to the stars, but we allow them perceptions, hearing as well as seeing; for we said that prayers to them were heard—our supplications to the sun, and those, even, of certain other men to the stars. It has moreover been the belief that in answer to prayer they accomplish many human wishes, and this so lightheartedly that they become not merely helpers towards good but even accomplices in evil. Since this matter lies in our way, it must be considered, for it carries with it grave difficulties that very much trouble those who cannot think of divine beings as, thus, authors or auxiliaries in unseemliness even including the connections of loose carnality.

This kind of thing is interesting. It shows that the extent of Plotinus’ philosophy did not overtake superstition. Did he know something we did not, though?

4.4.31. It is abundantly evident that the Circuit is a cause; it modifies, firstly, itself and its own content, and undoubtedly also it tells on the terrestrial, not merely in accordance with bodily conditions but also by the states of the soul it sets up; and each of its members has an operation upon the terrestrial and in general upon all the lower.

From here rest of verse. Talking about the influence of superstition (like the stars or prayers) on reality? And it appears more of a deeper law than a conscious reaction?

4.4.32. Such hurtful action of member upon member within one living being need not seem surprising: within ourselves, in our own activities, one constituent can be harmed by another; bile and animal spirit seem to press and goad other members of the human total: in the vegetal realm one part hurts another by sucking the moisture from it. And in the All there is something analogous to bile and animal spirit, as to other such constituents. For visibly it is not merely one living organism; it is also a manifold. In virtue of the unity the individual is preserved by the All: in virtue of the multiplicity of things having various contacts, difference often brings about mutual hurt; one thing, seeking its own need, is detrimental to another; what is at once related and different is seized as food; each thing, following its own natural path, wrenches from something else what is serviceable to itself, and destroys or checks in its own interest whatever is becoming a menace to it: each, occupied with its peculiar function, assists no doubt anything able to profit by that, but harms or destroys what is too weak to withstand the onslaught of its action, like fire withering things round it or greater animals in their march thrusting aside or trampling under foot the smaller.

The rise of all these forms of being and their modification, whether to their loss or gain, all goes to the fulfillment of the natural unhindered life of that one living being: for it was not possible for the single thing to be as if it stood alone; the final purpose could not serve to that only end, intent upon the partial: the concern must be for the whole to which each item is member: things are different both from each other and in their own stages, therefore cannot be complete in one unchanging form of life; nor could anything remain utterly without modification if the All is to be durable; for the permanence of an All demands varying forms.

The unty of everything requires things to harm one another. It is common sense. It’s the system.

4.4.33. In our dance-plays there are outside elements contributing to the total effect—fluting, singing, and other linked accessories—and each of these changes in each new movement: there is no need to dwell on these; their significance is obvious. But besides this there is the fact that the limbs of the dancer cannot possibly keep the same positions in every figure; they adapt themselves to the plan, bending as it dictates, one lowered, another raised, one active, another resting as the set pattern changes. The dancer's mind is on his own purpose; his limbs are submissive to the dance-movement which they accomplish to the end, so that the connoisseur can explain that this or that figure is the motive for the lifting, bending, concealment, effacing, of the various members of the body; and in all this the executant does not choose the particular motions for their own sake; the whole play of the entire person dictates the necessary position to each limb and member as it serves to the plan.

His analogies are superb. This entire verse is worth note.

4.4.34. The truth is that the configuration of any given group means merely the relationship of the several parts, and, changing the members, the relationship remains the same.

This paragraph speaks volumes to me. Am I projecting though?

4.4.35. But we must give some explanation of these powers. The matter requires a more definite handling. How can there be a difference of power between one triangular configuration and another?

A suuuper long verse but worth checking out. It's talking about the Universe is one system at work, everything is secretly communicating with one another. Which I think we can relate back to prayer? We can influence through interconnectedness.

4.4.38. Whatever springs automatically from the All out of that distinctive life of its own, and, in addition to that self-moving activity, whatever is due to some specific agency—for example, to prayers, simple or taking the form of magic incantations—this entire range of production is to be referred, not to each such single cause, but to the nature of the thing produced [i.e., to a certain natural tendency in the product to exist with its own quality].

Touches on prayer again here.

4.4.39. For, in sum: Firstly, intentions are not to be considered as the operative causes; necessities inherent in the nature of things account for all that comes from the other realm; it is a matter of the inevitable relation of parts, and, besides, all is the sequence to the living existence of a unity. Secondly, there is the large contribution made by the individual. Thirdly, each several communication, good in itself, takes another quality in the resultant combination. Fourthly, the life in the kosmos does not look to the individual but to the whole. Finally, there is Matter, the underlie, which being given one thing receives it as something else, and is unable to make the best of what it takes.

A summary with a ton of wisdom.

4.4.40. But magic spells; how can their efficacy be explained?

Here we go, this is the magic spell section, spend your time on this entire verse. It pretty much goes over what we just said. Magic works in a very simple way. The universe is connected via patterns, so by working with it, you can influence results. It's natural laws, not deities responding. You learn how the Universe operates and then you operate within that while your every thought is a vibration connected to everything else. This is something I have said before and believe with all my soul.

4.4.41. Thus, too, whatever is hurtful to man—the passionate spirit, for example, drawn by the medium of the gall into the principle seated in the liver—comes with no intention of hurt; it is simply as one transferring fire to another might innocently burn him: no doubt, since he actually set the other on fire he is a cause, but only as the attacking fire itself is a cause, that is by the merely accidental fact that the person to whom the fire was being brought blundered in taking it.

Seated in the liver?

4.4.44. Alone in immunity from magic is he who, though drawn by the alien parts of his total being, withholds his assent to their standards of worth, recognizing the good only where his authentic self sees and knows it, neither drawn nor pursuing, but tranquilly possessing and so never charmed away.

That's how you protect yourself.

Tractate 4.5. Problems of the Soul (III); or, On Sight

Moving onto sight, and our eyes are only receiving a signal. This chapter also covers hearing in the same way, noting the role of light and air in each sense. In this same way, our soul picks up frequencies at a distance. That is how things can affect one another without physical touch. This chapter was short and felt scientifically behind, which is understandable, but I didn't get much out of it.

4.5.6. Life is also an Act, the Act of the soul, and it remains so when anything—the human body, for instance—comes in its path to be affected by it; and it is equally an Act though there be nothing for it to modify: surely this may be true of light, one of the Acts of whatever luminary source there be [i.e., light, affecting things, may be quite independent of them and require no medium, air or other]. Certainly light is not brought into being by the dark thing, air, which on the contrary tends to gloom it over with some touch of earth so that it is no longer the brilliant reality: as reasonable to talk of some substance being sweet because it is mixed with something bitter.

If we are told that light is a mode of the air, we answer that this would necessarily imply that the air itself is changed to produce the new mode; in other words, its characteristic darkness must change into non-darkness; but we know that the air maintains its character, in no wise affected: the modification of a thing is an experience within that thing itself: light therefore is not a modification of the air, but a self-existent in whose path the air happens to be present.

Maybe something there.

4.5.8. Obviously, if the sympathetic relationship depends upon the fact that percipients and things perceived are all members of one living being, no acts of perception could take place: that far body could be known only if it were a member of this living universe of ours—which condition being met, it certainly would be. But what if, without being thus in membership, it were a corporeal entity, exhibiting light and colour and the qualities by which we perceive things, and belonging to the same ideal category as the organ of vision?

[...]

If, then, something that is a living whole perceives not its own content but things like to its content, it must perceive them under the conditions of that living whole; this means that, in so far as it has perception, the objects appear not as its content but as related to its content.

Maybe something connects vision to the overall point here.

Tractate 4.6. Perception and Memory

Perception is an act of intellect, just like memory is a trained skill. Plotinus says the soul works the same way. I think a lot of these ideas are matters for modern science, and probably don’t quite stand as they may have once.

4.6.3. Observe these facts: memory follows upon attention; those who have memorized much, by dint of their training in the use of leading indications [suggestive words and the like], reach the point of being easily able to retain without such aid: must we not conclude that the basis of memory is the soul-power brought to full strength?

Definitely an argument against biologically imprinted memories, I guess. Why would we briefly forget things like our PIN if it were imprinted?

4.6.3. Quick memory does not in general go with quick wit: the two do not fall under the same mental faculty; runner and boxer are not often united in one person; the dominant idea differs from man to man.

True.

Tractate 4.7. The Immortality of the Soul

The age of question: is the soul made of stuff?
The Stoics said yes, the soul is a fine substance, like a cloud. Plotinus disagrees because anything composite is by nature finite and mortal.
The Pythagoreans said yes, the soul a harmony like music, a relationship within the body that produce a certain note. Plotinus disagrees because then the soul would be a slave to the body and we would not experience that spiritual fight against impulse.
Aristotle said yes, the soul is the body at its peak, its complete potential realised. Plotinus disagrees because then the soul could never separate from the body, even in death.
Instead, Plotinus argues that the body wears out and dies, whereas the soul is the electricity that runs it, not physical stuff but existing elsewhere eternally. Your body may fall to bits but the power never goes away.

4.7.2. Fire, air, water, earth, are in themselves soulless—whenever soul is in any of them, that life is borrowed—and there are no other forms of body than these four: even the school that believes there are has always held them to be bodies, not souls, and to be without life.

Life is a borrowed bit.

4.7.3. It becomes clear that since neither Matter nor body in any mode has this power, life must be brought upon the stage by some directing principle external and transcendent to all that is corporeal.

I’m on his side, but as devils advocate... does it become clear? He says that a lot, as if he’s proven something within his own contemplations.

4.7.4. Body is either warm or cold, hard or soft, liquid or solid, black or white, and so on through all the qualities by which one is different from another; and, again, if a body is warm it diffuses only warmth, if cold it can only chill, if light its presence tells against the total weight which if heavy it increases; black, it darkens; white, it lightens; fire has not the property of chilling or a cold body that of warming.

Soul, on the contrary, operates diversely in different living beings, and has quite contrary effects in any one: its productions contain the solid and the soft, the dense and the sparse, bright and dark, heavy and light. If it were material, its quality—and the colour it must have—would produce one invariable effect and not the variety actually observed.

Noting.

4.7.7. We come to the same result by examining the sense of pain. We say there is pain in the finger: the trouble is doubtless in the finger, but our opponents must admit that the sensation of the pain is in the centre of consciousness. The suffering member is one thing, the sense of suffering is another: how does this happen?

What about the nervous system though?

4.7.8.A. It will be admitted that quality and quantity are two different things, that body is always a thing of quantity but not always a thing of quality: matter is not qualified. This admitted, it will not be denied that quality, being a different thing from quantity, is a different thing from body. Obviously quality could not be body when it has not quantity as all body must; and, again, as we have said, body, any thing of mass, on being reduced to fragments, ceases to be what it was, but the quality it possessed remains intact in every particle—for instance the sweetness of honey is still sweetness in each speck—this shows that sweetness and all other qualities are not body.

I don't quite understand that last line.

4.7.8.B. Now: if in the admixing of bodies neither constituent can retain its efficacy, the soul too could no longer be effective within the bodies; it could but be latent; it will have lost that by which it is soul, just as in an admixture of sweet and bitter the sweet disappears: we have, thus, no soul.

Like all analogies, this bitter and sweet comparison is weird. Oh, I didn’t realise bodies and souls were bitter and sweet? What does it have to do with anything?

4.7.8.D. The Pythagorean school holds this view thinking that the soul is, with some difference, comparable to the accord in the strings of a lyre. When the lyre is strung a certain condition is produced upon the strings, and this is known as accord: in the same way our body is formed of distinct constituents brought together, and the blend produces at once life and that soul which is the condition existing upon the bodily total.

Neoplatonism vs. Pythagoreanism, FIGHT.

4.7.8.E. We come to the doctrine of the Entelechy, and must enquire how it is applied to soul.

[...]

Now; if the soul has been so injected as to be assimilated into the body as the design of a statue is worked into the bronze, it will follow that, upon any dividing of the body, the soul is divided with it, and if any part of the body is cut away a fragment of soul must go with it. Since an Entelechy must be inseparable from the being of which it is the accomplished actuality, the withdrawal of the soul in sleep cannot occur; in fact sleep itself cannot occur. Moreover if the soul is an Entelechy, there is an end to the resistance offered by reason to the desires; the total [of body and Entelechy-Soul] must have one-uniform experience throughout, and be aware of no internal contradiction. Sense-perception might occur; but intellection would be impossible. The very upholders of the Entelechy are thus compelled to introduce another soul, the Intellect, to which they ascribe immortality. The reasoning soul, then, must be an Entelechy—if the word is to be used at all—in some other mode.

Entelechy is the complete realisation of inherent potential (like a tree from an acorn or a frog from a tadpole), a philosophy coined by Aristotle. The second part is an interesting discussion.

4.7.13. But how does the soul enter into body from the aloofness of the Intellectual?

There is the Intellectual-Principle which remains among the intellectual beings, living the purely intellective life; and this, knowing no impulse or appetite, is for ever stationary in that Realm. But immediately following upon it, there is that which has acquired appetite and, by this accruement, has already taken a great step outward; it has the desire of elaborating order on the model of what it has seen in the Intellectual-Principle: pregnant by those Beings, and in pain to the birth, it is eager to make, to create. In this new zest it strains towards the realm of sense: thus, while this primal soul in union with the Soul of the All transcends the sphere administered, it is inevitably turned outward, and has added the universe to its concern: yet in choosing to administer the partial and exiling itself to enter the place in which it finds its appropriate task, it still is not wholly and exclusively held by body: it is still in possession of the unembodied; and the Intellectual-Principle in it remains immune. As a whole it is partly in body, partly outside: it has plunged from among the primals and entered this sphere of tertiaries: the process has been an activity of the Intellectual-Principle, which thus, while itself remaining in its identity, operates throughout the soul to flood the universe with beauty and penetrant order—immortal mind, eternal in its unfailing energy, acting through immortal soul.

Important.

Tractate 4.8. The Soul's Descent Into Body

The soul overflows from its source but is never fully captured by the body, like how the sun's rays hit solar panels but are not depleted not even fully utilised. However, some of the power reaches us, so we have a portion, which is why it's important not to fully identify with our physical selves and remember that, part of us is part of the above, and so we should actually identify ourselves with the greater source more often than not.

This chapter (and indeed the surrounding chapters) were difficult to me. I was tempted to mark down so much of it, but at the same time, it was quite repetitive and we’ve already read most of it (the hierarchy of soul, the opposite of good only existing in the material realm etc.). But what is important to remember forever always is that everything remains connected and we can still access the bigger soul through our little souls.

4.8.1. Many times it has happened: Lifted out of the body into myself; becoming external to all other things and self-encentered; beholding a marvellous beauty; then, more than ever, assured of community with the loftiest order; enacting the noblest life, acquiring identity with the divine; stationing within It by having attained that activity; poised above whatsoever within the Intellectual is less than the Supreme: yet, there comes the moment of descent from intellection to reasoning, and after that sojourn in the divine, I ask myself how it happens that I can now be descending, and how did the soul ever enter into my body, the soul which, even within the body, is the high thing it has shown itself to be.

I did read about this, how Plotinus has claimed to travel out of his body and merge with higher energies.

4.8.2. The soul's care for the universe takes two forms: there is the supervising of the entire system, brought to order by deedless command in a kindly presidence, and there is that over the individual, implying direct action, the hand to the task, one might say, in immediate contact: in the second kind of care the agent absorbs much of the nature of its object.

Now in its comprehensive government of the heavenly system, the soul's method is that of an unbroken transcendence in its highest phases, with penetration by its lower power: at this, God can no longer be charged with lowering the All-Soul, which has not been deprived of its natural standing and from eternity possesses and will unchangeably possess that rank and habit which could never have been intruded upon it against the course of nature but must be its characteristic quality, neither failing ever nor ever beginning.

Noting.

4.8.3. In the Intellectual-Principle a distinction is to be made: there is the Intellectual-Principle itself, which like some huge living organism contains potentially all the other forms; and there are the forms thus potentially included now realized as individuals. We may think of it as a city which itself has soul and life, and includes, also, other forms of life; the living city is the more perfect and powerful, but those lesser forms, in spite of all, share in the one same living quality: or, another illustration, from fire, the universal, proceed both the great fire and the minor fires; yet all have the one common essence, that of fire the universal, or, more exactly, participate in that from which the essence of the universal fire proceeds.

Clear analogy.

4.8.4. So it is with the individual souls; the appetite for the divine Intellect urges them to return to their source, but they have, too, a power apt to administration in this lower sphere; they may be compared to the light attached upwards to the sun, but not grudging its presidency to what lies beneath it. In the Intellectual, then, they remain with soul-entire, and are immune from care and trouble; in the heavenly sphere, absorbed in the soul-entire, they are administrators with it just as kings, associated with the supreme ruler and governing with him, do not descend from their kingly stations: the souls indeed [as distinguished from the kosmos] are thus far in the one place with their overlord; but there comes a stage at which they descend from the universal to become partial and self-centred; in a weary desire of standing apart they find their way, each to a place of its very own. This state long maintained, the soul is a deserter from the All; its differentiation has severed it; its vision is no longer set in the Intellectual; it is a partial thing, isolated, weakened, full of care, intent upon the fragment; severed from the whole, it nestles in one form of being; for this, it abandons all else, entering into and caring for only the one, for a thing buffeted about by a worldful of things: thus it has drifted away from the universal and, by an actual presence, it administers the particular; it is caught into contact now, and tends to the outer to which it has become present and into whose inner depths it henceforth sinks far.

Very cool.

4.8.4. Thus, in sum, the soul, a divine being and a dweller in the loftier realms, has entered body; it is a god, a later phase of the divine: but, under stress of its powers and of its tendency to bring order to its next lower, it penetrates to this sphere in a voluntary plunge: if it turns back quickly, all is well; it will have taken no hurt by acquiring the knowledge of evil and coming to understand what sin is, by bringing its forces into manifest play, by exhibiting those activities and productions which, remaining merely potential in the unembodied, might as well never have been even there, if destined never to come into actuality, so that the soul itself would never have known that suppressed and inhibited total.

Good summary.

Tractate 4.9. All Souls Are One?

Dualism comes from physical segregation and the illusion of separation. It's like computers and the internet. The internet is not in your computer and your computer is not the focal point of the internet. The internet is the world soul. It reaches your little laptop and you have a bit of it where the content is tailored to your interest, you can even upload to it, but it's running across the world as the same thing. Plotinus uses this concept to expalin sympathy, which means that everything in the cosmos is interconnected and can affect one another, which is why spells/prayer work. I already understood all this, thankfully.

4.9.1. That the Soul of every individual is one thing we deduce from the fact that it is present entire at every point of the body—the sign of veritable unity—not some part of it here and another part there. In all sensitive beings the sensitive soul is an omnipresent unity, and so in the forms of vegetal life the vegetal soul is entire at each several point throughout the organism.

As it's the same soul across your body, so can we simply expand to understand how this is the same for universe.

4.9.2. Now to begin with, the unity of soul, mine and another's, is not enough to make the two totals of soul and body identical. An identical thing in different recipients will have different experiences; the identity Man, in me as I move and you at rest, moves in me and is stationary in you: there is nothing stranger, nothing impossible, in any other form of identity between you and me; nor would it entail the transference of my emotion to any outside point: when in any one body a hand is in pain, the distress is felt not in the other but in the hand as represented in the centralizing unity.

Explaining.

4.9.2. That one identical soul should be virtuous in me and vicious in someone else is not strange: it is only saying that an identical thing may be active here and inactive there.

Good way of putting it. Every soul has everything but only parts activate per individual.

4.9.3. [It is a question of powers]: the indivisible phase is classed as reasoning because it is not in division among bodies, but there is the later phase, divided among bodies, but still one thing and distinct only so as to secure sense-perception throughout; this is to be classed as yet another power; and there is the forming and making phase which again is a power. But a variety of powers does not conflict with unity; seed contains many powers and yet it is one thing, and from that unity rises, again, a variety which is also a unity.

Same idea as previous note. Everything is connected by the One Soul, just with varying properties.

4.9.5. How then can a multitude of essential beings be really one?

Obviously either the one essence will be entire in all, or the many will rise from a one which remains unaltered and yet includes the one—many in virtue of giving itself, without self-abandonment, to its own multiplication.

It is competent thus to give and remain, because while it penetrates all things it can never itself be sundered: this is an identity in variety.

There is no reason for dismissing this explanation: we may think of a science with its constituents standing as one total, the source of all those various elements: again, there is the seed, a whole, producing those new parts in which it comes to its division; each of the new growths is a whole while the whole remains undiminished: only the material element is under the mode of part, and all the multiplicity remains an entire identity still.

More of the same.

The Fifth Ennead.

This was a super goodie Ennead, much more digestible than the previous one, too. It's a deeper dive into the levels of soul stuff, including what is above and below.

Tractate 5.1. The Three Initial Hypostases

The Three Hypostases are: The One, The Nous, and The Soul. The soul is our link to the above. Unfortunately, we have forgotten where we came from and treat our perishable world as the most important thing.

5.1.1. A child wrenched young from home and brought up during many years at a distance will fail in knowledge of its father and of itself: the souls, in the same way, no longer discern either the divinity or their own nature; ignorance of their rank brings self-depreciation; they misplace their respect, honouring everything more than themselves; all their awe and admiration is for the alien, and, clinging to this, they have broken apart, as far as a soul may, and they make light of what they have deserted; their regard for the mundane and their disregard of themselves bring about their utter ignoring of the divine.

Another good analogy.

5.1.2. Let every soul recall, then, at the outset the truth that soul is the author of all living things, that it has breathed the life into them all, whatever is nourished by earth and sea, all the creatures of the air, the divine stars in the sky; it is the maker of the sun; itself formed and ordered this vast heaven and conducts all that rhythmic motion; and it is a principle distinct from all these to which it gives law and movement and life, and it must of necessity be more honourable than they, for they gather or dissolve as soul brings them life or abandons them, but soul, since it never can abandon itself, is of eternal being.

This entire verse is the most beautiful and consequential of the book.

5.1.4. Soul deals with thing after thing—now Socrates; now a horse: always some one entity from among beings—but the Intellectual-Principle is all and therefore its entire content is simultaneously present in that identity: this is pure being in eternal actuality; nowhere is there any future, for every then is a now; nor is there any past, for nothing there has ever ceased to be; everything has taken its stand for ever, an identity well pleased, we might say, to be as it is; and everything, in that entire content, is Intellectual-Principle and Authentic Existence; and the total of all is Intellectual-Principle entire and Being entire. Intellectual-Principle by its intellective act establishes Being, which in turn, as the object of intellection, becomes the cause of intellection and of existence to the Intellectual-Principle—though, of course, there is another cause of intellection which is also a cause to Being, both rising in a source distinct from either.

This section is good, but the whole verse should be noted for its abundance of practical advice.

5.1.6. In venturing an answer, we first invoke God Himself, not in loud word but in that way of prayer which is always within our power, leaning in soul towards Him by aspiration, alone towards the alone. But if we seek the vision of that great Being within the Inner Sanctuary—self-gathered, tranquilly remote above all else—we begin by considering the images stationed at the outer precincts, or, more exactly to the moment, the first image that appears.

Practical and common instruction: intending it is the only way.

5.1.7. Simply by the fact that in its self-quest it has vision: this very seeing is the Intellectual-Principle. Any perception of the external indicates either sensation or intellection, sensation symbolized by a line, intellection by a circle... [corrupt passage].

Ends with corrupt passage, just noting.

5.1.7. It has besides a consciousness, as it were, within itself of this same potentiality; it knows that it can of itself beget an hypostasis and can determine its own Being by the virtue emanating from its prior; it knows that its nature is in some sense a definite part of the content of that First; that it thence derives its essence, that its strength lies there and that its Being takes perfection as a derivative and a recipient from the First. It sees that, as a member of the realm of division and part, it receives life and intellection and all else it has and is, from the undivided and partless, since that First is no member of existence, but can be the source of all on condition only of being held down by no one distinctive shape but remaining the undeflected unity.

Intellect is like the middle ground, aware of both The One it comes from and the material is has become.

5.1.7. This is the meaning hidden in the Mysteries, and in the Myths of the gods: Kronos, as the wisest, exists before Zeus; he must absorb his offspring that, full within himself, he may be also an Intellectual-Principle manifest in some product of his plenty; afterwards, the myth proceeds, Kronos engenders Zeus, who already exists as the [necessary and eternal] outcome of the plenty there; in other words the offspring of the Divine Intellect, perfect within itself, is Soul [the life-principle carrying forward the Ideas in the Divine Mind].

And there it is. The Greek Gods are metaphors. Even the Greeks knew this in the 3rd Century. Kronos and Zeus were not literal, Neither are any of them.

5.1.9. For these reasons the ancient philosophers that ranged themselves most closely to the school of Pythagoras and of his later followers and to that of Pherekudes, have insisted upon this Nature, some developing the subject in their writings while others treated of it merely in unwritten discourses, some no doubt ignoring it entirely.

Just noting because this entire section was a diss track to other Greek philosophers.

5.1.10. There exists a Principle which transcends Being; this is The One, whose nature we have sought to establish in so far as such matters lend themselves to proof. Upon The One follows immediately the Principle which is at once Being and the Intellectual-Principle. Third comes the Principle, Soul.

Now just as these three exist for the system of Nature, so, we must hold, they exist for ourselves. I am not speaking of the material order—all that is separable—but of what lies beyond the sense realm in the same way as the Primals are beyond all the heavens; I mean the corresponding aspect of man, what Plato calls the Interior Man.

This whole verse. It mentions the Demiurge again a bit later.

Tractate 5.2. The Origin and Order of the Beings Following on the First

It's a chain. At the very bottom is physical matter, which is essentially soulless because it's generated so far from the source. Any original God essence is extreme faint, but it is there, as each level has a trace of that which came before. The soul created the material, so there is soul in it, just like The One is in everything too, no matter how little. It is out job to quieten the material noise and note the harmony in order to gaze up the chain to God.

This is a superior chapter. It finally gets to how you describe this concept, and within only two pages, it gets more done than most.

5.2.1. The One is all things and no one of them; the source of all things is not all things; all things are its possession—running back, so to speak, to it—or, more correctly, not yet so, they will be.

But a universe from an unbroken unity, in which there appears no diversity, not even duality?

It is precisely because that is nothing within the One that all things are from it: in order that Being may be brought about, the source must be no Being but Being's generator, in what is to be thought of as the primal act of generation. Seeking nothing, possessing nothing, lacking nothing, the One is perfect and, in our metaphor, has overflowed, and its exuberance has produced the new: this product has turned again to its begetter and been filled and has become its contemplator and so an Intellectual-Principle.

Launches with the most famous Enneads quote? I also love the word “overflowed”, I can see how that works.

5.2.2. But, looking more minutely into the matter, when shoots or topmost boughs are lopped from some growing thing, where goes the soul that was present in them? Simply, whence it came: soul never knew spatial separation and therefore is always within the source. If you cut the root to pieces, or burn it, where is the life that was present there? In the soul, which never went outside of itself.

No doubt, despite this permanence, the soul must have been in something if it reascends; and if it does not, it is still somewhere; it is in some other vegetal soul: but all this means merely that it is not crushed into some one spot; if a Soul-power reascends, it is within the Soul-power preceding it; that in turn can be only in the soul-power prior again, the phase reaching upwards to the Intellectual-Principle. Of course nothing here must be understood spatially: Soul never was in space; and the Divine Intellect, again, is distinguished from soul as being still more free.

Noting, especially that last line.

Tractate 5.3. The Knowing Hypostases and the Transcendent

I had a headache when reading this one, so possible not the best documentation. But from what I got, the "Knowing Hypostasis" is the perfect thinking from the Nous, not the same thinking our brains are used to. Meanwhile, The One transcends even that, it is beyond thinking.

5.3.4. That correspondence may be brought about in two ways: either the radii from that centre are traced upon us to be our law or we are filled full of the Divine Mind, which again may have become to us a thing seen and felt as a presence.

Hence our self-knowing comes to the knowing of all the rest of our being in virtue of this thing patently present; or by that power itself communicating to us its own power of self-knowing; or by our becoming identical with that principle of knowledge.

Thus the self-knower is a double person: there is the one that takes cognisance of the principle in virtue of which understanding occurs in the soul or mind; and there is the higher, knowing himself by the Intellectual-Principle with which he becomes identical: this latter knows the self as no longer man but as a being that has become something other through and through: he has thrown himself as one thing over into the superior order, taking with him only that better part of the soul which alone is winged for the Intellectual Act and gives the man, once established There, the power to appropriate what he has seen.

Transcending the obvious self.

5.3.5. To begin with, the distinction in one self thus suggested is a strange phenomenon. How is the self to make the partition? The thing cannot happen of itself. And, again, which phase makes it? The phase that decides to be the knower or that which is to be the known? Then how can the knowing phase know itself in the known when it has chosen to be the knower and put itself apart from the known? In such self-knowledge by sundering it can be aware only of the object, not of the agent; it will not know its entire content, or itself as an integral whole; it knows the phase seen but not the seeing phase and thus has knowledge of something else, not self-knowledge.

In order to perfect self-knowing it must bring over from itself the knowing phase as well: seeing subject and seen objects must be present as one thing. Now if in this coalescence of seeing subject with seen objects, the objects were merely representations of the reality, the subject would not possess the realities: if it is to possess them it must do so not by seeing them as the result of any self-division but by knowing them, containing them, before any self-division occurs.

At that, the object known must be identical with the knowing act [or agent], the Intellectual-Principle, therefore, identical with the Intellectual Realm. And in fact, if this identity does not exist, neither does truth; the Principle that should contain realities is found to contain a transcript, something different from the realities; that constitutes non-Truth; Truth cannot apply to something conflicting with itself; what it affirms it must also be.

Full verse commentary. It's difficult to organise my notes while trying to remember exactly what inspired them, but this seems like the verse where there is knowing something as well as the thing being known. The non-duality of recognising everyone and everything as an expression of the same divine soul (therefore rendering all of it one and the same) is fine, I get that, but to also somehow be that soul recognising being recognised was a full headfuck 180 spin for me. Very profound but I am unsure exactly how to use it practically? I can't just suddenly click into that deeper place, but I can fake it until I make it? "Imagine" (or intending) it until becomes easier? Because I’ve had some major success with that and other people, looking into their eyes and seeing a greater self. It really helps with social anxiety anyway. Nevertheless, this Neoplatonic concept is one of the most revelationary for me from this book.

5.3.5. In the Intellectual-Principle, the Being is an Act and in the absence of any other object it must be self-directed; by this self-intellection it holds its Act within itself and upon itself; all that can emanate from it is produced by this self-centering and self-intention; first—self-gathered, it then gives itself or gives something in its likeness; fire must first be self-centred and be fire, true to fire's natural Act; then it may reproduce itself elsewhere.

Once more, then; the Intellectual-Principle is a self-intent activity, but soul has the double phase, one inner, intent upon the Intellectual-Principle, the other outside it and facing to the external; by the one it holds the likeness to its source; by the other, even in its unlikeness, it still comes to likeness in this sphere, too, by virtue of action and production; in its action it still contemplates, and its production produces Ideal-forms—divine intellections perfectly wrought out—so that all its creations are representations of the divine Intellection and of the divine Intellect, moulded upon the archetype, of which all are emanations and images, the nearer more true, the very latest preserving some faint likeness of the source.

I think it’s saying is that we must focus on ourselves first as a part of God. It is only through our individual soul that we can make the decision to turn away from the external and toward the inner Intellectual-Principle. Sufism is actually great in this, how we can use these two states as comparison points to really magnify one another in comparison. I don’t know if I’m getting what Plotinus is saying exactly, but what I think I’m getting is practical and profound.

5.3.8. In the strength of such considerations we lead up our own soul to the Divine, so that it poses itself as an image of that Being, its life becoming an imprint and a likeness of the Highest, its every act of thought making it over into the Divine and the Intellectual.

Useful.

5.3.9. Of course we do not pretend that the sun's light [as the analogy might imply] remains a self-gathered and sun-centred thing: it is at once outrushing and indwelling; it strikes outward continuously, lap after lap, until it reaches us upon our earth: we must take it that all the light, including that which plays about the sun's orb, has travelled; otherwise we would have a void expanse, that of the space—which is material—next to the sun's orb. The Soul, on the contrary—a light springing from the Divine Mind and shining about it—is in closest touch with that source; it is not in transit but remains centred there, and, in likeness to that principle, it has no place: the light of the sun is actually in the air, but the soul is clean of all such contact so that its immunity is patent to itself and to any other of the same order.

Clarifying his oft-used analogy.

5.3.10. An agent must either act upon the extern or be a multiple and so able to act upon itself: making no advance towards anything other than itself, it is motionless and where it could know only blank fixity it can know nothing.

“blank fixity”! What a band name.

5.3.10. Then, again, in the assertion "I am this particular thing," either the "particular thing" is distinct from the assertor—and there is a false statement—or it is included within it, and, at once, multiplicity is asserted: otherwise the assertion is "I am what I am," or "I am I."

I love this type of thing.

5.3.12. The One, as transcending Intellect, transcends knowing: above all need, it is above the need of the knowing which pertains solely to the Secondary Nature. Knowing is a unitary thing, but defined: the first is One, but undefined: a defined One would not be the One-absolute: the absolute is prior to the definite.

Cannot be defined, Dao.

5.3.13. If we make it knowable, an object of affirmation, we make it a manifold; and if we allow intellection in it we make it at that point indigent: supposing that in fact intellection accompanies it, intellection by it must be superfluous.

Same vibe. As soon as it's something, it becomes not something else.

5.3.14. We do not, it is true, grasp it by knowledge, but that does not mean that we are utterly void of it; we hold it not so as to state it, but so as to be able to speak about it. And we can and do state what it is not, while we are silent as to what it is: we are, in fact, speaking of it in the light of its sequels; unable to state it, we may still possess it.

This paragraph assists in how we can speak of it.

5.3.15. Only the Transcendent can be that; it is the great beginning, and the beginning must be a really existent One, wholly and truly One, while its sequent, poured down in some way from the One, is all, a total which has participation in unity and whose every member is similarly all and one.

What then is the All?

The total of which the Transcendent is the Source.

So when the One expresses itself in multitudes, it is still the One but exists in the All. The All derives its existence from The One.

Originally, I got excited, because of the distinction between The One and The All. Heremticism talks about The All, which I always considered to be their identical word for The One (or, at least God). I am now seeing that perhaps it's not that simple. Both philosophies talk about the Absolute Good, and I think that's a closer idea to what Hermeticism mean as the One. Whereas The All is the living Cosmos, and therefore manifested. The answer of everything is in here somewhere.

5.3.17. All the need is met by a contact purely intellective. At the moment of touch there is no power whatever to make any affirmation; there is no leisure; reasoning upon the vision is for afterwards. We may know we have had the vision when the Soul has suddenly taken light. This light is from the Supreme and is the Supreme; we may believe in the Presence when, like that other God on the call of a certain man, He comes bringing light: the light is the proof of the advent. Thus, the Soul unlit remains without that vision; lit, it possesses what it sought. And this is the true end set before the Soul, to take that light, to see the Supreme by the Supreme and not by the light of any other principle—to see the Supreme which is also the means to the vision; for that which illumines the Soul is that which it is to see just as it is by the sun's own light that we see the sun.

But how is this to be accomplished?

Cut away everything.

That seems hella important.

Tractate 5.4. How the Secondaries Rise from the First; and On the One

Nice and short chapter. How I took this is like The Observer Effect. When we observe something, it becomes reality, but if we don't, the code is still there but undefined. That is the relationship between us and reality, but according to this, the same as the relationship between the Nous and the One. When the Nous looks at The One, that's how it came to be, subject and object.

5.4.1. If The First is perfect, utterly perfect above all, and is the beginning of all power, it must be the most powerful of all that is, and all other powers must act in some partial imitation of it. Now other beings, coming to perfection, are observed to generate; they are unable to remain self-closed; they produce: and this is true not merely of beings endowed with will, but of growing things where there is no will; even lifeless objects impart something of themselves, as far as they may; fire warms, snow chills, drugs have their own outgoing efficacy; all things to the utmost of their power imitate the Source in some operation tending to eternity and to service.

I like the last line, how all things imitate Source.

Tractate 5.5. That the Intellectual Beings Are Not Outside the Intellectual-Principle; and on the Nature of the Good

Thinking requires there to be something you think about, and something requires other things to exist in order to define itself in contrast. That is why The One does not think, for that would place limits. Instead, it overflows into the Nous. The Nous is about a potentially endless reality. All true things exist in the Nous in full perfect completion. And through the Nous, everything in existence is tying to return to the Goodness of The One even if it doesn't know it because it's stuck in the material. Yes even this material and everything you experience takes place in the mind. Therefore, the truth is not out there, it's in here, inside of you, and therefore is you. This is a basic philosophy now, but at the time, it must've killed.

5.5.1. The Intellectual-Principle, the veritably and essentially intellective, can this be conceived as ever falling into error, ever failing to think reality?

Assuredly no: it would no longer be intelligent and therefore no longer Intellectual-Principle: it must know unceasingly—and never forget; and its knowledge can be no guesswork, no hesitating assent, no acceptance of an alien report. Nor can it call on demonstration or, we are told it may at times act by this or, I method, at least there must be something patent to it in virtue of its own nature. In actual fact reason tells us that all its knowledge is thus inherent to it, for there is no means by which to distinguish between the spontaneous knowledge and the other. But, in any case, some knowledge, it is conceded, is inherent to it. Whence are we to understand the certainty of this knowledge to come to it or how do its objects carry the conviction of their reality?

More deatils explaining the Intellectual Principle.

5.5.1. But the great argument is that if we are to allow that these objects of Intellection are in the strict sense outside the Intellectual-Principle, which, therefore, must see them as external, then inevitably it cannot possess the truth of them.

In all it looks upon, it sees falsely; for those objects must be the authentic things; yet it looks upon them without containing them and in such knowledge holds only their images; that is to say, not containing the authentic, adopting phantasms of the true, it holds the false; it never possesses reality. If it knows that it possesses the false, it must confess itself excluded from the truth; if it fails of this knowledge also, imagining itself to possess the truth which has eluded it, then the doubled falsity puts it the deeper into error.

Seems like an important explanation.

5.5.3. Thus we have here one identical Principle, the Intellect, which is the universe of authentic beings, the Truth: as such it is a great god or, better, not a god among gods but the Godhead entire. It is a god, a secondary god manifesting before there is any vision of that other, the Supreme which rests over all, enthroned in transcendence upon that splendid pediment, the Nature following close upon it.

[...]

[Interpolation: Zeus (Universal Soul) is in this a symbol of him, Zeus who is not content with the contemplation of his father (Kronos, divine Intellect) but looks to that father's father (to Ouranos, the Transcendent) as what may be called the divine energy working to the establishment of a real being.]

God definitions including more allegory for Zeus. I find this so important because atheists often use the whole "why don't you believe in Zeus then" whereas Ancient Greek were clearly documenting these characters as personifications before the New Testament was even compiled.

5.5.4. We have said that all must be brought back to a unity: this must be an authentic unity, not belonging to the order in which multiplicity is unified by participation in what is truly a One; we need a unity independent of participation, not a combination in which multiplicity holds an equal place: we have exhibited, also, the Intellectual Realm and the Intellectual-Principle as more closely a unity than the rest of things, so that there is nothing closer to The One. Yet even this is not The purely One.

Here is where you’ll find the “The One Is Beyond Intellect” statement. Because that's still multiplicity.

5.5.4. [...] the dyad has come into being, but the precedent monad still stands; and this monad is quite distinct within the dyad from either of the two constituent unities, since there is nothing to make it one rather than the other: being neither, but simply that thing apart, it is present without being inherent.

Modad is singular, Dyad is multiplicity. So he's saying that even when things multiply, the original unity is still there.

5.5.5. What we know as Being, the first sequent upon The One, advanced a little outward, so to speak, then chose to go no further, turned inward again and comes to rest and is now the reality and hearth [ousia and hestia] of the universe. Pressing [with the rough breathing] on the word for Being [on] we have the word "hen" [one], an indication that in our very form of speech we tell, as far as may be, that Being [the weaker] is that which proceeds from [the stronger] The One. Thus both the thing that comes to be and Being itself are carriers of a copy, since they are outflows from the power of The primal One: this power sees and in its emotion tries to represent what it sees and breaks into speech "On"; "einai"; "ousia," "hestia" [Existent: Existence: Essence: Hestia or Hearth], sounds which labour to express the essential nature of the universe produced by the travail of the utterer and so to represent, as far as sounds may, the origin of reality.

"Being" and Intellect are interchangeable it seems, kind of like existence in a way, the first thing to emit from the One even though it's always connected to it, always looking back into it.

5.5.6. This produced reality is an Ideal form—for certainly nothing springing from the Supreme can be less—and it is not a particular form but the form of all, beside which there is no other; it follows that The First must be without form, and, if without form, then it is no Being; Being must have some definition and therefore be limited; but the First cannot be thought of as having definition and limit, for thus it would be not the Source but the particular item indicated by the definition assigned to it. If all things belong to the produced, which of them can be thought of as the Supreme? Not included among them, this can be described only as transcending them: but they are Being and the Beings; it therefore transcends Being.

This chapter has been good at summarising things.

5.5.6. Its definition, in fact, could be only "the indefinable": what is not a thing is not some definite thing. We are in agony for a true expression; we are talking of the untellable; we name, only to indicate for our own use as best we may. And this name, The One, contains really no more than the negation of plurality: under the same pressure the Pythagoreans found their indication in the symbol "Apollo" [a= not; pollon= of many] with its repudiation of the multiple. If we are led to think positively of The One, name and thing, there would be more truth in silence: the designation, a mere aid to enquiry, was never intended for more than a preliminary affirmation of absolute simplicity to be followed by the rejection of even that statement: it was the best that offered, but remains inadequate to express the Nature indicated. For this is a principle not to be conveyed by any sound; it cannot be known on any hearing but, if at all, by vision; and to hope in that vision to see a form is to fail of even that.

Perfect description of the One, totally in tune with the Dao

5.5.8. So that we are left wondering whence it came, from within or without; and when it has gone, we say, "It was here. Yet no; it was beyond!" But we ought not to question whence; there is no whence, no coming or going in place; now it is seen and now not seen. We must not run after it, but fit ourselves for the vision and then wait tranquilly for its appearance, as the eye waits on the rising of the sun, which in its own time appears above the horizon—out of the ocean, as the poets say—and gives itself to our sight.

Very important (talking about Intellectual Principle). Especially about not running after it, but preparing yourself for it to come to you. A lot of philosophies say that!

5.5.10. Still, do not, I urge you, look for The Good through any of these other things; if you do, you will see not itself but its trace: you must form the idea of that which is to be grasped cleanly standing to itself not in any combination, the unheld in which all have hold: for no other is such, yet one such there must be.

[...]

You who make the venture will throw forward all your being but you will never tell it entire—for that, you must yourself be the divine Intellect in Act—and at your utmost success it will still pass from you or, rather, you from it. In ordinary vision you may think to see the object entire: in this intellective act, all, less or more, that you can take to mind you may set down as The Good.

Practical advice.

5.5.12. Not that God has any need of His derivatives: He ignores all that produced realm, never necessary to Him, and remains identically what He was before He brought it into being. So too, had the secondary never existed, He would have been unconcerned, exactly as He would not have grudged existence to any other universe that might spring into being from Him, were any such possible; of course no other such could be since there is nothing that has not existence once the All exists.

This whole verse is useful at differentiating the Good (The One's nature) and Beauty (expression of Good). This paragraph goes on to say that God is not The All. That's why people say Neoplatonism is not Pantheistic, because God (aka The One) is not the manifested material cosmos, but beyond that. Still, if the All emanates from The One/God, I could just as easily argue that fundamentally, the Universe is a render of God and therefore, Pantheism still reigns supreme.

Tractate 5.6. That the Principle Transcending Being Has No Intellectual Act. What Being Has Intellection Primally and What Being Has It Secondarily

Another super short chapter covering a lot of what we've already been through. Everything, including thinking, fundamentally comes from The One, but The One doesn't think. Nous is the first thinker in a mass unified all-encompassing way, then Soul comes next. The trick (and it's a profoundly life-shattering trick) is to remember the unification and see that you, the thinker, and the thing thought about are the identical.

5.6.4. We may use the figure of, first, light; then, following it, the sun; as a third, the orb of the moon taking its light from the sun: Soul carries the Intellectual-Principle as something imparted and lending the light which makes it essentially intellective; Intellectual-Principle carries the light as its own though it is not purely the light but is the being into whose very essence the light has been received; highest is That which, giving forth the light to its sequent, is no other than the pure light itself by whose power the Intellectual-Principle takes character.

He uses this light analogy excessively but it helps.

5.6.6. When we affirm the reality of the Real Beings and their individual identity of being and declare that these Real Beings exist in the Intellectual Realm, we do not mean merely that they remain unchangeably self-identical by their very essence, as contrasted with the fluidity and instability of the sense-realm; the sense-realm itself may contain the enduring. No; we mean rather that these principles possess, as by their own virtue, the consummate fulness of being. The Essence described as the primally existent cannot be a shadow cast by Being, but must possess Being entire; and Being is entire when it holds the form and idea of intellection and of life. In a Being, then, the existence, the intellection, the life are present as an aggregate. When a thing is a Being, it is also an Intellectual-Principle, when it is an Intellectual-Principle it is a Being; intellection and Being are co-existents. Therefore intellection is a multiple not a unitary and that which does not belong to this order can have no Intellection. And if we turn to the partial and particular, there is the Intellectual form of man, and there is man, there is the Intellectual form of horse and there is horse, the Intellectual form of Justice, and Justice.

This is something we have touched on before, but perhaps this is the best place to really get to it. When Plotinus talks of "Real Beings", he's talking about a type of metaphysical true form of whatever exists. Like a spiritual blueprint, is how I see it. To use his go-to creature, there is the perfect horse in the Intellectual Realm, like the idea of a horse, and from that, all horses are manifested in the real life. The physical is an imperfect render (or "drawing" I've heard said) of that intellectual essence. But because we too have intellect, it's not accurate to say we are completely removed from it either. It's all part of The One, anyway.

Around here got me thinking about thinking. The One doesn't think. Thinking comes with the Intellectual Principle. Which is why, as soon as thinking occurs, that's when the One became something, therefore not something else. The very act of thinking is what is the first step away from The One. But also following that, I wondered... is thinking divine? Like, is the very act of thinking a holy act? Don't know why I've never contemplated that, and in so many way, it obviously is. I'm not sure what to do with that or what it means, but it felt like a massive shift in my brain. Once you realise thoughts are inherently sacred... then you may start being more careful with them. I'd put this in top 5 revelations this book gave to me, (even if it didn't necessarily intend to).

Tractate 5.7. Is There an Ideal Archetype of Particular Beings?

Super short chapter again, which I love. It covers a fun question. If there are perfect archetypes of everything in the Nous (like the human), then is there a level where a perfect archetype of me specifically exists? From what I gather, the answers is not really, except to say that we do have a higher self (our souls) which is in close enough proximity to the Nous and this concept.

5.7.1. If Socrates, Socrates' soul, is external then the Authentic Socrates—to adapt the term—must be There; that is to say, the individual soul has an existence in the Supreme as well as in this world. If there is no such permanent endurance and what was Socrates may with change of time become another soul and be Pythagoras or someone else—then the individual Socrates has not that existence in the Divine.

Singling out Socrates. Just thought of this now... how does this relate to Shinto's Kami???? IT MIGHT BE FKN IDENTICAL, YOU KNOW.

Tractate 5.8. On the Intellectual Beauty

Apparently this is one massively influential tractate. True Beauty exists only in the Nous, so when you see something beautiful in reality, it contains more of the higher order. It makes sense, because beauty is about harmony in so many ways. So beautiful objects have beautiful souls which gradually climbs into the Nous then The One. The sensation of seeing beauty is because our Souls note familiarity. Which is all fine and good, except is beauty not subjective? I adore noise rock and violent movies. I see beauty in a destroyed painting or a piece of trash in a rose bush. How does this apply? Are people born naturally pleasant to look at closer to God? Don't they already have enough stuff? I agree with the principle, but less with the application, it seems more individualistic to me.

5.8.1. Let us go to the realm of magnitudes: Suppose two blocks of stone lying side by side: one is unpatterned, quite untouched by art; the other has been minutely wrought by the craftsman's hands into some statue of god or man, a Grace or a Muse, or if a human being, not a portrait but a creation in which the sculptor's art has concentrated all loveliness.

Now it must be seen that the stone thus brought under the artist's hand to the beauty of form is beautiful not as stone—for so the crude block would be as pleasant—but in virtue of the form or idea introduced by the art. This form is not in the material; it is in the designer before ever it enters the stone; and the artificer holds it not by his equipment of eyes and hands but by his participation in his art. The beauty, therefore, exists in a far higher state in the art; for it does not come over integrally into the work; that original beauty is not transferred; what comes over is a derivative and a minor: and even that shows itself upon the statue not integrally and with entire realization of intention but only in so far as it has subdued the resistance of the material.

Art, then, creating in the image of its own nature and content, and working by the Idea or Reason-Principle of the beautiful object it is to produce, must itself be beautiful in a far higher and purer degree since it is the seat and source of that beauty, indwelling in the art, which must naturally be more complete than any comeliness of the external. In the degree in which the beauty is diffused by entering into matter, it is so much the weaker than that concentrated in unity; everything that reaches outwards is the less for it, strength less strong, heat less hot, every power less potent, and so beauty less beautiful.

Artist stuff, important for me and will be referencing this exact verse in a later book.

5.8.1. Thus Pheidias wrought the Zeus upon no model among things of sense but by apprehending what form Zeus must take if he chose to become manifest to sight.

More Zeus symbolism.

5.8.2. Whence shone forth the beauty of Helen, battle-sought; or of all those women like in loveliness to Aphrodite; or of Aphrodite herself; or of any human being that has been perfect in beauty; or of any of these gods manifest to sight, or unseen but carrying what would be beauty if we saw?

More Greek god metaphors.

5.8.2. Then again the principle producing the beauty must be, itself, ugly, neutral or beautiful: ugly, it could not produce the opposite; neutral, why should its product be the one rather than the other? The Nature, then, which creates things so lovely must be itself of a far earlier beauty; we, undisciplined in discernment of the inward, knowing nothing of it, run after the outer, never understanding that it is the inner which stirs us; we are in the case of one who sees his own reflection but not realizing whence it comes goes in pursuit of it.

But that the thing we are pursuing is something different and that the beauty is not in the concrete object is manifest from the beauty there is in matters of study, in conduct and custom; briefly in soul or mind. And it is precisely here that the greater beauty lies, perceived whenever you look to the wisdom in a man and delight in it, not wasting attention on the face, which may be hideous, but passing all appearance by and catching only at the inner comeliness, the truly personal; if you are still unmoved and cannot acknowledge beauty under such conditions, then looking to your own inner being you will find no beauty to delight you and it will be futile in that state to seek the greater vision, for you will be questing it through the ugly and impure.

Beauty is on the inside, like way inside, soul-level. Well explained.

5.8.4. To "live at ease" is There; and, to these divine beings, verity is mother and nurse, existence and sustenance; all that is not of process but of authentic being they see, and themselves in all: for all is transparent, nothing dark, nothing resistant; every being is lucid to every other, in breadth and depth; light runs through light. And each of them contains all within itself, and at the same time sees all in every other, so that everywhere there is all, and all is all and each all, and infinite the glory. Each of them is great; the small is great; the sun, There, is all the stars; and every star, again, is all the stars and sun. While some one manner of being is dominant in each, all are mirrored in every other.

Funny, my notes here said "none of this went in". Upon revisit, kinda makes sense why. This verse is where Plotinus describes what it's like in the Intellectual Realm, and we must just believe him that he knows all of this. Nevertheless, it sounds pretty chill.

5.8.6. Similarly, as it seems to me, the wise of Egypt—whether in precise knowledge or by a prompting of nature—indicated the truth where, in their effort towards philosophical statement, they left aside the writing-forms that take in the detail of words and sentences—those characters that represent sounds and convey the propositions of reasoning—and drew pictures instead, engraving in the temple—inscriptions a separate image for every separate item: thus they exhibited the mode in which the Supreme goes forth.

Super cool, bigging up the Egyptians. The contact between Ancient Egypt and Ancient Greek is honestly the most exciting historic trade of occult knowledge of which I can fathom.

5.8.8. If this principle were not beautiful, what other could be? Its prior does not deign to be beautiful; that which is the first to manifest itself—Form and object of vision to the intellect—cannot but be lovely to see. It is to indicate this that Plato, drawing on something well within our observation, represents the Creator as approving the work he has achieved: the intention is to make us feel the lovable beauty of the autotype and of the Divine Idea; for to admire a representation is to admire the original upon which it was made.

Noteworthy. The paragraph afterwards speaks of the Demiurge again.

5.8.9. Let us, then, make a mental picture of our universe: each member shall remain what it is, distinctly apart; yet all is to form, as far as possible, a complete unity so that whatever comes into view shall show as if it were the surface of the orb over all, bringing immediately with it the vision, on the one plane, of the sun and of all the stars with earth and sea and all living things as if exhibited upon a transparent globe.

Bring this vision actually before your sight, so that there shall be in your mind the gleaming representation of a sphere, a picture holding sprung, themselves, of that universe and repose or some at rest, some in motion. Keep this sphere before you, and from it imagine another, a sphere stripped of magnitude and of spatial differences; cast out your inborn sense of Matter, taking care not merely to attenuate it: call on God, maker of the sphere whose image you now hold, and pray Him to enter. And may He come bringing His own Universe with all the Go

Full-on visualisation exercise here.

5.8.10. This is why Zeus, although the oldest of the gods and their sovereign, advances first [in the Phaidros myth] towards that vision, followed by gods and demigods and such souls as are of strength to see. That Being appears before them from some unseen place and rising loftily over them pours its light upon all things, so that all gleams in its radiance; it upholds some beings, and they see; the lower are dazzled and turn away, unfit to gaze upon that sun, the trouble falling the more heavily on those most remote.

This threw me, because Zeus is usually spoken about so allegorical, but here almost... not. But apparently this is just a reflection of how Plato uses it (in Phaedrus, apparently), Zeus is another word for the cosmic intellect. It is confusing, because that is very much a "cosmic being", but the distinction comes that the mythology is considered to be symbolic.

5.8.10. To those that do not see entire, the immediate impression is alone taken into account; but those drunken with this wine, filled with the nectar, all their soul penetrated by this beauty, cannot remain mere gazers: no longer is there a spectator outside gazing on an outside spectacle; the clear-eyed hold the vision within themselves, though, for the most part, they have no idea that it is within but look towards it as to something beyond them and see it as an object of vision caught by a direction of the will.

Poetics.

5.8.11. Similarly any one, unable to see himself, but possessed by that God, has but to bring that divine—within before his consciousness and at once he sees an image of himself, himself lifted to a better beauty: now let him ignore that image, lovely though it is, and sink into a perfect self-identity, no such separation remaining; at once he forms a multiple unity with the God silently present; in the degree of his power and will, the two become one; should he turn back to the former duality, still he is pure and remains very near to the God; he has but to look again and the same presence is there.

Merging with The One, if you're interested.

5.8.11. It must be remembered that sensations of the ugly and evil impress us more violently than those of what is agreeable and yet leave less knowledge as the residue of the shock: sickness makes the rougher mark, but health, tranquilly present, explains itself better; it takes the first place, it is the natural thing, it belongs to our being; illness is alien, unnatural and thus makes itself felt by its very incongruity, while the other conditions are native and we take no notice. Such being our nature, we are most completely aware of ourselves when we are most completely identified with the object of our knowledge.

Health as an analogy for the Good and "Bad" is perfect. Healthy/Good is the natural state. Unhealthy/Bad is not a state per se, it's an absence of.

5.8.12. The vision has been of God in travail of a beautiful offspring, God engendering a universe within himself in a painless labour and—rejoiced in what he has brought into being, proud of his children—keeping all closely by Him, for pleasure He has in his radiance and in theirs.

Of this offspring—all beautiful, but most beautiful those that have remained within—only one has become manifest without; from him [Zeus, sovereign over the visible universe] the youngest born, we may gather, as from some image, the greatness of the Father and of the Brothers that remain within the Father's house.

He is now describing God, which I figure is The One, but could not possibly be? And its birthing life, including Zeus. I dunno, the Greekiness loses me a tad.

5.8.13. The God fettered [as in the Kronos Myth] to an unchanging identity leaves the ordering of this universe to his son (to Zeus), for it could not be in his character to neglect his rule within the divine sphere, and, as though sated with the Authentic-Beauty, seek a lordship too recent and too poor for his might. Ignoring this lower world, Kronos [Intellectual-Principle] claims for his own father [Ouranoo, the Absolute, or One] with all the upward-tending between them: and he counts all that tends to the inferior, beginning from his son [Zeus, the All-Soul], as ranking beneath him. Thus he holds a mid position determined on the one side by the differentiation implied in the severance from the very highest and, on the other, by that which keeps him apart from the link between himself and the lower: he stands between a greater father and an inferior son. But since that father is too lofty to be thought of under the name of Beauty, the second God remains the primally beautiful.

Ok, so there is the allegory laid out, 100%. It's just different names for same things.

Tractate 5.9. The Intellectual-Principle, the Ideas, and the Authentic Existence

Physical objects are not actually real. What's far more real is the pure ideas in the Nous, that's the proper reality. Our physical world is a weaker copy of those true blueprints, which are fully alive. That is why the soul longs to return upward, to the Nous, as the stable truth.

5.9.2. But how is the ascent to be begun? Whence comes the power? In what thought is this love to find its guide?

The guiding thought is this: that the beauty perceived on material things is borrowed.

The pattern giving beauty to the corporeal rests upon it as Idea to its Matter and the substrate may change and from being pleasant become distasteful, a sign, in all reason, that the beauty comes by participation.

Practical mental exercise to connect with the deeper beauty.

5.9.3. The underly has adopted, we see, certain shapes by which it becomes fire, water, air, earth; and these shapes have been imposed upon it by something else. This other is Soul which, hovering over the Four [the elements], imparts the pattern of the Kosmos, the Ideas for which it has itself received from the Intellectual-Principle as the soul or mind of the craftsman draws upon his craft for the plan of his work.

The Intellectual-Principle is in one phase the Form of the soul, its shape; in another phase it is the giver of the shape—the sculptor, possessing inherently what is given—imparting to soul nearly the authentic reality while what body receives is but image and imitation.

The Nous step giving us the material shape.

5.9.5. It is by participation that the sense-known has the being we ascribe to it; the underlying nature has taken its shape from elsewhere; thus bronze and wood are shaped into what we see by means of an image introduced by sculpture or carpentry; the craft permeates the materials while remaining integrally apart from the material and containing in itself the reality of statue or couch. And it is so, of course, with all corporeal things.

This universe, characteristically participant in images, shows how the image differs from the authentic beings: against the variability of the one order, there stands the unchanging quality of the other, self-situate, not needing space because having no magnitude, holding an existent intellective and self-sufficing. The body-kind seeks its endurance in another kind; the Intellectual-Principle, sustaining by its marvellous Being, the things which of themselves must fall, does not itself need to look for a staying ground.

I like the sculpture analogy.

5.9.6. This relation may be illustrated by the powers in seed; all lies undistinguished in the unit, the formative ideas gathered as in one kernel; yet in that unit there is eye-principle, and there is hand-principle, each of which is revealed as a separate power by its distinct material product. Thus each of the powers in the seed is a Reason-Principle one and complete yet including all the parts over which it presides: there will be something bodily, the liquid, for example, carrying mere Matter; but the principle itself is Idea and nothing else, idea identical with the generative idea belonging to the lower soul, image of a higher. This power is sometimes designated as Nature in the seed-life; its origin is in the divine; and, outgoing from its priors as light from fire, it converts and shapes the matter of things, not by push and pull and the lever work of which we hear so much, but by bestowal of the Ideas.

Another workable analogy.

5.9.9. This universe is a living thing capable of including every form of life; but its Being and its modes are derived from elsewhere; that source is traced back to the Intellectual-Principle: it follows that the all-embracing archetype is in the Intellectual-Principle, which, therefore, must be an intellectual Kosmos, that indicated by Plato in the phrase "The living existent."

Noting.

5.9.12. It must be observed that the Ideas will be of universals; not of Socrates but of Man: though as to man we may enquire whether the individual may not also have place There. Under the heading of individuality there is to be considered the repetition of the same feature from man to man, the simian type, for example, and the aquiline: the aquiline and the simian must be taken to be differences in the Idea of Man as there are different types of the animal: but Matter also has its effect in bringing about the degree of aquilinity. Similarly with difference of complexion, determined partly by the Reason-Principle, partly by Matter and by diversity of place.

Connecting to next.

5.9.13. It remains to decide whether only what is known in sense exists There or whether, on the contrary, as Absolute-Man differs from individual man, so there is in the Supreme an Absolute-Soul differing from Soul and an Absolute-Intellect differing from Intellectual-Principle.

So weird that I noted this as interesting, but it's literally what I've been thinking about all day as I come to it now during the proper analysis. I'll explain it how I see it, as relating to Kami. There is the archetype of the human, the absolute perfect human, the idea of the human which exists in the Nous. We become imperfect variation of that. But the question here is whether we have our own individual absolute souls per each of us. In a Kami sense, we would, and according to many other philosophies too (if anything, Neoplatonism's ideas would be the odd one out). I believe it to be the case if I believe anything whatsoever, even if I am unsure quite how this type of delegation works in the overall Nous set out in this book.

5.9.13. Every soul, authentically a soul, has some form of rightness and moral wisdom; in the souls within ourselves there is true knowing: and these attributes are no images or copies from the Supreme, as in the sense-world, but actually are those very originals in a mode peculiar to this sphere. For those Beings are not set apart in some defined place; wherever there is a soul that has risen from body, there too these are: the world of sense is one—where, the Intellectual Kosmos is everywhere. Whatever the freed soul attains to here, that it is There.

We have the original source in us, even if we are images. I like.

5.9.14. But on the question as to whether the repulsive and the products of putridity have also their Idea—whether there is an Idea of filth and mud—it is to be observed that all that the Intellectual-Principle derived from The First is of the noblest; in those Ideas the base is not included: these repulsive things point not to the Intellectual-Principle but to the Soul which, drawing upon the Intellectual-Principle, takes from Matter certain other things, and among them these.

Dealing with why ugly things appear, what relation they have to the source. Not sure I understand or agree, but I guess it's saying ugly things are drawing from the material direction rather than the nous direction?

The Sixth Ennead.

As if the journey hadn't been difficult enough, they saved the longest for last. Here, Plotinus goes on about how to measure actual existence beyond the physical, especially in terms of Being and other factors that are not so easily defined (for example, justice).

Tractate 6.1. On the Kinds of Being (I)

The categories we use to define physical things do not apply to the higher reality within Nous. Largely using comparative points, he tries to define what substance is and what it actually means to "be". Part of his mission appears to be an attack on Aristotle four aspects by explaining how the abstract versions of qualities/states are not so easily categorised when speaking on the abstract Intellectual Realm.

There are three consecutive "On the Kinds of Being" chapters, and more than any, they felt like a philosopher lost in his own thoughts. They meant very little to me. Even if he could convicne me, other people may have different categorisations, and it's all valid and it's all unimportant. It's not why I read this book. Hence, despite extremely long chapters, I noted very little, although I do wonder how much of a role my fatigue was playing at this point.

6.1.6. Right and left, before and behind, would seem to belong less to the category of Relation than to that of Situation. Right means "situated at one point," left means "situated at another." But the right and left are in our conception, nothing of them in the things themselves.

Before and after are merely two times; the relation is again of our making.

This whole section (including 6.1.5 before) was fascinating, really putting into question how we define things in relation to other things and how that brings into question their existence.

6.1.7. Greatness and smallness both entail a presence—the presence of greatness and smallness respectively. When we come to greater and smaller, the participants in these relations are greater and smaller only when greatness and smallness are actually observed in them.

Before and after are merely two times; the relation is again of our making.

Exactly as before, it's how being is relative to other beings.

6.1.9. Doubleness, it is clear, is the cause of a thing being double, and from it is derived halfness.

Same as above. I find this stuff interesting.

6.1.13. With regard to Date:

6.1.13 —6.1.14 went over abstract ideas like date, location, action. It seemed a lot about language as it did quality. I got a little bored around this point.

6.1.19. Even writing, though taking place upon an external object, does not call for passivity, since no effect is produced, upon the tablet beyond the Act of the writer, nothing like pain; we may be told that the tablet has been inscribed, but this does not suffice for passivity.

Again, in the case of walking there is the earth trodden upon, but no one thinks of it as having experienced Passion [or suffering]. Treading on a living body, we think of suffering, because we reflect not upon the walking but upon the ensuing pain: otherwise we should think of suffering in the case of the tablet as well.

It is so in every case of Action: we cannot but think of it as knit into a unity with its opposite, Passion. Not that this later "Passion" is the opposite of Action in the way in which being burned is the opposite of burning: by Passion in this sense we mean the effect supervening upon the combined facts of the burning and the being burned, whether this effect be pain or some such process as withering.

Action does not necessarily produce an effect on something.

6.1.22. Does it follow that if a man as he walks produces footprints, he cannot be considered to have performed an action? Certainly as a result of his existing something distinct from himself has come into being. Yet perhaps we should regard both action and Act as merely accidental, because he did not aim at this result: it would be as we speak of Action even in things inanimate—"fire heats," "the drug worked."

A final note on many paragraphs about passivity and action (20-22?). I struggled to fit it into the bigger picture, but from what I gather, things happen and effect other things, even our souls because they are so intertwined with reality. But the further we move towards the Intellect-Realm or The One, the more we transcend all of this.

6.1.23. As for Possession, if the term is used comprehensively, why are not all its modes to be brought under one category? Possession, thus, would include the quantum as possessing magnitude, the quale as possessing colour; it would include fatherhood and the complementary relationships, since the father possesses the son and the son possesses the father: in short, it would include all belongings.

A paragraph about what possessing things means. Plotinus appears unsure that it even exists because it's so broad, and even more so, normally what we describe as possession is an action of taking and holding. All of this is about as interesting as it is not useful. Truly philosophy for philosophy's sake.

6.1.24. There remains Situation, which like Possession is confined to a few instances such as reclining and sitting.

Situation next. Again, Plotinus argues against them as actual qualities. They are either actions or positions relative to places (sitting, lying down, etc.). Cool.

6.1.26. Furthermore, God becomes a secondary to Matter, inasmuch as even he is regarded as a body composed of Matter and Form—though how he acquires the Form is not revealed. If however he be admitted to exist apart from Matter in virtue of his character as a principle and a rational law [logos], God will be bodiless, the Creative Power bodiless. If we are told that he is without Matter but is composite in essence by the fact of being a body, this amounts to introducing another Matter, the Matter of God.

Exactly.

6.1.29. Matter then is the sole Reality. But how do we come to know this? Certainly not from Matter itself. How, then? From Intellect? But Intellect is merely a state of Matter, and even the "state" is an empty qualification. We are left after all with Matter alone competent to make these assertions, to fathom these problems. And if its assertions were intelligent, we must wonder how it thinks and performs the functions of Soul without possessing either Intellect or Soul. If, then, it were to make foolish assertions, affirming itself to be what it is not and cannot be, to what should we ascribe this folly? Doubtless to Matter, if it was in truth Matter that spoke. But Matter does not speak; anyone who says that it does proclaims the predominance of Matter in himself; he may have a soul, but he is utterly devoid of Intellect, and lives in ignorance of himself and of the faculty alone capable of uttering the truth in these things.

Makes sense. If matter is all there is then that’s matter telling matter this. Your thoughts are matter thinking about itself. That’s untrustworthy.

Tractate 6.2. On the Kinds of Being (II)


The highest level of reality cannot be understood using the same physical categories. For example, Aristotle had 10 Categories within which everything would fall, which include Quantity, Quality, Relation, Place, and Time. Plotinus spends a lot of time analysing this, possible as useful in the physical, but not so much in the Nous.

Naturally, Plotinus is way more into Plato's "Greatest Kinds" which apply to the Nous. These are: Being, Life, Sameness, Difference, Motion, and Rest. You may thing, hang on, how can Motion and Rest coexist, but it's because he perfect Forms never need to change (such as 1+ + 1 =2) so they Rest, but Intellect is always alive and thinking in Motion. At the same time, Plotinus breaks the Nouse down into Being, Thought, Life, and Forms. These are distinct but not separate things, as they play together like a symphony. Physical objects are the result of these fundamental categories, not the foundation. If the physical world disappeared, these aspects would still persist.

This stuff does not interest me. It feels hypothetical and inconsequential to my path. That said, I do trust Plotinus. Even if his musings are a tad waffly, I appreciate how his method of simplification is generally simplified better than most.

6.2.4. In the case of body it was easy to concede unity-with-plurality; the one body is divisible to infinity; its colour is a different thing from its shape, since in fact they are separated. But if we take Soul, single, continuous, without extension, of the highest simplicity—as the first effort of the mind makes manifest—how can we expect to find multiplicity here too? We believed that the division of the living being into body and soul was final: body indeed was manifold, composite, diversified; but in soul we imagined we had found a simplex, and boldly made a halt, supposing that we had come to the limit of our course.

The complexity of material and simplicity of soul in its non-multiplicity.

6.2.8. Thus all the Existents are one, at once Motion and Stability; Motion and Stability are genera all-pervading, and every subsequent is a particular being, a particular stability and a particular motion.

We have caught the radiance of Being, and beheld it in its three manifestations: Being, revealed by the Being within ourselves; the Motion of Being, revealed by the motion within ourselves; and its Stability revealed by ours. We accommodate our being, motion, stability to those [of the Archetypal], unable however to draw any distinction but finding ourselves in the presence of entities inseparable and, as it were, interfused. We have, however, in a sense, set them a little apart, holding them down and viewing them in isolation; and thus we have observed Being, Stability, Motion—these three, of which each is a unity to itself; in so doing, have we not regarded them as being different from each other? By this posing of three entities, each a unity, we have, surely, found Being to contain Difference.

[...]

Thus, in addition to the other three [Being, Motion, Stability], we are obliged to posit the further two, Identity and Difference, so that we have in all five genera.

So is this it? The final grouping? Five kinds of Being, done?

6.2.11. When we predicate Being of a particular, do we thereby predicate of it unity, and does the degree of its unity tally with that of its being? Such correspondence is accidental: unity is not proportionate to Being; less unity need not mean less Being. An army or a choir has no less Being than a house, though less unity.

Makes sense.

6.2.15. How then do the four genera complete Substance without qualifying it or even particularizing it?

This full section is a good summary which affirms the five kinds of being: Being, Motion, Stability, Identity, and Difference. Stuff like Quantity and Quality are physical.

6.2.17. Why are not beauty, goodness and the virtues, together with knowledge and intelligence, included among the primary genera?

Meanwhile, stuff like Good is higher than Being, associated with The One. Part of me is like, cool. Another part is like, I'm unconvinced you know this and unsure it matters to my journey.

6.2.18. Knowledge again, is Motion originating in the self; it is the observation of Being—an Act, not a State: hence it too falls under Motion, or perhaps more suitably under Stability, or even under both; if under both, knowledge must be thought of as a complex, and if a complex, is posterior.

Knowledge as motion is a new idea but kinda makes sense.

6.2.21. Everything exists forever, unfailing, involved by very existence in eternity. Individuals have their separate entities, but are at one in the [total] unity. The complex, so to speak, of them all, thus combined, is Intellect; and Intellect, holding all existence within itself, is a complete living being, and the essential Idea of Living Being. In so far as Intellect submits to contemplation by its derivative, becoming an Intelligible, it gives that derivative the right also to be called "living being."

This stood out.

6.2.22. There is Intellect in our intellect also.

There's what in our what now?

Tractate 6.3. On the Kinds of Being (III)

On we go. Different levels of reality: the physical and the Nous, and therefore, different types of Being. The difference is that in the physical, things change and erode and die, whereas in the Nous, the Intellect remain perfect and incorruptible. A good example is Beauty, which lies in the code. A beautiful flower will wilt but the Beauty Form of a flower never changes.

This is the final part of the long argument about how reality cannot be understood by studying the physical. I was glad it was over, although I do wish I could see inside his mind. I’m sure that whatever he is trying to say here is profoundly life changing if it super clicks.
6.3.11. What is it, then, which makes a mountain small and a grain of millet large? Surely, in the first place, "small" is equivalent to "smaller." It is admitted that the term is applied only to things of the same kind, and from this admission we may infer that the mountain is "smaller" rather than "small," and that the grain of millet is not large in any absolute sense but large for a grain of millet. In other words, since the comparison is between things of the same kind, the natural predicate would be a comparative.

Again, why is not beauty classed as a relative? Beauty, unlike greatness, we regard as absolute and as a quality; "more beautiful" is the relative. Yet even the term "beautiful" may be attached to something which in a given relation may appear ugly: the beauty of man, for example, is ugliness when compared with that of the gods; "the most beautiful of monkeys," we may quote, "is ugly in comparison with any other type." Nonetheless, a thing is beautiful in itself; as related to something else it is either more or less beautiful.

Similarly, an object is great in itself, and its greatness is due, not to any external, but to its own participation in the Absolute Great.

Are we actually to eliminate the beautiful on the pretext that there is a more beautiful? No more then must we eliminate the great because of the greater: the greater can obviously have no existence whatever apart from the great, just as the more beautiful can have no existence without the beautiful.

Comparatives.

6.3.12. "Many," predicated of the inhabitants of a house, does duty for "more": "few" people are said to be in the theatre instead of "less."

Surprised this translates.

6.3.15. Consider: the visible Socrates is a man, yet we give the name of Socrates to that likeness of him in a portrait, which consists of mere colours, mere pigments: similarly, it is a Reason-Principle which constitutes Socrates, but we apply the name Socrates to the Socrates we see: in truth, however, the colours and shapes which make up the visible Socrates are but reproductions of those in the Reason-Principle, while this Reason-Principle itself bears a corresponding relation to the truest Reason-Principle of Man. But we need not elaborate this point.

I like this type of thought.

6.3.17. If we decide to refer all souls to the higher, we are still at liberty to perform for Sensible qualities a division founded upon the senses themselves—the eyes, the ears, touch, taste, smell; and if we are to look for further differences, colours may be subdivided according to varieties of vision, sounds according to varieties of hearing, and so with the other senses: sounds may also be classified qualitatively as sweet, harsh, soft.

Noting this whole paragraph as something worth understanding. Goes into qualities and the qualities of qualities especially in terms of physical vs soul.

6.3.18. But consider the sweet as beneficial, the bitter as injurious: then bitter and sweet are distinguished, not by Quality, but by Relation. We might also be disposed to identify the sweet with the thick, and the Pungent with the thin: "thick" however hardly reveals the essence but merely the cause of sweetness—an argument which applies equally to pungency.

We must therefore reflect whether it may be taken as an invariable rule that Quality is never a differentia of Quality, any more than Substance is a differentia of Substance, or Quantity of Quantity.

Surely, it may be interposed, five differs from three by two. No: it exceeds it by two; we do not say that it differs: how could it differ by a "two" in the "three"? We may add that neither can Motion differ from Motion by Motion. There is, in short, no parallel in any of the other genera.

Good stuff.

6.3.19. But how are we to classify such terms as "not white"? If "not white" signifies some other colour, it is a quality. But if it is merely a negation of an enumeration of things not white, it will be either a meaningless sound, or else a name or definition of something actual: if a sound, it is a kind of motion; if a name or definition, it is a relative, inasmuch as names and definitions are significant. But if not only the things enumerated are in some one genus, but also the propositions and terms in question must be each of them significative of some genus, then we shall assert that negative propositions and terms posit certain things within a restricted field and deny others. Perhaps, however, it would be better, in view of their composite nature, not to include the negations in the same genus as the affirmations.

Again, this is clearing some stuff up.

6.3.23. The Motion which acts upon Sensible objects enters from without, and so shakes, drives, rouses and thrusts its participants that they may neither rest nor preserve their identity—and all to the end that they may be caught into that restlessness, that flustering excitability which is but an image of Life.

[...]

Now, when the potentiality of Motion consists in an ability to walk, it may be imagined as thrusting a man forward and causing him to be continually adopting a different position; when it lies in the capacity to heat, it heats; when the potentiality takes hold of Matter and builds up the organism, we have growth; and when another potentiality demolishes the structure, the result is decay, that which has the potentiality of demolition experiencing the decay. Where the birth-giving principle is active, we find birth; where it is impotent and the power to destroy prevails, destruction takes place—not the destruction of what already exists, but that which intervenes upon the road to existence.

Health comes about in the same way—when the power which produces health is active and predominant; sickness is the result of the opposite power working in the opposite direction.

Thus, Motion is conditioned, not only by the objects in which it occurs, but also by its origins and its course, and it is a distinctive mark of Motion to be always qualified and to take its quality from the moved.

Something here was landing.

Tractate 6.4. On the Integral Omnipresence of the Authentic Existent (I)

This chapter was back on track! So while physical objects are divided into parts, the deeper realities like Soul or Intellect can be everywhere at once without division. THat's cool, but the big drop comes when Plotinus says that wherever the soul is present (for example, in your right now), it containts the entirey of the Universal Soul, not just a part of it. Whaaaat. It makes sense in a way though, like when the sun shines on this field or that field, they are not sepearating the warmth or stealing warmth from one another. Or if a song plays on the radio and a million people hear it, the sharing of that music does not split it apart. Or if you stand in front of 30 mirrors, you aren't divided 30 times, it's just 30 reflectons of the identical figure. It's a huge concept, bigger than we think, because it is said to have had a monumental impace on how later Christian, Jewish, and Islamic mystics discussed the omnipresence of God.

6.4.3. But are we to think of this Authentic Being as, itself, present, or does it remain detached, omnipresent in the sense only that powers from it enter everywhere?

Under the theory of presence by powers, souls are described as rays; the source remains self-locked and these are flung forth to impinge upon particular living things.

There's that ray thing again.

6.4.4. But how explain beings by the side of Being, and the variety of intelligences and of souls, when Being has the unity of omnipresent identity and not merely that of a species, and when intellect and soul are likewise numerically one? We certainly distinguish between the soul of the All and the particular souls.

The one universal Soul can contain many distinct souls without losing its unity. I honestly feel like we've covered that by now.

6.4.5. The nature of the greatness of soul is indicated by the fact that as the body grows, the larger mass is held by the same soul that sufficed to the smaller; it would be in many ways absurd to suppose a corresponding enlargement in the soul.

If you’re fatter, you do not have a bigger soul. Sorry.

6.4.9. If in such a partition of the unity, that which entered into each participant were an entire—always identical with the first—then, in the progressive severance, the firsts would become numerous, each particular becoming a first: and then what prevents these many firsts from reconstituting the collective unity? Certainly not the bodies they have entered, for those firsts cannot be present in the material masses as their Forms if they are to remain identical with the First from which they come. On the other hand, taking the part conceived as present in the multiple to be simply a power [emanating from the First], at once such a part ceases to be the unity; we have then to ask how these powers come to be cut off, to have abandoned their origin; they certainly have not moved away with no purpose in their movement.

The way I see all of this is that we are inside the Greater Soul, so we are the separations, and within us there happens to be a piece of this Greater Soul, but it exists everywhere all of the time, so we are not taking from it, we are merely a part of it.

6.4.10. To begin with the image and archetype: If we are reminded of an artist's picture we observe that here the image was produced by the artist, not by his subject; even in the case of a self-portrait, the picture is no "image of archetype," since it is not produced by the painter's body, the original represented: the reproduction is due to the effective laying on of the colours.

Nor is there strictly any such making of image as we see in water or in mirrors or in a shadow; in these cases the original is the cause of the image which, at once, springs from it and cannot exist apart from it. Now, it is in this sense that we are to understand the weaker powers to be images of the Priors. As for the illustration from the fire and the warmed object, the warmth cannot be called an image of the fire unless we think of warmth as containing fire so that the two are separate things. Besides, the fire removed, the warmth does sooner or later disappear, leaving the object cold.

This kinda gets to me. I hate analogies. It’s the art of finding things in the world that agree with your opinion and using them as references even though they are completely different ideas. Who’s to say the soul is anything like these comparison points?

6.4.11. We can but see that presence is determined by the fitness of the participant so that, while Being is omnipresent to the realm of Being, never falling short of itself, yet only the competent possess themselves of that presence which depends not upon situation but upon adequacy; the transparent object and the opaque answer very differently to the light. These firsts, seconds, thirds, of participance are determined by rank, by power, not by place but by differentiation; and difference is no bar to coexistence, witness soul and Intellectual-Principle: similarly our own knowledge, the trivial next the gravest; one and the same object yields colour to our sight, fragrance to smell, to every sense a particular experience, all presented simultaneously.

Makes sense.

6.4.12. Think of a sound passing through the air and carrying a word; an ear within range catches and comprehends; and the sound and word will strike upon any other ear you may imagine within the intervening void, upon any that attends; from a great distance many eyes look to the one object and all take it fully; all this, because eye and ear exist. In the same way, what is apt for soul will possess itself of soul, while from the one identical presence another will derive something else.

Although, this is a good analogy. We can all hear the same sound at the same time, and the more people who hears it does not diminish its power. The soul is the same.

6.4.14. The one soul reaches to the individual but nonetheless contains all souls and all intelligences; this, because it is at once a unity and an infinity; it holds all its content as one yet with each item distinct, though not to the point of separation. Except by thus holding all its content as one-life entire, soul entire, all intelligence—it could not be infinite; since the individualities are not fenced off from each other, it remains still one thing. It was to hold life not single but infinite and yet one life, one in the sense not of an aggregate built up but of the retention of the unity in which all rose. Strictly, of course, it is a matter not of the rising of the individuals but of their being eternally what they are; in that order, as there is no beginning, so there is no apportioning except as an interpretation by the recipient. What is of that realm is the ancient and primal; the relation to it of the thing of process must be that of approach and apparent merging with always dependence.

The idea that our souls each contain everything because they are not separate souls is harder for me to just accept. But I am trying because I don't necessarily disagree and I definitely see the value.

6.4.15. The soul, sprung from the divine, lay self-enclosed at peace, true to its own quality; but its neighbour, in uproar through weakness, instable of its own nature and beaten upon from without, cries, at first to itself and afterwards upon the living total, spreading the disorder at large. Thus, at an assembly the Elders may sit in tranquil meditation, but an unruly populace, crying for food and casting up a host of grievances, will bring the whole gathering into ugly turmoil; when this sort of people hold their peace so that a word from a man of sense may reach them, some passable order is restored and the baser part ceases to prevail; otherwise the silence of the better allows the rabble to rule, the distracted assembly unable to take the word from above.

This is the evil of state and of council: and this is the evil of man; man includes an inner rabble—pleasures, desires, fears—and these become masters when the man, the manifold, gives them play.

But one that has reduced his rabble and gone back to the Man he was, lives to that and is that Man again, so that what he allows to the body is allowed as to something separate.

There is the man, too, that lives partly in the one allegiance and partly in the other; he is a blend of the good that is himself with the evil that is alien.

Great stuff. Is that last paragraph me?

6.4.16. The soul's evil will be this association, its good the release. Why? Because, even unmerged, a soul in any way to be described as attached to this universe is in some degree fallen from the All into a state of partition; essentially belonging to the All, it no longer directs its act Thither: thus, a man's knowledge is one whole, but he may guide himself by no more than some single item of it, where his good would lie in living not by some such fragment but by the total of his knowing.

That One Soul—member of the Intellectual kosmos and there merging what it has of partial into the total—has broken away, so to speak, from the All to the part and to that devotes itself becoming partial with it: thus fire that might consume everything may be set to ply its all-power upon some trifle. So long as the soul remains utterly unattached it is soul not singled out; when it has accepted separation—not that of place but that of act determining individualities—it is a part, no longer the soul entire, or at least not entire in the first sense; when, on the contrary, it exercises no such outward control it is perfectly the All-Soul, the partial in it latent.

As for the entry into the World of the Shades, if this means into the unseen, that is its release; if into some lower place, there is nothing strange in that, since even here the soul is taken to be where the body is, in place with the body.

This kinda contradicts everything. So our souls can be separated?

Tractate 6.5. On the Integral Omnipresence of the Authentic Existent (II)

The true Intellectual Reality (Nous) does not exist in a 3D space so it's not a slave to our finite physics. It can be everywhere at once without any division, stretching, or dilution. Therefore, every soul including yours, can access the whole Soul without any trouble.

6.5.3. The One, numerically identical, undistributed, an unbroken entire, yet stands remote from nothing that exists by its side; but it does not, for that, need to pour itself forth: there is no necessity either that certain portions of it enter into things or again that, while it remains self-abiding, something produced and projected from it enter at various points into that other order. Either would imply something of it remaining there while the emanant is elsewhere: thus separated from what has gone forth, it would experience local division. And would those emanants be, each in itself, whole or part? If part, the One has lost its nature, that of an entire, as we have already indicated; if whole, then either the whole is broken up to coincide point for point with that in which it is become present or we are admitting that an unbroken identity can be omnipresent.

A good summary of where we are up to.

6.5.4. Then consider this god [in man] whom we cannot think to be absent at some point and present at another. All that have insight into the nature of the divine beings hold the omnipresence of this god and of all the gods, and reason assures us that so it must be.

Now all-pervasion is inconsistent with partition; that would mean no longer the god throughout but part of the god at one point and part at another; the god ceases to be one god, just as a mass cut up ceases to be a mass, the parts no longer giving the first total. Further, the god becomes corporeal.

If all this is impossible, the disputed doctrine presents itself again; holding the god to pervade the Being of man, we hold the omnipresence of an integral identity.

Again, if we think of the divine nature as infinite—and certainly it is confined by no bounds—this must mean that it nowhere fails; its presence must reach to everything; at the point to which it does not reach, there it has failed; something exists in which it is not.

I am enjoying this but unsure how I feel. Could the soul be a separate thing actually? Our piece of god? Still connected but also somewhat delegated?

6.5.6. The Intellectual Beings, thus, are multiple and one; in virtue of their infinite nature their unity is a multiplicity, many in one and one over many, a unit-plurality. They act as entire upon entire; even upon the partial thing they act as entire; but there is the difference that at first the partial accepts this working only partially though the entire enters later. Thus, when Man enters into human form there exists a particular man who, however, is still Man. From the one thing Man—man in the Idea—material man has come to constitute many individual men: the one identical thing is present in multiplicity, in multi-impression, so to speak, from the one seal.

This does not mean that Man Absolute, or any Absolute, or the Universe in the sense of a Whole, is absorbed by multiplicity; on the contrary, the multiplicity is absorbed by the Absolute, or rather is bound up with it. There is a difference between the mode in which a colour may be absorbed by a substance entire and that in which the soul of the individual is identically present in every part of the body: it is in this latter mode that Being is omnipresent.

Back on the Idea (Hu)Man from which all humans manifest. My notes were hilarious around this time, I seemed quite confused. I'll keep those to myself.

6.5.7. To Real Being we go back, all that we have and are; to that we return as from that we came. Of what is There we have direct knowledge, not images or even impressions; and to know without image is to be; by our part in true knowledge we are those Beings; we do not need to bring them down into ourselves, for we are There among them. Since not only ourselves but all other things also are those Beings, we all are they; we are they while we are also one with all: therefore we and all things are one.

When we look outside of that on which we depend we ignore our unity; looking outward we see many faces; look inward and all is the one head. If man could but be turned about by his own motion or by the happy pull of Athene—he would see at once God and himself and the All. At first no doubt all will not be seen as one whole, but when we find no stop at which to declare a limit to our being we cease to rule ourselves out from the total of reality; we reach to the All as a unity—and this not by any stepping forward, but by the fact of being and abiding there where the All has its being.

This is the entire section and the whole thing is great. "If man could but be turned about by his own motion or by the happy pull of Athene—he would see at once God and himself and the All."

6.5.8. For my part I am satisfied that anyone considering the mode in which Matter participates in the Ideas will be ready enough to accept this tenet of omnipresence in identity, no longer rejecting it as incredible or even difficult. This because it seems reasonable and imperative to dismiss any notion of the Ideas lying apart with Matter illumined from them as from somewhere above—a meaningless conception, for what have distance and separation to do here?

Matter participates in the Nous rather than Nous being split into matter.

6.5.10. Similarly wisdom is entire to all; it is one thing; it is not distributed parcelwise; it cannot be fixed to place; it is not spread about like a colouring, for it is not corporeal; in any true participation in wisdom there must be one thing acting as unit upon unit. So must it be in our participation in the One; we shall not take our several portions of it, nor you some separate entire and I another. Think of what happens in Assemblies and all kinds of meetings; the road to sense is the road to unity; singly the members are far from wise; as they begin to grow together, each, in that true growth, generates wisdom while he recognizes it. There is nothing to prevent our intelligences meeting at one centre from their several positions; all one, they seem apart to us as when without looking we touch one object or sound one string with different fingers and think we feel several. Or take our souls in their possession of good; it is not one good for me and another for you; it is the same for both and not in the sense merely of distinct products of an identical source, the good somewhere above with something streaming from it into us; in any real receiving of good, giver is in contact with taker and gives not as to a recipient outside but to one in intimate contact.

A few things. Does this mean as an individual we can access the wisdom of the universe? Because I’ve said this. But the "Good for one is the Good for all" is inaccurate. Some people love noise metal. Some love anal. This type of objective good is the main thing I push against in Neoplatonism.

Tractate 6.6. On Numbers

Using numbers to represent principles of order that exist within the Nous and structure reality. Of course, The One is beyond numbers because numbers mean multiplicity. A lot of this chapter focuses on the number 10 (decad) which is my lucky numbers. I assume this ties into Pythagoreanism.

6.6.3. Yet the universe has at once extension and beauty?

Yes; because it has not been allowed to slip away into the limitless but is held fast by unity; and it has beauty in virtue of Beauty not of Magnitude; it needed Beauty to parry that magnitude; in the degree of its extension it was void of beauty and to that degree ugly. Thus extension serves as Matter to Beauty since what calls for its ordering is a multiplicity. The greater the expansion, the greater the disorder and ugliness.

I think I understand. It’s the patterns that keep the beauty in otherwise it’d lose itself to chaos?

6.6.4. Plato, where he says that men arrived at the conception of Number by way of the changes of day and night—thus making the concept depend upon variation among things—seems to hold that the things numerable precede and by their differences produce number: Number then would consist in a process within the human mind passing onwards from thing to thing; it results by the fact that the mind takes count, that is when the mind traverses things and reports their differences; observing pure identity unbroken by difference, it says One. But there is the passage where he tells us that the veritable Number has Being, is a Being; this is the opposed view that Number is no product of the reckoning mind but a reality in itself, the concept of which is reawakened in the mind by changes in things of sense.

Interesting that maths started with day and night. That makes total sense.

6.6.5. But how explain the dyad and triad? How comes the total to be unitary and any particular number to be brought under unity? The theory offers a multiplicity of units, and no number is reducible to unity but the simple "one." It might be suggested that a dyad is that thing—or rather what is observed upon that thing—which has two powers combined, a compound thing related to a unity: or numbers might be what the Pythagoreans seem to hold them in their symbolic system in which Justice, for example, is a Tetrad: but this is rather to add the number, a number of manifold unity like the decad, to the multiplicity of the thing which yet is one thing. Now it is not so that we treat the ten things; we bring them together and apply the figure ten to the several items. Or rather in that case we say ten, but when the several items form a unity we say decad. This would apply in the Intellectual as in the sensible.

Pythag name drop.

6.6.6. Justice therefore is not the thought of Justice but, as we may put it, a state of the Intellectual-Principle, or rather an activity of it—an appearance so lovely that neither evening nor dawn is so fair, nor anything else in all the realm of sense, an Intellectual manifestation self-rising, self-seen, or, rather, self-being.

More a comment on the whole section. Justice has been a weird one this whole book, really delved into it here. It's not that Justice is a concept we invented by thinking about it, we think about Justice because it already exiss in the Nous as a perfectly unified truth. And that in itself is why Justice is beautiful.

6.6.8. First, then, we take Being as first in order; then Intellectual-Principle; then the Living-Form considered as containing all things: Intellectual-Principle, as the Act of Real Being, is a second.

Thus it is clear that Number cannot be dependent upon the Living-Form since unity and duality existed before that; nor does it rise in the Intellectual-Principle since before that there existed Real Being which is both one and numerous.

Plotinus is wrestling from where Number comes from...

6.6.8. For the present we must take it that Being precedes Number, is its source. But if One means one being and the duality two beings, then unity precedes Being, and Number precedes the Beings.

...and concludes that Number begins at the precise moment of multiplicity, therefore when The One emenates beyond itself.

6.6.13. As regards the word "This," it is nat a bare word; it affirms an indicated existence without using the name, it tells of a certain presence, whether a substance or some other existent; any This must be significant; it is no attitude of the mind applying itself to a non-existent; the This shows a thing present, as much as if we used the strict name of the object.

That's cool!

6.6.14. If by division the one identical mass can become a duality without loss of quantity, clearly the unity it possessed and by this destructive division lost was something distinct. What may be alternatively present and absent to the same subject must be classed among Real-Beings, regardless of position; an accidental elsewhere, it must have reality in itself whether it be manifested in things of sense or in the Intellectual—an accidental in the Laters but self-existent in the higher, especially in the First in its aspect of Unity developing into Being. We may be told that Unity may lose that character without change in itself, becoming duality by association with something else; but this is not true; unity does not become two things; neither the added nor what takes the addition becomes two; each remains the one thing it was; the duality is predicable of the group only, the unity remaining unchanged in each of those unchanged constituents.

Two and the Dyad are not essentially relative: if the only condition to the construction of duality were meeting and association such a relation might perhaps constitute Twoness and Duality; but in fact we see Duality produced by the very opposite process, by the splitting apart of a unity. This shows that duality—or any other such numerical form—is no relation produced either by scission or association. If one configuration produces a certain thing it is impossible that the opposite should produce the same so that the thing may be identified with the relation.

Duality is said to be a real thing, not just a relationship between two things. Number has its own reality beyond just being a part of a split or a unification.

6.6.17. But what of the Infinite Number we hear of; does not all this reasoning set it under limit?

And rightly so if the thing is to be a number; limitlessness and number are in contradiction.

Funny, in a way.

Tractate 6.7. How the Multiplicity of the Ideal-Forms Came into Being; and on the Good

The One didn't build anything, it could not, for the moment it does anything, it is defined and multiplies, because it would be doing something which is two distinct things. Plotinus resolves this by saying its perfection overflows which becomes the Nous, in where the perfect forms exist. But the Nous never looks away from The One. It contemplates The One, which is impossible to contemplate, but in its attempts at articulating that, the Nous unfolds into the harmonious multiplicity of perfect forms.

It's all very clever, but is clever enough? Plotinus (and Plato) are great at reasoning and has clearly convinced himself (and others) but I am unsure. I love the concepts, they are profoundly forward-thinking (even by today's standards) but they are also massively bold statements with repercussions on godly levels. If we seek logic, so much of Neoplatonism is just taking Plotinus' word for it. On the other hand, however, I do acknowledge that these things cannot be explained, only experienced, and apparently Plotinus did experience some sort of union with The Nous (and even The One!) before. Perhaps he is just desperately trying to get us to understand what he knows as fact, and his approach of doing so with intellect is admirable.

I clearly take issues with it, especially with the objective Good, which I've already discussed. However, some of it lands hard. The Nous perceiving reality into existence is Observer Effect/quantum mechanics 101. Even if separating The One and The Nous was rubbish, this works. Furthermore, the evolution of my notes were interesting on the topic of Good/Less Good vs. Good/Evil. I was unconvinced before, but truly sold by the end. There is a default state, like healthy, and then there are states away from that, like less healthy, rather than an opposite normal state. Darkness is an absence of light. Cold is an absence of warmth. Something is taken away. It's a spectrum, not a world of opposites.

6.7.1. God, or some one of the gods, in sending the souls to their birth, placed eyes in the face to catch the light and allotted to each sense the appropriate organ, providing thus for the safety which comes by seeing and hearing in time and, seeking or avoiding under guidance of touch.

But what led to this provision?

It cannot be that other forms of being were produced first and that, these perishing in the absence of the senses, the maker at last supplied the means by which men and other living beings might avert disaster.

We may be told that it lay within the divine knowledge that animal life would be exposed to heat and cold and other such experiences incident to body and that in this knowledge he provided the senses and the organs apt to their activity in order that the living total might not fall an easy prey.

Now, either he gave these organs to souls already possessing the sensitive powers or he gave senses and organs alike.

But if the souls were given the powers as well as the organs, then, souls though they were, they had no sensation before that giving. If they possessed these powers from the moment of being souls and became souls in order to their entry into process, then it is of their very nature to belong to process, unnatural to them to be outside of process and within the Intellectual: they were made in the intent that they should belong to the alien and have their being amid evil; the divine provision would consist in holding them to their disaster; this is God's reasoned purpose, this the plan entire.

I think about this all the time. The order of creation. Were certain organs produced to perceive certain vibrations? What frequencies are we missing though?

6.7.4. But if reasoning soul is the man, why does it not constitute man upon its entry into some other animal form?

Good question. If The One is One so the soul stuff is identical, at what point does the code for the man come into play instead of another animal. He goes deeper into this idea from 6.7.5 —6.7.7, which is pretty typical in its "humans are superior" due to our self-awareness, moral judgement, intellect etc, which is used to suggest that the human organism is a stronger expression of the Nous.

6.7.11. It is with this in mind that Plato says there is soul in everything of this sphere. That soul is the cause of the fire of the sense-world; the cause of fire here is a certain Life of fiery character, the more authentic fire. That transcendent fire being more truly fire will be more veritably alive; the fire absolute possesses life. And the same principles apply to the other elements, water and air.

Everything is alive! (at least as a perfect form in the Nous)

6.7.12. To ask how those forms of life come to be There is simply asking how that heaven came to be; it is asking whence comes life, whence the All-Life, whence the All-Soul, whence collective Intellect: and the answer is that There no indigence or impotence can exist but all must be teeming, seething, with life. All flows, so to speak, from one fount not to be thought of as one breath or warmth but rather as one quality englobing and safeguarding all qualities—sweetness with fragrance, wine—quality and the savours of everything that may be tasted, all colours seen, everything known to touch, all that ear may hear, all melodies, every rhythm.

Everything exists as its perfect self in the upper realm before it manifests shittier here.

6.7.13. Beings could not exist save by the activity of Intellectual-Principle; wandering down every way it produces thing after thing, but wandering always within itself in such self-bound wandering as authentic Intellect may know; this wandering permitted to its nature is among real beings which keep pace with its movement; but it is always itself; this is a stationary wandering, a wandering within the Meadow of Truth from which it does not stray.

It holds and covers the universe which it has made the space, so to speak, of its movement, itself being also that universe which is space to it. And this Meadow of Truth is varied so that movement through it may be possible; suppose it not always and everywhere varied, the failing of diversity is a failure of movement; failure in movement would mean a failing of the Intellectual Act; halting, it has ceased to exercise its Intellectual Act; this ceasing, it ceases to be.

Out of nowhere he drops this Meadow of Truth concept, and never mentions it again. I dug around, it comes from Plato's Phaedrus. It's the Nous again, surprise.

6.7.17. But in what mode are these secondaries, and Intellectual-Principle itself, within the First? They are not in the Filling Principle; they are not in the filled since before that moment it did not contain them.

And then suddenly there's the Filling Principle. From what I gather, it is referring to the Good filling the Nous.

6.7.17. Giving need not comport possessing; in this order we are to think of a giver as a greater and of a gift as a lower; this is the meaning of origin among real Beings. First there must be an actualized thing; its laters must be potentially their own priors; a first must transcend its derivatives; the giver transcends the given, as a superior. If therefore there is a prior to actuality, that prior transcends Activity and so transcends Life. Our sphere containing life, there is a Giver of Life, a principle of greater good, of greater worth than Life; this possessed Life and had no need to look for it to any giver in possession of Life's variety.

[...]

Once more, how does the particular Intellect come to this differentiation?

It takes its characteristic difference by becoming entirely a unity within the collective whose totality could not be identical with any particular.

Thus the Life in the Supreme was the collectivity of power; the vision taking place There was the potentiality of all; Intellectual-Principle, thus arising, is manifested as this universe of Being. It stands over the Beings not as itself requiring base but that it may serve as base to the Form of the Firsts, the Formless Form. And it takes position towards the soul, becoming a light to the soul as itself finds its light in the First; whenever Intellectual-Principle becomes the determinant of soul it shapes it into Reasoning Soul, by communicating a trace of what itself has come to possess.

Thus Intellectual-Principle is a vestige of the Supreme; but since the vestige is a Form going out into extension, into plurality, that Prior, as the source of Form, must be itself without shape and Form: if the Prior were a Form, the Intellectual-Principle itself could be only a Reason-Principle. It was necessary that The First be utterly without multiplicity, for otherwise it must be again referred to a prior.

It’s really trying to explain how the formless unified as everything comes to manifest in different things. It seems that’s the whole point of Nous, as almost a reflection on The One? I am unsure I quite get how someone would explain or even know this stuff.

6.7.18. But The Good is without parts?

No doubt The Good is a unity; but here it has become particularized. The First Activity is good and anything determined in accord with it is good as also is any resultant. There is the good that is good by origin in The First, the good that is in an ordered system derived from that earlier, and the good that is in the actualization [in the thing participant]. Derived, then, not identical—like the speech and walk and other characteristics of one man, each playing its due part.

Everything comes from Good but some of it gets less good?

6.7.22. That light known, then indeed we are stirred towards those Beings in longing and rejoicing over the radiance about them, just as earthly love is not for the material form but for the Beauty manifested upon it. Every one of those Beings exists for itself but becomes an object of desire by the colour cast upon it from The Good, source of those graces and of the love they evoke. The soul taking that outflow from the divine is stirred; seized with a Bacchic passion, goaded by these goads, it becomes Love. Before that, even Intellectual-Principle with all its loveliness did not stir the soul; for that beauty is dead until it take the light of The Good, and the soul lies supine, cold to all, unquickened even to Intellectual-Principle there before it. But when there enters into it a glow from the divine, it gathers strength, awakens, spreads true wings, and however urged by its nearer environing, speeds its buoyant way elsewhere, to something greater to its memory: so long as there exists anything loftier than the near, its very nature bears it upwards, lifted by the giver of that love. Beyond Intellectual-Principle it passes but beyond The Good it cannot, for nothing stands above That. Let it remain in Intellectual-Principle and it sees the lovely and august, but it is not there possessed of all it sought; the face it sees is beautiful no doubt but not of power to hold its gaze because lacking in the radiant grace which is the bloom upon beauty.

This entire section is worth reading. Every paragraph is about love and beauty.

6.7.22. If we are asked how the evil thing can have tendency towards the good, we answer that we have not attributed tendency to Matter; our argument needed the hypothesis of sensation in Matter—in so far as possible consistently with retention of its character—and we asserted that the entry of Form, that dream of the Good, must raise it to a nobler order. If then Matter is Evil, there is no more to be said; if it is something else—a wrong thing, let us say—then in the hypothesis that its essence acquire sensation would not the appropriate upon the next or higher plane be its good, as in the other cases? But not what is evil in Matter would be the quester of good but that element in it [lowest Form] which in it is associated with evil.

Discussing Matter as evil.

6.7.31. But since Thence come the beauty and light in all, it is Thence that Intellectual-Principle took the brilliance of the Intellectual Energy which flashed Nature into being; Thence soul took power towards life, in virtue of that fuller life streaming into it. Intellectual-Principle was raised thus to that Supreme and remains with it, happy in that presence. Soul too, that soul which as possessing knowledge and vision was capable, clung to what it saw; and as its vision so its rapture; it saw and was stricken; but having in itself something of that principle it felt its kinship and was moved to longing like those stirred by the image of the beloved to desire of the veritable presence. Lovers here mould themselves to the beloved; they seek to increase their attraction of person and their likeness of mind; they are unwilling to fall short in moral quality or in other graces lest they be distasteful to those possessing such merit—and only among such can true love be. In the same way the soul loves the Supreme Good, from its very beginnings stirred by it to love. The soul which has never strayed from this love waits for no reminding from the beauty of our world: holding that love—perhaps unawares—it is ever in quest, and, in its longing to be borne Thither, passes over what is lovely here and with one glance at the beauty of the universe dismisses all; for it sees that all is put together of flesh and Matter, befouled by its housing, made fragmentary by corporal extension, not the Authentic Beauty which could never venture into the mud of body to be soiled, annulled.

An incredibly beautiful verse talking about Beauty.

6.7.33. Take an example from love: so long as the attention is upon the visible form, love has not entered: when from that outward form the lover elaborates within himself, in his own partless soul, an immaterial image, then it is that love is born, then the lover longs for the sight of the beloved to make that fading image live again. If he could but learn to look elsewhere, to the more nearly formless, his longing would be for that: his first experience was loving a great luminary by way of some thin gleam from it.

Shape is an impress from the unshaped; it is the unshaped that produces shape, not shape the unshaped; and Matter is needed for the producing; Matter, in the nature of things, is the furthest away, since of itself it has not even the lowest degree of shape. Thus lovableness does not belong to Matter but to that which draws upon Form: the Form upon Matter comes by way of soul; soul is more nearly Form and therefore more lovable; Intellectual-Principle, nearer still, is even more to be loved: by these steps we are led to know that the First Principle, principle of Beauty, must be formless.

Also worth noting.

6.7.40. In sum, this intellection of the Good is impossible: I do not mean that it is impossible to have intellection of the Good—we may admit the possibility but there can be no intellection by The Good itself, for this would be to include the inferior with the Good.

If intellection is the lower, then it will be bound up with Being; if intellection is the higher, its object is lower. Intellection, then, does not exist in the Good; as a lesser, taking its worth through that Good, it must stand apart from it, leaving the Good unsoiled by it as by all else. Immune from intellection the Good remains incontaminably what it is, not impeded by the presence of the intellectual act which would annul its purity and unity.

Feels like we're repeating ourselves, but The Good/One cannot think as that requires multiplicity. Therefore, Intellection/Nous is the first realm where thought is possible.

Tractate 6.8. On Free-Will and the Will of the One

The age old and unavoidable "free will" question. I don't believe in it, myself. Neoplatonism makes it even stickier with the concept of The One, because if everything comes from that, how could we have any choice anyway? Plotinus' solution is that the closer to The One we go, the more freedom we have. Material desires control. Emotions control. So when we can turn towards the pure Good and act from that nature, then we flow with perfection. All of which convicnes me that Neoplatonism is essentially hard determinist with added details.

6.8.1. To establish this will help to show whether we are to ascribe freedom to the gods and still more to God, or to refuse it, or again, while asserting it, to question still, in regard both to the higher and lower—the mode of its presence.

God and the gods are separate, another weapon against those who argue Zeus is the Greek God.

6.8.1. What then do we mean when we speak of freedom in ourselves and why do we question it?

My own reading is that, moving as we do amid adverse fortunes, compulsions, violent assaults of passion crushing the soul, feeling ourselves mastered by these experiences, playing slave to them, going where they lead, we have been brought by all this to doubt whether we are anything at all and dispose of ourselves in any particular.

Yes, I don’t believe in free will.

6.8.5. If freedom is to be allowed to soul in its Act, it certainly cannot be allowed in regard to issue, for we are not master of events: if in regard to fine conduct and all inspired by Intellectual-Principle, that may very well be freedom; but is the freedom ours?

Because there is war, we perform some brave feat; how is that our free act since had there been no war it could not have been performed? So in all cases of fine conduct; there is always some impinging event leading out our quality to show itself in this or that act. And suppose virtue itself given the choice whether to find occasion for its exercise—war evoking courage; wrong, so that it may establish justice and good order; poverty that it may show independence—or to remain inactive, everything going well, it would choose the peace of inaction, nothing calling for its intervention, just as a physician like Hippocrates would prefer no one to stand in need of his skill.

Again, pretty much saying we don’t have free will because we are not in control of the external.

6.8.6. Virtue and Intellectual-Principle are sovereign and must be held the sole foundation of our self-disposal and freedom; both then are free; Intellectual-Principle is self-confined: Virtue, in its government of the soul which it seeks to lift into goodness, would wish to be free; in so far as it does so it is free and confers freedom; but inevitably experiences and actions are forced upon it by its governance: these it has not planned for, yet when they do arise it will watch still for its sovereignty calling these also to judgement. Virtue does not follow upon occurrences as a saver of the emperilled; at its discretion it sacrifices a man; it may decree the jettison of life, means, children, country even; it looks to its own high aim and not to the safeguarding of anything lower. Thus our freedom of act, our self-disposal, must be referred not to the doing, not to the external thing done but to the inner activity, to the Intellection, to virtue's own vision.

Trying to understand this. I don't think there's free will in this, but rather a different sort of freedom by reaching our highest principles by prioritising virtue and striving for the Good. In some way, I think it's less action based, more observing based, in that if we move closer to the Nous/Intellect, then we can analyse the world from a more rational and harmonious manner. And if you refuse for the external world to shape you, then you're not existing in a state of reaction and there's the freedom. Nevertheless, it's still totally deterministic.

6.8.11. We begin by posing space, a place, a Chaos; into this existing container, real or fancied, we introduce God and proceed to enquire: we ask, for example, whence and how He comes to be there: we investigate the presence and quality of this new-comer projected into the midst of things here from some height or depth. But the difficulty disappears if we eliminate all space before we attempt to conceive God: He must not be set in anything either as enthroned in eternal immanence or as having made some entry into things: He is to be conceived as existing alone, in that existence which the necessity of discussion forces us to attribute to Him, with space and all the rest as later than Him—space latest of all. Thus we conceive as far as we may, the spaceless; we abolish the notion of any environment: we circumscribe Him within no limit; we attribute no extension to Him; He has no quality since no shape, even shape Intellectual; He holds no relationship but exists in and for Himself before anything is.

How can we think any longer of that "Thus He happened to be"? How make this one assertion of Him of whom all other assertion can be no more than negation? It is on the contrary nearer the truth to say "Thus He has happened not to be": that contains at least the utter denial of his happening.

God details. Male pronouns are funny, so the opposite of The One teachings. But I guess Plotinus actually separates the One and God, and furthermore, there is that hazy line of Greek gods to deal with.

6.8.12. Where we speak of self-mastery there is a certain duality, Act against essence; from the exercise of the Act arises the conception of the mastering principle—though one identical with the essence—hence arises the separate idea of mastery, and the being concerned is said to possess self-mastery. Where there is no such duality joining to unity but solely a unity pure—either because the Act is the whole being or because there is no Act at all—then we cannot strictly say that the being has this mastery of self.

Some practical advice at the end there.

6.8.13. It may be added that nothing else contains in its essence the principle of its own satisfaction; there will be inner discord: but this hypostasis of the Good must necessarily have self-option, the will towards the self; if it had not, it could not bring satisfaction to the beings whose contentment demands participation in it or imagination of it.

Kinda Buddhist? Life is suffering, in a way.

6.8.14. God is cause of Himself; for Himself and of Himself He is what He is, the first self, transcendently The Self.

Good line.

6.8.16. If God is nowhere, then not anywhere has He "happened to be"; as also everywhere, He is everywhere in entirety: at once, He is that everywhere and everywise: He is not in the everywhere but is the everywhere as well as the giver to the rest of things of their being in that everywhere. Holding the supreme place—or rather no holder but Himself the Supreme—all lies subject to Him; they have not brought Him to be but happen, all, to Him—or rather they stand there before Him looking upon Him, not He upon them. He is borne, so to speak, to the inmost of Himself in love of that pure radiance which He is, He Himself being that which He. loves. That is to say, as self-dwelling Act and Intellectual-Principle, the most to be loved, He has given Himself existence. Intellectual-Principle is the issue of Act: God therefore is issue of Act, but, since no other has generated Him, He is what He made Himself: He is not, therefore, "as He happened to be" but as He acted Himself into being.

Pantheistic if you wanna.

6.8.18. A circle related in its path to a centre must be admitted to owe its scope to that centre: it has something of the nature of that centre in that the radial lines converging on that one central point assimilate their impinging ends to that point of convergence and of departure, the dominant of radii and terminals: the terminals are of one nature with the centre, separate reproductions of it, since the centre is, in a certain sense, the total of terminals and radii impinging at every point upon it; these lines reveal the centre; they are the development of that undeveloped.

In the same way we are to take Intellectual-Principle and Being. This combined power springs from the Supreme, an outflow and as it were development from That and remaining dependent upon that Intellective nature, showing forth That which, in the purity of its oneness, is not Intellectual-Principle since it is no duality. No more than in the circle are the lines or circumference to be identified with that Centre which is the source of both: radii and circle are images given forth by indwelling power and, as products of a certain vigour in it, not cut off from it.

Interesting analogy.

6.8.19. Stirred to the Supreme by what has been told, a man must strive to possess it directly; then he too will see, though still unable to tell it as he would wish.

I like this, makes sense. You won’t ever be able to describe it. Spirituality is an experience. If you talk about it, you'll likely sound crazy to anyone who hasn't felt the same. But the point is that it exists because the first-hand reports are abundant across history up until right today.

6.8.21. When therefore you seek to state or to conceive Him, put all else aside; abstracting all, keep solely to Him; see that you add nothing; be sure that your theory of God does not lessen Him. Even you are able to take contact with Something in which there is no more than That Thing itself to affirm and know, Something which lies away above all and is—it alone—veritably free, subject not even to its own law, solely and essentially That One Thing, while all else is thing and something added.

More practical advice, which is what we need.

Tractate 6.9. One the Good, or the One

The perfect final topic: The One itself. If you had to summarise Neoplatonism in one sentence, it could be: everything comes from The One/Good and everything is trying to return to it. The ultimate (almost impossible) mission is to reunite with it. But you cannot reach it with thought, because a thinker is a thing thinking and a thinking about a thing, so in that multiplicity, The One cannot be. You can't even descrbie it because it doesn't even really exist in any way we can comprehend. Nevertheless, The One is God to me, and I love The One. What a great way to end. It hit hard.

6.9.1. It is in virtue of unity that beings are beings.

This is equally true of things whose existence is primal and of all that are in any degree to be numbered among beings. What could exist at all except as one thing? Deprived of unity, a thing ceases to be what it is called: no army unless as a unity: a chorus, a flock, must be one thing. Even house and ship demand unity, one house, one ship; unity gone, neither remains thus even continuous magnitudes could not exist without an inherent unity; break them apart and their very being is altered in the measure of the breach of unity.

Helping the concept along. Anything that loses unity loses its being.

6.9.2. In sum: The Unity cannot be the total of beings, for so its oneness is annulled; it cannot be the Intellectual-Principle, for so it would be that total which the Intellectual-Principle is; nor is it Being, for Being is the manifold of things.

I like in sums.

6.9.3. The soul or mind reaching towards the formless finds itself incompetent to grasp where nothing bounds it or to take impression where the impinging reality is diffuse; in sheer dread of holding to nothingness, it slips away. The state is painful; often it seeks relief by retreating from all this vagueness to the region of sense, there to rest as on solid ground, just as the sight distressed by the minute rests with pleasure on the bold.

Soul must see in its own way; this is by coalescence, unification; but in seeking thus to know the Unity it is prevented by that very unification from recognising that it has found; it cannot distinguish itself from the object of this intuition. Nonetheless, this is our one resource if our philosophy is to give us knowledge of The Unity.

We are in search of unity; we are to come to know the principle of all, the Good and First; therefore we may not stand away from the realm of Firsts and lie prostrate among the lasts: we must strike for those Firsts, rising from things of sense which are the lasts. Cleared of all evil in our intention towards The Good, we must ascend to the Principle within ourselves; from many, we must become one; only so do we attain to knowledge of that which is Principle and Unity. We shape ourselves into Intellectual-Principle; we make over our soul in trust to Intellectual-Principle and set it firmly in That; thus what That sees the soul will waken to see; it is through the Intellectual-Principle that we have this vision of The Unity; it must be our care to bring over nothing whatever from sense, to allow nothing even of soul to enter into Intellectual-Principle: with Intellect pure, and with the summit of Intellect, we are to see the All-Pure.

Powerful and practical!

6.9.3. Note, similarly, that, when we speak of this First as Cause, we are affirming something happening not to it but to us, the fact that we take from this Self-Enclosed: strictly we should put neither a This nor a That to it; we hover, as it were, about it, seeking the statement of an experience of our own, sometimes nearing this Reality, sometimes baffled by the enigma in which it dwells.

Cool.

6.9.4. The main part of the difficulty is that awareness of this Principle comes neither by knowing nor by the Intellection that discovers the Intellectual Beings but by a presence overpassing all knowledge. In knowing, soul or mind abandons its unity; it cannot remain a simplex: knowing is taking account of things; that accounting is multiple; the mind, thus plunging into number and multiplicity, departs from unity.

Our way then takes us beyond knowing; there may be no wandering from unity; knowing and knowable must all be left aside; every object of thought, even the highest, we must pass by, for all that is good is later than This and derives from This as from the sun all the light of the day.

"Not to be told; not to be written": in our writing and telling we are but urging towards it: out of discussion we call to vision: to those desiring to see, we point the path; our teaching is of the road and the travelling; the seeing must be the very act of one that has made this choice.

Wowowow, helps.

6.9.5. Thus we come to see Intellectual-Principle almost as an object of sense: the Intellectual Kosmos is perceptible as standing above soul, father to soul: we know Intellectual-Principle as the motionless, not subject to change, containing, we must think, all things; a multiple but at once indivisible and comporting difference. It is not discriminate as are the Reason-Principles, which can in fact be known one by one: yet its content is not a confusion; every item stands forth distinctly, just as in a science the entire content holds as an indivisible and yet each item is a self-standing verity.

Explaining Nous and the soul a bit.

6.9.6. Think of The One as Mind or as God, you think too meanly; use all the resources of understanding to conceive this Unity and, again, it is more authentically one than God, even though you reach for God's unity beyond the unity the most perfect you can conceive. For This is utterly a self-existent, with no concomitant whatever. This self-sufficing is the essence of its unity. Something there must be supremely adequate, autonomous, all-transcending, most utterly without need.

Here we read one of the biggest differences between me and Plotinus' perspective. Why are you putting limitations on God, bro?

6.9.6. To what could its Intellection be directed? To itself? But that would imply a previous ignorance; it would be dependent upon that Intellection in order to knowledge of itself; but it is the self-sufficing. Yet this absence of self-knowing does not comport ignorance; ignorance is of something outside—a knower ignorant of a knowable—but in the Solitary there is neither knowing nor anything unknown. Unity, self-present, it has no need of self-intellection: indeed this "self-presence" were better left out, the more surely to preserve the unity; we must eliminate all knowing and all association, all intellection whether internal or external. It is not to be though of as having but as being Intellection; Intellection does not itself perform the intellective act but is the cause of the act in something else, and cause is not to be identified with caused: most assuredly the cause of all is not a thing within that all.

Digging into the depths of The One here.

6.9.8. In our present state—part of our being weighed down by the body, as one might have the feet under water with all the rest untouched—we bear—ourselves aloft by that—intact part and, in that, hold through our own centre to the centre of all the centres, just as the centres of the great circles of a sphere coincide with that of the sphere to which all belong. Thus we are secure.

Seems like a workable thought.

6.9.8. Thus the Supreme as containing no otherness is ever present with us; we with it when we put otherness away. It is not that the Supreme reaches out to us seeking our communion: we reach towards the Supreme; it is we that become present. We are always before it: but we do not always look: thus a choir, singing set in due order about the conductor, may turn away from that centre to which all should attend: let it but face aright and it sings with beauty, present effectively. We are ever before the Supreme—cut off is utter dissolution; we can no longer be—but we do not always attend: when we look, our Term is attained; this is rest; this is the end of singing ill; effectively before Him, we lift a choral song full of God.

Beautiful.

6.9.9. That our good is There is shown by the very love inborn with the soul; hence the constant linking of the Love-God with the Psyches in story and picture; the soul, other than God but sprung of Him, must needs love. So long as it is There, it holds the heavenly love; here its love is the baser; There the soul is Aphrodite of the heavens; here, turned harlot, Aphrodite of the public ways: yet the soul is always an Aphrodite. This is the intention of the myth which tells of Aphrodite's birth and Eros born with her.

The soul in its nature loves God and longs to be at one with Him in the noble love of a daughter for a noble father; but coming to human birth and lured by the courtships of this sphere, she takes up with another love, a mortal, leaves her father and falls.

But one day coming to hate her shame, she puts away the evil of earth, once more seeks the father, and finds her peace.

Aphrodite and Eros myths.

6.9.9. Those to whom all this experience is strange may understand by way of our earthly longings and the joy we have in winning to what we most desire—remembering always that here what we love is perishable, hurtful, that our loving is of mimicries and turns awry because all was a mistake, our good was not here, this was not what we sought; There only is our veritable love and There we may hold it and be with it, possess it in its verity no longer submerged in alien flesh. Any that have seen know what I have in mind: the soul takes another life as it approaches God; thus restored it feels that the dispenser of true life is There to see, that now we have nothing to look for but, far otherwise, that we must put aside all else and rest in This alone, This become, This alone, all the earthly environment done away, in haste to be free, impatient of any bond holding us to the baser, so that with our being entire we may cling about This, no part in us remaining but through it we have touch with God.

Another gorgeous paragraph. Annoyingly, however, MacKenna chose to change one of the most famous lines in the book, which originally reads: “the flight of the alone to the Alone.”

6.9.10. In our self-seeing There, the self is seen as belonging to that order, or rather we are merged into that self in us which has the quality of that order. It is a knowing of the self restored to its purity. No doubt we should not speak of seeing; but we cannot help talking in dualities, seen and seer, instead of, boldly, the achievement of unity. In this seeing, we neither hold an object nor trace distinction; there is no two. The man is changed, no longer himself nor self-belonging; he is merged with the Supreme, sunken into it, one with it: centre coincides with centre, for on this higher plane things that touch at all are one; only in separation is there duality; by our holding away, the Supreme is set outside. This is why the vision baffles telling; we cannot detach the Supreme to state it; if we have seen something thus detached we have failed of the Supreme which is to be known only as one with ourselves.

Goals.

6.9.11. The man formed by this mingling with the Supreme must—if he only remember—carry its image impressed upon him: he is become the Unity, nothing within him or without inducing any diversity; no movement now, no passion, no outlooking desire, once this ascent is achieved; reasoning is in abeyance and all Intellection and even, to dare the word, the very self; caught away, filled with God, he has in perfect stillness attained isolation; all the being calmed, he turns neither to this side nor to that, not even inwards to himself; utterly resting he has become very rest. He belongs no longer to the order of the beautiful; he has risen beyond beauty; he has overpassed even the choir of the virtues; he is like one who, having penetrated the inner sanctuary, leaves the temple images behind him—though these become once more first objects of regard when he leaves the holies; for There his converse was not with image, not with trace, but with the very Truth in the view of which all the rest is but of secondary concern.

Woah.

6.9.11. This is the life of gods and of the godlike and blessed among men, liberation from the alien that besets us here, a life taking no pleasure in the things of earth, the passing of solitary to solitary.

The final line. I won't lie, after two years of reading this giant book, lugging it across countries, trying to get through it, I felt quite emotional to turn that last page. I hugged the book immediately following because it felt right. There is an Ideal Form of this book out there, after all. There's a kami in there.

Jesus Was a Shapeshifting Alien